State v. Prevatte (2002)

State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 448-49 (2002).

Gen.Stat. § 15A-2000(c)(2) (2003) (emphasis added), or whether the aggravating factors "outweigh[ed] any mitigating circumstance in a sufficiently substantial manner so as to call for the death penalty," see State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 486 (2002) (emphasis added), without assessing the evidence supporting the particular aggravating factors submitted. 36 Understanding that which the plurality does not, the judge who presided over Allen's sentencing instr…

Stat. § 15A- 2000(c)(2) (2003) (emphasis added), or whether the aggravating fac- tors "outweigh[ed] any mitigating circumstance in a sufficiently sub- stantial manner so as to call for the death penalty," see State v. Prevatte, 570 S.E.2d 440, 486 (N.C. 2002) (emphasis added), without assessing the evidence supporting the particular aggravating factors submitted.

See State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 236 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 472 (2002) (“Decisions concerning which defenses to pursue are matters of trial strategy and are not generally second-guessed by this Court.”), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 986 , 155 L.

State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 236 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 472 (2002).

The right to appointed counsel, however, does not include the “right to replace appointed counsel merely because the defendant is dissatisfied with the present attorney’s work or because of a disagreement over trial tactics.” State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 216 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 461 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 986 , 155 L.

State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. at 236 , 570 S.E.2d at 472 (“Decisions concerning which defenses to pursue are matters of trial strategy and are not generally second-guessed by this Court.”).

See State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 236 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 472 (2002) (“[M]atters of trial strategy . . . are not generally second-guessed by this Court.”).

Our Supreme Court has held that “[a]rguments that ask the jurors to place themselves in the victim’s shoes are improper.” State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 244 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 476 (2002) (citation omitted).

First, we note that we generally refrain from critiquing trial counsel's decision to pursue or not pursue a particular defense. *924 See State v. Prevatte , 356 N.C. 178 , 236, 570 S.E.2d 440 , 472 (2002) ("Decisions concerning which defenses to pursue are matters of trial strategy and are not generally second-guessed by this Court.").

“During closing arguments, attorneys are given wide latitude to pursue their case.” State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 237 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 472 (2002) (citing State v. Scott, 343 N.C. 313, 343 , 471 S.E.2d 605, 623 (1996)), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 986 , 155 L.

See Hutchins, 303 N.C. at 335 , 279 S.E.2d at 797 ; see also State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 216 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 461 (2002) (“An indigent defendant has no right to replace appointed counsel merely because the defendant is dissatisfied with the present attorney’s work or because of a disagreement over trial tactics.”), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 986 , 155 L.

See State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 216 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 461 (2002) ("When a defendant makes a motion for new counsel, if it appears the present attorney is reasonably competent and there is no conflict between attorney and client that renders the attorney incompetent, the motion for new counsel must be denied.") (citing State v. Anderson, 350 N.C. 152,167 , 513 S.E.2d 296, 305-06 (1999)), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 986 , 155 L.

State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 448-49 (2002).

See State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 236 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 472 (2002) (“decisions concerning which defenses to pursue are matters of trial strategy and are not generally second-guessed by this Court.”).

State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 253-54 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 482 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 986 , 155 L.

"During closing arguments, attorneys are given wide latitude to pursue their case." State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 237 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 473 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 986 , 123 S.Ct. 1800 , 155 L.Ed.2d 681 (2003) (citation omitted).

"The (e)(9) aggravating circumstance can be submitted when the killing is agonizing or dehumanizing to the victim; when the killing is conscienceless, pitiless, or unnecessarily torturous to the victim; or when the murder shows the defendant's mind was unusually depraved, beyond the depravity normally present in first-degree murder." State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 261 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 486 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 986 , 123 S.Ct. 1800 , 155 L.Ed.2d 681 (2003).

IV, § 18; State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 237 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 472 (2002) (“prosecutor has the duty to vigorously present the State’s case”), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 155 L.

App. 596 , 602 (2024) (alteration omitted) (citing State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 244 (2002)); see also State v. McCollum, 334 N.C. 208, 224 (1993) (“An argument asking the jurors to put themselves in place of the victims will not be condoned . . . .” (cleaned up)).

The Court reasoned: When a jury follows the trial court's instruction and restarts deliberations, as it is presumed to do, see State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 254 [] (2002), there is no longer a risk that the verdict will be rendered by thirteen people.

“Decisions concerning which defenses to pursue are matters of trial strategy and are not generally second-guessed by this Court.” State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 236 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 472 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 986 , 155 L.

App. at 149 , 726 S.E.2d at 189 ; State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 216 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 461 (2002).

When a jury follows the trial court’s instruction and restarts deliberations, as it is presumed to do, see State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 254 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 482 (2002), there is no longer a risk that the verdict will be rendered by thirteen people.

When a jury follows the trial court’s instruction and restarts deliberations, as it is presumed to do, see State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 254 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 482 (2002), there is no longer a risk that the verdict will be rendered by thirteen people.

Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that a jury “follow[s] a trial court’s instructions.” State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 254 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 482 (2002) (citation omitted).

State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 236 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 472 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 986 , 155 L.

See State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 254 (2002) (“Jurors are presumed to follow a trial court’s instructions.”), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 936 , 155 L.

ELDER 2022-NCSC-142 Opinion of the Court ¶ 35 According to well-established North Carolina law, since “kidnapping is a specific intent crime, the State must prove that the defendant unlawfully confined, restrained, or removed the person for one of the [ten] purposes set out in the statute.” State v. Moore, 315 N.C. 738, 743 (1986);8 accord State v. China, 370 N.C. 627, 633 (2018); State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 252 (2002).

ELDER 2022-NCSC-142 Opinion of the Court ¶ 35 According to well-established North Carolina law, since “kidnapping is a specific intent crime, the State must prove that the defendant unlawfully confined, restrained, or removed the person for one of the [ten] purposes set out in the statute.” State v. Moore, 315 N.C. 738, 743 (1986);8 accord State v. China, 370 N.C. 627, 633 (2018); State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 252 (2002).

Decisions concerning trial strategy “are not generally second-guessed by this Court.” State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 236 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 472 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 986 (2003) (citation omitted). ¶ 106 Reading the majority opinion, defendant’s brief, and listening to defendant’s oral argument, one could easily conclude that defendant’s two attorneys were grossly incompetent and ill-equipped to handle a murder trial.

Decisions concerning trial strategy “are not generally second-guessed by this Court.” State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 236 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 472 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 986 (2003) (citation omitted). ¶ 106 Reading the majority opinion, defendant’s brief, and listening to defendant’s oral argument, one could easily conclude that defendant’s two attorneys were grossly incompetent and ill-equipped to handle a murder trial.

MCALLISTER ARROWOOD, J., dissenting “[M]atters of trial strategy . . . are not generally second-guessed by this Court.” State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 236 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 472 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 986 , 155 L.

“Decisions concerning which defenses to pursue are matters of trial strategy and are not generally second-guessed by this Court.” State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 236 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 472 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 986 , 155 L.

State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 236 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 472 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 986 , 123 S. Ct. 1800 , 155 L.

In considering the merits of ineffective assistance of counsel claims, “[decisions concerning which defenses to pursue are matters of trial strategy and are not generally second-guessed by this Corut.” State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 236 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 472 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 986 , 123 S. Ct. 1800 , 155 L.

“Decisions concerning which defenses to pursue ... are not generally second-guessed by [the appellate] Court.” State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 236 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 472 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 986 , 155 L.

The error must be “so basic, prejudicial, and lacking in its elements that justice was not done.” State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 258 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 484 (2002).

Defendant’s decision to testify, the defenses he asserted, and the manner in which he asserted them were matters of trial strategy, and “[decisions *429 concerning which defenses to pursue are matters of trial strategy and are not generally second-guessed by this Court.” State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 236 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 472 (2002).

State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 250 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 480 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 986 , 155 L.

State v. Baldwin, 330 N.C. 446, 457 , 412 S.E.2d 31, 38 (1992). 356 N.C. 178, 233 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 470 (2002) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 986 , 155 L.

Consequently, “ ‘[t]he [work-product] doctrine was designed to protect the mental processes of the attorney from outside interference and provide a privileged area in which he can analyze and prepare his client’s case.’ ” State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 218 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 462 (2002) (quoting State v. Hardy, 293 N.C. 105, 126 , 235 S.E.2d 828, 841 (1977)).

“Under plain error review, ‘reversal is justified when the claimed error is so basic, prejudicial, and lacking in its elements that justice was not done[,]’ ” State v. Miller, 357 N.C. 583, 592 , 588 S.E.2d 857, 864 (2003) (quoting State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 258 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 484 (2002)), and, “absent the [claimed] error, the jury probably would have reached a different result.” State v. Jones, 355 N.C. 117, 125 , 558 S.E.2d 97, 103 (2002).

Ed. 2d 819 (2004) (quoting State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 258 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 484 (2002), and, “absent the [claimed] error, the jury probably would have reached a different result.” State v. Jones, 355 N.C. 117, 125 , 558 S.E.2d 97, 103 (2002).

Further, in State v. Prevatte, we concluded that “if a prose *369 cutor’s comment on a defendant’s failure to testify was not extended or was a ‘slightly veiled, indirect comment on [a] defendant’s failure to testify,’ there was no prejudicial violation of the defendant’s rights.” 356 N.C. 178, 248 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 479 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 986 , 155 L.

Furthermore, in addressing whether trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective because a defense of insanity, rather than insanity *292 and diminished capacity, was pursued at trial, this Court has indicated that “[decisions concerning which defenses to pursue are matters of trial strategy and are not generally second-guessed by this Court.” State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 236 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 472 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 986 , 155 L.

State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 253-54 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 482 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 986 , 155 L.

Under plain error review, “reversal is justified when the claimed error is so basic, prejudicial, and lacking in its elements that justice was not done.” State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 258 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 484 (2002), cert. denied, -U.S.-, 155 L.

See Loaiza v. State, 186 Ga. App. 72, 74 , 366 S.E.2d 404, 406 (1988)(no reversible error where trial court sustained defendant’s objection to prosecutor’s use of this Burke quote in closing argument, but denied mistrial motion); Commonwealth v. Davis, 38 Mass.App.Ct. 932, 934 , 646 N.E.2d 1093, 1095 (1995)(prosecutor’s use of this Burke quote in closing argument, to which defendant objected, did not require reversal); People v. Williams, 453 N.W.2d 675 (Mich.1990)(prosecuto…

App. Proc. 28(a); State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 214 , 570 S.E.2d 440, 460 (2002).