Tompkins v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. (1953)

Co., 89 Ga.App. 171 , 79 S.E.2d 41, 47 (1953) (holding that if an easement for railroad purposes is conveyed, it does not allow for communications or power lines on the right-of-way because they exceed the scope of a railroad purpose); see also Haggart v. United States, 108 Fed.Cl. 70, 93 (Fed.Cl.2012) (finding that “recreational trail use is not a railroad purpose and thus exceeds the scope of the ... easements”).

Co. (1953) 89 Ga.App. 171, 176 [ 79 S.E.2d 41 ] ; see also East Alabama Ry.

Co., 89 Ga. App. 171, 176 ( 79 S. E. 2d 41 ), the Court of Appeals held that the easement here involved is “an easement known as a railroad right-of-way.” Such an easement can not be construed as limiting or restricting the use of the property for main-line purposes only.

Co., 89 Ga. App. 171, 178 ( 79 S. E. 2d 41 ).

See Tompkins, 89 Ga.App. at 177-78 , 79 S.E.2d at 45 (dismissing action against railroad where the railroad contracted with telephone company to allow telephone lines along its right of way and was compensated $500 per year as consideration for allowing the phone lines).