Mitchell v. Esparza (2003)

See also Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17 , 124 S.Ct. 7 , 157 L.Ed.2d 263 (2003) ("A federal court may not overrule a state court for simply holding a view different from its own, when the precedent from this Court is, at best, ambiguous."). 6 248 Our circuit has spent considerable time and effort trying to divine whether the jury was precluded from considering various mitigating evidence within the confines of the special issues.

See Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12 , 124 S.Ct. 7, 11 , 157 L.Ed.2d 263 (2003) (“A federal court may not overrule a state court for simply holding a view different from its own, when the precedent from [the Supreme] Court is, at best, ambiguous.”).

Cf. Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17 , 124 S.Ct. 7 , 157 L.Ed.2d 263 (2003) (“A federal court may not overrule a state court for simply holding a view different from its own, when the precedent from this Court is, at best, ambiguous.”).

E.g., Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12 , 124 S.Ct. 7, 12 , 157 L.Ed.2d 263 (2003) (“We may not grant respondent’s habeas petition, however, if the state court simply erred....”); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 , 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1175 , 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003) (“The gloss of clear error fails to give proper deference to state courts by conflating "error (even clear error) with unreasonableness.”); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 11 , 123 S.Ct. 362, 366 , 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002…

Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17 (2003) (“A federal court may not overrule a state court for simply holding a view different from its own, when the precedent from this Court is, at best, ambiguous.”). --12-- No. 05-1902 McCray v. Metrish II McCray also raises three claims regarding the admissibility of his confession.

See, e.g. , Mitchell v. Esparza , 540 U.S. 12 , 16, 124 S.Ct. 7 , 157 L.Ed.2d 263 (2003) ("[A] state court need not even be aware of our precedents, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The state courts, citing Arkansas law, “identified and applied the clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 , 124 S.Ct. 7 , 157 L.Ed.2d 263 (2003) (“[A] state court need not even be aware of our precedents, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.”) (internal quotation omitted).

“An error affects a defendant’s substantial rights if it is likely to have had any substantial effect on his conviction.” United States v. Whittington, 455 F.3d 736, 740 (6th Cir.2006) (citations omitted); see also Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17-18 , 124 S.Ct. 7 , 157 L.Ed.2d 263 (2003) (“An error is harmless ‘when it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’”).

In determining whether there is clearly established federal law, we are not limited by the actions of the state court. 5 See Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 455 , 125 S.Ct. 847 , 160 L.Ed.2d 881 (2005) (“Federal courts are not free to presume that a state court did not comply with constitutional dictates on the basis of nothing more than a lack of citation.”); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 , 124 S.Ct. 7 , 157 L.Ed.2d 263 (2003) (“[A] state court need not even be aware of …

See Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 , 124 S.Ct. 7 , 157 L.Ed.2d 263 (2003) (“[A] state court need not even be aware of [Supreme Court] precedents, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

See Mitchell, 540 U.S. at 17 (“As the Ohio Court of Appeals’ decision does not conflict with the reasoning or the holdings of our precedent, it is not ‘contrary to . . . clearly established Fed- eral law.’ ”) (emphasis added).

Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411 , 120 S.Ct. 1495 ; Mitchell v. Esparza, — U.S. —, —, 124 S.Ct. 7, 11 , 157 L.Ed.2d 263 (2003) (“unreasonable application” is an “objectively unreasonable” application of clearly established law as opposed to “incorrect”).

Cf. Mitchell v. Esparza, 124 S. Ct. 7, 11-12 (2003) (per curiam) (holding that state court’s determination that failure to charge aggravating factor for capital murder in indictment and to submit it to the jury was subject to harmless error review was not "contrary to," or "an unreasonable application of" its precedents governing harmless error review); id. at 11 ("We cannot say that because the violation occurred in the context of a capital sentencing proceeding that our pr…

“A constitutional error is harmless when it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17-18 (2003).

See, e.g., Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003) (“[A] state court need not even be aware of our precedents, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state‐ court decision contradicts them.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The state courts, citing Arkansas law, “identified and applied the clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003) (“[A] state court need not even be aware of our precedents, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.”) (internal quotation omitted).

See Mitchell v. Esparza, 124 S.Ct. 7, 11 (2003) ("A federal court may not overrule a state court for simply holding a view different from its own, when the precedent from [the Supreme] Court is, at best, ambiguous.").

Cf. Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17 (2003) (“A federal court may not overrule a state court for simply holding a view different from its own, when the precedent from this Court is, at best, ambiguous.”).

More, recently, in Esparza , the Supreme Court seemed to hold that, instead of independently applying Brecht , federal courts should apply the objective unreasonableness test to a state appellate court’s application of Chapman. 540 U.S. at -, 124 S.Ct. at 12 (“We may not grant respondent’s habeas petition, however, if the court simply erred in concluding that the State’s errors were harmless; rather, habeas relief is appropriate only if the [state court] applied harmless-err…

Prejudice “For constitutional errors, the Government must persuade us that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Hall, 56 M.J. 432, 436 (C.A.A.F.2002); see also Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17-18 , 124 S.Ct. 7 , 157 L.Ed.2d 263 (2003) (“A constitutional error is harmless when it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

See also Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17-18 , 124 S.Ct. 7, 12 , 157 L.Ed.2d 263 (2003) (“A constitutional error is harmless when it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

“A state court’s decision is ‘contrary to’ ... clearly established law if it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court cases]’ or if it >confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that] precedent.’” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (per curiam) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406 (2000)); see also Be…

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 , a district court “shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (a). “[I]n a § 2254 habeas corpus proceeding, a federal court’s review of alleged due process violations stemming from a state court conviction is narrow.” Anders…

A federal habeas court “may not overrule a state court for … holding a view different from its own” when the precedent from the Supreme Court “is, at best, ambiguous.” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17 (2003).

“A state court’s decision is ‘contrary to’ . . . clearly established law if it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court cases]’ or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [this] precedent.’” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003), quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 , 405–406 (2000). “[T]he ‘unreasonable a…

“A state court’s decision is ‘contrary to’ . . . clearly established law if it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court cases]’ or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [this] precedent.’” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003), quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000.) “[T]he ‘unreasonable app…

Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1155 (11th Cir. 2010); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003).

“A state court’s decision is ‘contrary to’ . . . clearly established law if it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court cases]’ or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [this] precedent.’” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003), quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). “[T]he ‘unreasonable app…

Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1155 (11th Cir. 2010); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003).

As to habeas relief under section 2254(d)(1), “[a] state court’s decision is contrary to . . . clearly established law if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a [Supreme Court] decision . . . and nevertheless arrives at a [different] result.” Cagle v. Norris, 474 F.3d 1090, 1095 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003)…

Rather, that 1 court for simply holding a view different from its own, when the precedent from [the Supreme 2 Court] is, at best, ambiguous.” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17 (2003). 3 When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has summarily 4 denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the 5 absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.

“A federal court may not overrule a state 11 court for simply holding a view different from its own, when the precedent from [the Supreme 12 Court] is, at best, ambiguous.” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17 (2003). 13 When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has summarily 14 denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the 15 absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to…

Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003).

“A state court’s decision is ‘contrary to’ . . . clearly established law if it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court cases]’ or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [this] precedent.’” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). “[T]he ‘unreasonable ap…

“A state court’s decision is ‘contrary to’ . . . clearly established law if it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court cases]’ or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [this] precedent.’” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 , 3 405-06 (2000)). “[T]he ‘unreasonable…

Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1155 (11th Cir. 2010); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003).

Brown, 544 U.S. at 141 ; Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (“A state court’s decision is ‘contrary to’ our clearly established law if it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases’ or it ‘confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from our precedent.’”).

Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1155 (11th Cir. 2010); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003).

The Supreme Court holds that [a] state court’s decision is “contrary to” . . . clearly established law if it “applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases” or if it “confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that] precedent.” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (per curiam) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 36…

Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003).

See Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 455 (2005) ("[F]ederal courts are not free to presume that a state court did not comply with constitutional dictates on the basis of nothing more than a lack of citation."); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003) ("[A] state court need not even be aware of our precedents, 'so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.'") (citation omitted).

See Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 455 (2005) ("[F]ederal courts are not free to presume that a state court did not comply with constitutional dictates on the basis of nothing more than a lack of citation."); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003) ("[A] state court need not even be aware of our precedents, 'so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.'") (citation omitted).

See Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 455 (2005) (“[F]ederal courts are not free to presume that a state court did not comply with constitutional dictates on the basis of nothing more than a lack of citation.”); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003) (“[A] state court need not even be aware of our precedents, ‘so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.’”) (citation omitted).

See Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 455 (2005) ("[F]ederal courts are not free to presume that a state court did not comply with constitutional dictates on the basis of nothing more than a lack of citation."); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003) ("[A] state court need not even be aware of our precedents, 'so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.'") (citation omitted).

See Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 455 (2005) ("[F]ederal courts are not free to presume that a state court did not comply with constitutional dictates on the basis of nothing more than a lack of citation."); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003) ("[A] state court need not even be aware of our precedents, 'so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.'") (citation omitted).

See Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 455 (2005) ("[F]ederal courts are not free to presume that a state court did not comply with constitutional dictates on the basis of nothing more than a lack of citation."); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003) ("[A] state court need not even be aware of our precedents, 'so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.'") (citation omitted).

See Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 455 (2005) ("[F]ederal courts are not free to presume that a state court did not comply with constitutional dictates on the basis of nothing more than a lack of citation."); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003) ("[A] state court need not even be aware of our precedents, 'so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.'") (citation omitted).

See Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 455 (2005) ("[F]ederal courts are not free to presume that a state court did not comply with constitutional dictates on the basis of nothing more than a lack of citation."); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003) ("[A] state court need not even be aware of our precedents, 'so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.'") (citation omitted).

If a state court has determined that a 14 Confrontation Clause error was harmless under the Chapman standard, then “a federal court may 15 not award habeas relief under § 2254 unless the harmlessness determination itself was 16 unreasonable.” See Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2197–98 (2015) (quoting Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112 , 119 17 (2007) ) (emphasis in original); see also Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18 (2003) (“[H]abeas 18 relief is appropriate only if the [state court] ap…

See Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18 (2003) ("We may not grant respondent's habeas petition, however, if the state court simply erred in concluding that the State's errors were harmless; rather, habeas relief is appropriate only if the [state court] applied harmless-error review in an 'objectively unreasonable' manner.") (citations omitted).