State v. Allen (1988)

In doing so, the state court noted that the case was indistinguishable from State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176 , 367 S.E.2d 626, 630-31 (1988), which had held that such contrary opinions contained within the records and reports relied upon by an expert may be highlighted for the purpose of impeaching the expert.

State v. Allen, 322 N.C. at 184, 367 S.E. 2d at 630 ; State v. Wood, 306 N.C. at 516-17 , 294 S.E. 2d at 313 .

State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176, 189-90 , 367 S.E.2d 626, 633 (1988); State v. Phillips, 300 N.C. 678, 682 , 268 S.E.2d 452, 455 (1980).

See State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176, 185 , 367 S.E.2d 626, 631 (1988) (“The presumption in non-jury trials is that the court disregards incompetent evidence in making its decision.”).

See State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176, 185 , 367 S.E.2d 626, 631 (1988) (“The presumption in non-jury trials is that the court disregards incompetent evidence in making its decision.”).

See generally State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176, 185 , 367 S.E.2d 626, 631 (1988) (“The presumption in non-jury trials is that the court disregards incompetent evidence in making its decision.”).

See State v. Simpson, 341 N.C. 316, 354-55 , 462 S.E.2d 191, 213 (1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 1048 , 134 L.Ed.2d 194 (1996); State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176, 183 , 367 S.E.2d 626, 629-30 (1988).

"Regulation of the manner and the extent of inquiries on voir dire rests largely in the trial judge's discretion." State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176, 189 , 367 S.E.2d 626, 663 (1988) (emphasis added).

While a trial court generally has the discretion to regulate the “manner and the extent of inquiries [during] voir dire” by rejecting improper questions, State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176, 189 , 367 S.E.2d 626, 633 (1988), it exceeds the trial court’s discretion to entirely prevent a party from asking any questions at all about an appropriate subject that is relevant at trial.

“Arson is the willful and malicious burning of the dwelling house of another person.” State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176, 196 , 367 S.E.2d 626, 637 (1988).

A confession may be involuntary when “circumstances precluding understanding or the free exercise of will were present.” State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176, 186 , 367 S.E.2d 626, 631 (1988).

Our standard of review on appeal in such matters is abuse of discretion, and the trial court’s decision will be upheld unless defendant can show the ruling to be “so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” State v. Allen, 322 N.C: 176, 189, 367 S.E.2d 626, 633 (1988). *157 In State v. Coleman, 161 N.C.

“A trial court is not required to give requested instructions verbatim.” State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176, 197 , 367 S.E.2d 626, 637 (1988) (citation omitted).

Our standard of review on appeal is abuse of discretion, and the court’s decision will be upheld unless defendant can show the ruling to be “so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176, 189 , 367 S.E.2d 626, 633 (1988) (citing State v. Barts, 316 N.C. 666, 682 , 343 S.E.2d 828, 839 (1986)).

State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176, 189 , 367 S.E.2d 626, 633 (1988).

State v. Wood, 306 N.C. 510, 516-17 , 294 S.E.2d 310, 313 (1982); see also Jones, 322 N.C. at 412 , 368 S.E.2d at 847 ; State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176, 184 , 367 S.E.2d 626, 630 (1988).

This Court may reverse for abuse of discretion only upon a showing that the trial court’s ruling in regards to the examination of prospective jurors “was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176, 189 , 367 S.E.2d 626, 633 (1988).

The common law definition of arson is still in force in North Carolina, State v. Barnes, 333 N.C. 666, 677 , 430 S.E.2d 223, 229 (1993), and has been stated as “the willful and malicious burning of the dwelling house of another person.” State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176, 196 , 367 S.E.2d 626, 637 (1988).

As to the substance of the question, “this Court has consistently held that ‘an expert witness’ compensation is a permissible cross-examination subject to test partiality towards the party by whom the expert was called.’ ” State v. Brown, 335 N.C. 477, 493 , 439 S.E.2d 589, 636 (1994) (quoting State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176, 195 , 367 S.E.2d 626, 636 (1988)), quoted in State v. Lawrence, 352 N.C. 1, 22 , 530 S.E.2d 807, 821 (2000).

State v. Wood, 306 N.C. 510, 516-17 , 294 S.E.2d 310, 313 (1982); see also Jones, 322 N.C. at 412 , 368 S.E.2d at 847 ; State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176, 184 , 367 S.E.2d 626, 630 (1988).

He may argue to the jury the facts in evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom together with the relevant law so as to present his side of the case.’ ” State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176, 195 , 367 S.E.2d 626, 636 (1988) (quoting State v. Covington, 290 N.C. 313, 327-28 , 226 S.E.2d 629, 640 (1976)).

The trial court may be reversed for an abuse of discretion “only upon a showing that its ruling was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176, 189 , 367 S.E.2d 626, 633 (1988).

Further, “this Court has consistently held that ‘an expert witness’ compensation is a permissible cross-examination subject to test partiality towards the party by whom the expert was called.’ ” State v. Brown, 335 N.C. 477, 493 , 439 S.E.2d 589, 598-99 (1994) (quoting State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176, 195 , 367 S.E.2d 626, 636 (1988)); see also State v. Wilson, 335 N.C. 220, 226 , 436 S.E.2d 831, 835 (1993).

While these cases are instructive, they are not controlling because the challenged arguments here were during the guilt phase of defendant’s trial. “[T]his Court has consistently held that ‘an expert witness’ compensation is a permissible cross-examination subject to test partiality towards the party by whom the expert was called.’ ” State v. Brown, 335 N.C. 477, 493 , 439 S.E.2d 589, 598-99 (1994) (quoting State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176, 195 , 367 S.E.2d 626, 636 (1988)).

State v. Allred, 275 N.C. 554 , 169 S.E.2d 833 (1969). ‘Obviously, prospective jurors may be asked questions which will elicit information not, per se, a ground for challenge in order that the party, propounding the question, may exercise intelligently his or its peremptory challenges.’ [State v. Jarrette, 284 N.C. 625 , 202 S.E.2d 721 (1974)].” State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176, 190 , 367 S.E.2d 626, 633 (1988) (quoting State v. Young, 287 N.C. at 387 , 214 S.E.2d at 771 ); see …

Defendant appears to *493 agree that this Court has consistently held that “an expert witness’ compensation is a permissible cross-examination subject to test partiality towards the party by whom the expert was called.” State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176, 195 , 367 S.E.2d 626, 636 (1988); see also State v. Creech, 229 N.C. 662 , 51 S.E.2d 48 (1949).

App. P. 10(b)(2).” State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176, 199 , 367 S.E.2d 626, 638 (1988).

State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176, 184 , 367 S.E.2d 626, 630 (1988).

The common law definition of arson, which is in force in this State, is “the willful and malicious burning of the dwelling house of another person.” State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176, 196 , 367 S.E.2d 626, 636 (1988).

The common law definition of arson, in force in this state, is “ ‘the willful and malicious burning of the dwelling house of another person.’ ” State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176, 196 , 367 S.E.2d 626, 636 (1988) (quoting State v. Vickers, 306 N.C. 90, 100 , 291 S.E.2d 599, 606 (1982)).

Supp. 1990); State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176, 184 , 367 S.E.2d 626, 630-31 (1988); State v. Huffstetler, 312 N.C. 92, 107-08 , 322 *399 S.E.2d 110, 120 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1009 , 85 L.

“Even though unimpeached and uncontradicted,” expert testimony is not conclusive upon the trier “since the trier may apply his own experience or knowledge in determining how far to follow the expressed opinion.” Security-First Nat’l Bank of Los Angeles v. Lutz, 322 F. 2d 348, 355 (9th Cir. 1963); cf. State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176, 185 , 367 S.E. 2d 626, 631 (1988) (merely because one psychologist testified at hearing did not mean judge obligated to find his opinion dispositiv…

State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176, 196 , 367 S.E.2d 626, 637 (1988).

See Allen, 322 N.C. at 195 , 367 S.E.2d at 636 .

Compare State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176, 196 , 367 S.E. 2d 626, 637 (1987) (tenant could commit arson by burning own apartment only because entire building where others dwelled was threatened) with 5 Am.

See State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176 , 367 S.E.2d 626 ; State v. Perry, 316 N.C. 87 , 340 S.E.2d 450 .

Our Supreme Court "has consistently held that an expert witness' compensation is a permissible cross-examination subject to test partiality towards the party by whom the expert was called." State v. Cummings, 352 N.C. 600 , 620, 536 S.E.2d 36 , 51 (2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Brown, 335 N.C. 477 , 493, 439 S.E.2d 589 , 598-99 (1994) ; see also State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176 , 195, 367 S.E.2d 626 , 636 (1988) ; State v. Creech, 229 N.C. 662 …

See also State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176, 198-99 , 367 S.E.2d 626, 638 (1988) (“The trial court gave the pattern jury instruction in N.C.P.I. — Crim. 304.10 which informed the jury of the commitment hearing procedures in N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-1321 and -1322, pursuant to article 5 of chapter 122C.

See, e.g., State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176, 196 , 367 S.E.2d 626, 637 (1988).

See State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176 , 367 S.E.2d 626 (1988); State v. Phillips, 300 N.C. 678 , 268 S.E.2d 452 (1980).

See, e.g., State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176, 184 , 367 S.E. 2d 626, 630 (1988) (applying R.

See State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176 , 198–99 (1988) (“The trial court gave the pattern jury instruction in N.C.P.I. – Crim. 304.10 which informed the jury of the commitment hearing procedures in N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-1321 and -1322, pursuant to article 5 of chapter 122C.