Swain v. Tillett (1967)

Our Supreme Court has defined "keeper" as "one who, either with or without the owner's permission, undertakes to manage, control or care for the animal as owners in general are accustomed to do." Swain v. Tillett, 269 N.C. 46, 51 , 152 S.E.2d 297, 302 (1967) (emphasis added).

In order to recover at common law for injuries inflicted by a domestic animal, a plaintiff must show both “(1) that the animal was dangerous, vicious, mischievous, or ferocious, or one termed in law as possessing a vicious propensity; and (2) that the owner or keeper *629 knew or should have known of the animal’s vicious propensity, character, and habits.” Sellers v. Morris, 233 N.C. 560, 561 , 64 S.E.2d 662, 663 (1951). “ ‘The gravamen of the cause of action in this event i…

In such cases, “ ‘[t]he gravamen of the cause of action ... is not negligence, but rather the wrongful keeping of the animal with knowledge of its viciousness[.]’ ” Swain v. Tillett, 269 N.C. 46, 51 , 152 S.E.2d 297, 301 (1967) (quoting Barber v. Hochstrasser, 136 N.J.L. 76, 79 , 54 A.2d 458, 460 (1947)).

See Glave v. Michigan Terminix Co., 159 Mich.App. 537 , 407 N.W.2d 36, 37 (1987) (Under the doctrine of animals ferae naturae, where the defendants never tamed, confined or otherwise controlled the animals, but in fact encouraged their departure, the defendants were not the keepers of the animals.); Swain v. Tillett, 269 N.C. 46 , 152 S.E.2d 297, 301-302 (1967) (Under the doctrine of animals ferae naturae, a person is a keeper of an animal where the person "undertakes to man…

Swain v. Tillett, 269 N.C. 46, 51 , 152 S.E.2d 297, 301 (1967) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Swain v. Tillett, 269 N.C. 46, 51 , 152 S.E.2d 297, 301 (1967).

To recover for injuries inflicted by a domestic animal, a plaintiff must allege and prove: "(1) that the animal was dangerous, vicious, mischievous, or ferocious, or one termed in law as possessing a vicious propensity; and (2) that the owner or keeper knew or should have known of the animal's vicious propensity, character, and habits." Swain v. Tillett, 269 N.C. 46, 51 , 152 S.E.2d 297, 301 (1967) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

Livestock, Inc., 37 N.C.App. 704 , 247 S.E.2d 2, 5 (1978) (quoting Swain v. Tillett, 269 N.C. 46 , 152 S.E.2d 297, 302 (1967)), noted: The word “keep,” as applied to animals, has a peculiar significance.

In order to recover at common law for injuries inflicted by a domestic animal, a plaintiff must show “(1) that the animal was dangerous, vicious, mischievous, or ferocious, or one termed in law as possessing a vicious propensity; and (2) that the owner or keeper knew or should have known of the animal’s vicious propensity, character, and habits.” Sellers v. Morris, 233 N.C. 560, 561 , 64 S.E.2d 662, 663 (1951). “ ‘The gravamen of the cause of action in this event is not negl…

As said in the early and leading case of Oakes v. Spaulding, 40 Vt. 347, 353 (1867), the defendants “sustained the relation of joint ownership voluntarily, and they thereby became charged with the correlative duty, and such duty rested on each personally.” The joint ownership “inured to the benefit of both with reference to rights of property; it charged both with commensurate duties in reference to it as property.” Subsequent cases have imposed liability upon an owner who h…

In the trial of this action, it was proper, if not necessary, for plaintiffs to show that defendants’ dog was “dangerous, vicious, mischievous, or ferocious, or one termed in law as possessing a vicious propensity; . ... ” Swain v. Tillett, 269 N.C. 46, 51 , 152 S.E. 2d 297, 301 (1967), and cases therein cited.

App. 471, 474 , 572 S.E.2d 219, 222 (2002) (“[T]he gravamen of the cause of action is not negligence, but rather the wrongful keeping of the animal with knowledge of its viciousness.” (emphasis added) (alterations, citations, and quotation marks omitted)); see also Swain v. Tillet, 269 N.C. 46, 51 , 152 S.E.2d 297, 301 (1967) (“To recover for injuries inflicted by a domestic animal . . . plaintiff must allege and prove: (1) that the animal was dangerous, vicious, mischievous…

App. 471, 474 , 572 S.E.2d 219, 222 (2002) (“[T]he gravamen of the cause of action is not negligence, but rather the wrongful keeping of the animal with knowledge of its viciousness.” (emphasis added) (alterations, citations, and quotation marks omitted)); see also Swain v. Tillet, 269 N.C. 46, 51 , 152 S.E.2d 297, 301 (1967) (“To recover for injuries inflicted by a domestic animal . . . plaintiff must allege and prove: (1) that the animal was dangerous, vicious, mischievous…

See Swain v. Tillett, 269 N.C. 46 , 152 S.E.2d 297 (1967); Hunt v. Hunt, 86 N.C.

See Swain v. Tillett, 269 N.C. at 51 , 152 S.E.2d at 301 .

See e.g., Swain v. Tillett, 269 N.C. 46 , 152 S.E. 2d 297 (1967); Sink v. Moore and Hall v. Moore, supra; Hill v. Moseley, supra; Hallyburton v. Fair Association, 119 N.C. 526 , 26 S.E. 114 (1896); Pharo v. Pearson, 28 N.C.