Stanfield v. Peregoy (1993)

Id. at 343-44 , 429 S.E.2d at 13 (citations omitted).

Cf. Stanfield v. Peregoy, 245 Va. 339, 344-45 , 429 S.E.2d 11, 14 (1993).

Common sense distinguishes the school bus driver in Linhart from the one driving an empty bus to the school, who was only “approaching the place where he would embark on his governmental duty of transporting children.” Stanfield v. Peregoy, 245 Va. 339, 345 (1993) (emphasis added) (discussing the holding in Wynn, 170 Va. at 590 ).

Common sense distinguishes the school bus driver in Linhart from the one driving an empty bus to the school, who was only “approaching the place where he would embark on his governmental duty of transporting children.” Stanfield v. Peregoy, 245 Va. 339, 345 (1993) (emphasis added) (discussing the holding in Wynn, 170 Va. at 590 ).

Rafter, 87 Va. Cir. at 276 (discussing several Supreme Court of Virginia cases endorsing this principle); see, e.g., Linhart v. Lawson, 261 Va. 30, 36 , 540 S.E.2d 875, 878 (2001) (holding that a school bus driver was entitled to sovereign immunity because “the transportation of children in a school bus is a governmental function in which the government has a substantial interest and over which the government exercises significant control . . . [and because] the act complain…

Elucidating this principle by way of example, the Supreme Court of Virginia has held the following to be governmental functions: emergency snow removal, see Stanfield v. Peregoy, 245 Va. 339, 340 , 429 S.E.2d 11, 11-12 (1993); Bialk v. City of Hampton, 242 Va. 56, 57 , 405 S.E.2d 619, 620-21 (1991), the exercise of police powers (such as abating a public nuisance), see Lee v. City of Norfolk, 281 Va. 423, 439 , 706 S.E.2d 330, 338 (2011); see also Edwards v. City of Portsmou…

Co. v. Hylton, 260 Va. 56, 63 , 530 S.E.2d 421, 424 (2000); Stanfield v. Peregoy, 245 Va. 339, 342 , 429 S.E.2d 11, 12 (1993).

Co. v. Hylton, 260 Va. 56, 63 , 530 S.E.2d 421, 424 (2000); Stanfield v. Peregoy, 245 Va. 339, 342 , 429 S.E.2d 11, 12 (1993).

Similarly, in Stanfield v. Peregoy, 245 Va. 339, 343 (1993), the Court found a snow plow driver who struck a bus while operating the snow plow was entitled to sovereign immunity because keeping city streets safe is a government function that rises above mere routine operation of the truck in routine traffic.

Stanfield v. Peregoy, 245 Va. 339, 344-45 (1993).

In Stanfield v. Peregoy, 245 Va. 339, 340 , 429 S.E.2d 11, 11-12 (1993), the plaintiffs allegedly were injured when a bus in which they were riding collided with a city-owned truck that was engaged in spreading salt during a snowstorm.

The Virginia Supreme Court has made a distinction between merely operating a governmental vehicle used for the governmental function of transporting children and “actually performing the governmental function while operating such a vehicle.” Stanfield v. Peregoy, 245 Va. 339, 345 , 429 S.E.2d 11, 14 (1993).

Manifestly, the operation of this vehicle involved special risks arising from the governmental activity and the exercise of judgment or discretion about the proper means of effectuating the governmental purpose of the defendant’s employer. 245 Va. at 343-44 (citations omitted).

Stanfield v. Peregoy, 245 Va. 339 , 429 S.E.2d 11, 12 (1993).

See Stanfield v. Peregoy, 245 Va. 339, 345 , 429 S.E.2d 11 (1993). 5 This reading is consistent with the LinhaH court’s determination that the bus driver, who was actively transporting children, was engaged in a discretionary, non-ministerial, governmental purpose and was therefore immune.

See, Stanfield v. Peregoy, 245 Va. 339, 345 , 429 S.E.2d 11, 14 (1993) (Snow plow and salt vehicle driver engaged in act of plowing entitled to immunity as court found sufficient judgment and discretion in act of “performing government function while operating vehicle” during collision).

See Stanfield, 245 Va. at 345 , 429 S.E.2d at 14 (noting that the school bus driver in Wynn claimed sovereign immunity merely because he was operating a school bus not because he was actually transporting children at the time of the accident).

See Stanfield v. Peregoy, 245 Va. 339 (1993) (holding a snow plow driver entitled to sovereign immunity when he was engaged in discretionary action at the time he ran the stop sign); Colby v. Boyden, 241 Va. 125 (1991) (holding a police officer was entitled to sovereign immunity when he collided with a vehicle in an intersection against a red light because he was engaged in a discretionary activity of pursuing a fleeing lawbreaker); National RR.