Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Commonwealth (1983)

Browning-Ferris v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 157, 161 , 300 S.E.2d 603, 605-06 (1983); Deal v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 618, 622 , 299 S.E.2d 346, 348 (1983); see Albemarle County v. Marshall, Clerk, 215 Va. 756, 762 , 214 S.E.2d 146, 150 (1975) (acquiescence for period of seven years).

Dist., 194 Cal.App.3d 243, 251 , 239 Cal.Rptr. 395 (1987) (“In the absence of controlling authority, [attorney general] opinions are persuasive since the legislature is presumed to be cognizant of that construction of the statute.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Virginia, 225 Va. 157 , 300 S.E.2d 603, 605-06 (1983) (“The legislature is presumed to have had knowledge of the Attorney General’s interpretation of the statutes,…

Gen. 78 (concluding that 1992 amendment to remove operation of mopeds from the prohibition of Code § 46.2-301, without a corresponding change in Code § 46.2-357, indicates General Assembly’s intent that Code § 46.2-357 continue to prohibit a person who has been adjudged a habitual offender from operating a moped); see also Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 157, 161-62 , 300 S.E.2d 603, 605-06 (1983) (“The legislature is presumed to have had knowledge of the Atto…

Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 157, 161-62, 300 S.E.2d 603, 605-06 (1983); Richard L.

Citing Browning-Ferris v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 157, 161-62 , 300 S.E.2d 603, 605-06 (1983), the Board argues that “[t]hese interpretations by the Attorney General should be given great weight because the legislature has done nothing to contradict them.” Even though such interpretations are entitled to due consideration, they are, of course, not binding on us.

This is especially so because the General Assembly is “presumed to have had knowledge of the Attorney General’s interpretation of the statutes, and its failure to make corrective amendments evinces legislative acquiescence in the Attorney General’s view.” Beck, 267 Va. at 492 (quoting Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 157, 161-62 (1983)).

The Court said that “[t]he legislature is presumed to have had knowledge of the Attorney General’s interpretation of the statutes, and its failure to make corrective amendments evinces legislative acquiescence in the Attorney General’s view.” Id. (quoting Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 157, 161-62 (1983)).

“The legislature is presumed to have had knowledge of the Attorney General’s interpretation of the statute[], and its failure to make corrective amendments evinces legislative acquiescence in the Attorney General’s view” when the opinion has been extant as long as this one, and is “particularly” to be afforded “due consideration.” Beck v. Shelton, 267 Va. 482, 492 (2004) (quoting Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 157, 161-62 (1983); Twietmeyer v. City of Hampton…

“The legislature is presumed to have had knowledge of the Attorney General’s interpretation of the statutes, and its failure to make corrective amendments evinces legislative acquiescence in the Attorney General’s view.” Id. (quoting Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 157, 161-62 (1983)).

The General Assembly’s “failure to make corrective amendments evinces legislative acquiescence in the Attorney General’s view.” Id. (quoting Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 157, 161-62 (1983)). 12 Thus, the owner of real estate subject to a notice under Code § 58.1-3965 has “the right to redeem such real estate prior to the date set for a judicial sale thereof by paying into court all taxes, penalties and interest due . . . together with all costs including co…

“The legislature is presumed to have had knowledge of the Attorney General’s interpretation of the statutes, and its failure to make corrective amendments evinces legislative acquiescence in the Attorney General’s view.” Beck, 267 Va. at 492 , 593 S.E.2d at 200 (quoting Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 157, 161 , 300 S.E.2d 603, 605-06 (1983)).

“The legislature is presumed to have had knowledge of the Attorney General’s interpretation of the statutes, and its failure to make corrective amendments evinces legislative acquiescence in the Attorney General’s view.” Browning—Ferris, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 157, 161-62 , 300 S.E.2d 603, 605-06 (1983).

“The legislature is presumed to have had knowledge of the Attorney General’s interpretation of the statutes, and its failure to make corrective amendments evinces legislative acquiescence in the Attorney General’s view.” Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 157, 161-62 , 300 S.E.2d 603, 605-06 (1983).

“The legislature is presumed to have had knowledge of the Attorney General’s interpretation of the statutes, and its failure to make corrective amendments evinces legislative acquiescence in the Attorney General’s view.” Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 157, 161-62 , 300 S.E.2d 603, 605-06 (1983).

“The legislature is presumed to have had knowledge of the Attorney General’s interpretation of the statutes, and its failure to make corrective amendments evinces legislative acquiescence in the Attorney General’s view.” Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 157, 161-62 , 300 S.E.2d 603, 605-06 (1983).

“The legislature is presumed to have had knowledge of the Attorney General’s interpretation of the statutes, and its failure to make corrective amendments evinces legislative acquiescence in the Attorney General’s view.” Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 157, 161-62 , 300 S.E.2d 603, 605-06 (1983).

“The legislature is presumed to have had knowledge of the Attorney General’s interpretation of the statutes, and its failure to make corrective amendments evinces legislative acquiescence in the Attorney General’s view.” Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 157, 161-62 , 300 S.E.2d 603, 605-06 (1983).

Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 157, 161-62 (1983) (quoting Deal v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 618, 622 [1983]).

“The legislature is presumed to have had knowledge of the Attorney General’s interpretation of the statutes, and its failure to make corrective amendments evinces legislative acquiescence in the Attorney General’s view.” Id. (quoting Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 157 , 300 S.E.2d 603, 605-06 (1983)). 7 Despite the plain language of § 56-49.01 and the Attorney General’s opinion, the Littles nevertheless maintain that the statute is unconstitutionally vague.

“The legislature is presumed to have had knowledge of the Attorney General’s interpretation of the statutes, and its failure to make corrective amendments evinces legislative acquiescence in the Attorney General’s view.” Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 157, 161-62 (1983).

(See Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 157, 161 (1983).) The Attorney General also noted that “A law enforcement agency or an agency providing services to the prosecution or police may have sufficient involvement in the prosecution of a criminal matter that it becomes, in effect, a party to the case.” 1991 Va. A.G.

“The legislature is presumed to have had knowledge of the Attorney General’s interpretation of the statutes, and its failure to make corrective amendments evinces legislative acquiescence in the Attorney General’s view.” Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 157, 161-62 , 300 S.E.2d 603, 605-06 (1983).

“This is particularly so when the General Assembly has known of the Attorney General’s Opinion, in this case for five years, and has done nothing to change it. ‘The legislature is presumed to have had knowledge of the Attorney General’s interpretation of the statutes, and its failure to make corrective amendments evinces legislative acquiescence in the Attorney General’s view’.” Beck v. Shelton, 267 Va. 482, 492 , 593 S.E.2d 195, 200 (2004) (citing Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. C…

“The legislature is presumed to have had knowledge of the Attorney General’s interpretation of the statutes, and its failure to make corrective amendments evinces legislative acquiescence in the Attorney General’s view.” Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 157, 161-62 , 300 S.E.2d 603, 605-06 (1983).

With respect to the opinions of the Attorney General, it is a matter of statutory construction in the Commonwealth that, “[t]he legislature is presumed to have had knowledge of the Attorney General’s interpretation of the statutes, and its failure to make corrective amendments evinces legislative acquiescence in the Attorney General’s view.” Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 157, 161, 162 (1983) (authorities omitted).

Therefore, “we conclude that the General Assembly approves [the relevant portion of] the Attorney General’s construction.” Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 157, 161 , *790 300 S.E.2d 603, 605 (1983).

Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 157, 161-62 , 300 S.E.2d 603, 605-06 (1983); Richard L.

Compare Beck v. Shelton, 267 Va. 482, 492 , 593 S.E.2d 195, 200 (2004)(when General Assembly was aware of interpretation of statute embodied in an Opinion of the Attorney General for five years and “fail[ed] to make corrective amendments” to statute during that time, such “failure . . . evinces legislative acquiescence in the Attorney General’s view”)(quoting Browning- Ferris, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 157, 161-62 , 300 S.E.2d 603, 605-06 (1983)).

See Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Commonwealth (1983), 225 Va. 157, 161 , 300 S.E.2d 603, 605 ("The critical factor in this operation is the service performed in collecting and disposing of the waste, not the ownership of the debris."); Northern Hills Sanitation, Inc. v. Cossart (1978), S.D., 264 N.W.2d 711, 713 ("As far as the wear and tear on our highways is concerned, it would seem to matter little whether a motor vehicle is carrying twenty tons of garbage or twenty tons of ca…

See, e.g., Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 157, 300 S.E.2d 603, 604-05 (1983) (holding that waste is property under the state's regulatory scheme); Northern Hills Sanitation, Inc. v. Cossart, 264 N.W.2d 711, 713 (S.D.1978) (same); Waste Control Sys., Inc. v. State, 114 N.H. 21 , 314 A.2d 659, 661-62 (1974) (deferring to the regulating agency's definition of property); Schlagel v. Hoelsken, 162 Colo. 142 , 425 P.2d 39, 42 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 827 , 88…

See Browning-Ferris v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 157, 161 (1983) (explaining that the “failure [of the General Assembly] to make corrective amendments evinces legislative acquiescence in the Attorney General’s view”).

See, e.g. , Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Commonwealth , 300 S.E.2d 603, 604-05 (Va. 1983) (holding that waste is property under the state's regulatory scheme); Northern Hills Sanitation, Inc. v. Cossart , 264 N.W.2d 711, 713 (S.D. 1978) (same); Waste Control Sys., Inc. v. State , 314 A.2d 659, 661-62 (N.H. 1974) (deferring to the regulating agency's definition of property); Schlagel v. Hoelsken , 425 P.2d 39, 42 (Colo. 1967), cert. denied , 389 U.S. 827 (1967) (holding that the …

See, Browning Ferris v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 157 (1983).

See Albemarle Co. v. Marshall, Clerk, 215 Va. 756, 762 (1975), Browning Ferris v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 157, 161 (1983), (citing Deal v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 618, 622 (1983)).