Devega v. State (2010)

See Devega, supra (“[E]ven if we assume that the warrantless arrest in this case was illegal . . . , suppression of the fruits of that arrest is not required because the arrest was made with sufficient probable cause and in an office, rather than in the sanctity of the home.”); Parker v. State, 326 Ga. App. 175 , 8 179 (3) ( 754 SE2d 409 ) (2014) (reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed a crime developed into probable cause to arrest when co-defendants positively i…

In Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 453 (4) (d) ( 689 SE2d 293 ) (2010), police investigators relied upon “ping” information to locate a cell phone through its GPS system.

Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 451 (4) (b) ( 689 SE2d 293 ) (2010).

Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 451 (4) (b) ( 689 SE2d 293 ) (2010).

Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 449 (3) ( 689 SE2d 293 ) (2010) (“By not raising [a] double-hearsay objection at the time the testimony was introduced, [the defendant] waived that objection”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Id. 25 Riley, 305 Ga at 169 (3). 26 Id. 27 Hughes v. State, 296 Ga. 744, 748 ( 770 SE2d 636 ) (2015) (punctuation omitted); see Bostic v. State, 332 Ga. App. 604, 606 ( 774 SE2d 175 ) (2015) (explaining that probable cause exists for an arrest where “the objective facts known to the officer establish a probability that the suspect has been engaged in illegal activity”); Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 451 (4) (b) ( 689 SE2d 293 ) (2010) 16 “more than a mere suspicion or possib…

See Hughes, 296 Ga. at 748 (2); Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 451 (4) (b) ( 689 SE2d 293 ) (2010).

See, e.g., Drake v. State, 296 Ga. 286, 289-290 (2) ( 766 SE2d 447 ) (2014) (under totality of circumstances, defendant was not under arrest when he gave voluntary statement to police); Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 454 (4) (e) ( 689 SE2d 293 ) (2010) (counsel not ineffective for failing to challenge defendant’s statement where no error in its admission). (b) Citing Riley v. California, ___ U. S. ___ ( 134 SCt 2473 , 189 LE2d 430) (2014), Davis argues that his trial counsel …

See, e.g., Drake v. State, 296 Ga. 286, 289-290 (2) ( 766 SE2d 447 ) (2014) (under totality of circumstances, defendant was not under arrest when he gave voluntary statement to police); Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 454 (4) (e) ( 689 SE2d 293 ) (2010) (counsel not ineffective for failing to challenge defendant’s statement where no error in its admission). (b) Citing Riley v. California, _ U. S. _ ( 134 SCt 2473 , 189 LE2d 430) (2014), Davis argues that his trial counsel was …

(Punctuation omitted.) Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 451 (4) (b) ( 689 SE2d 293 ) (2010).

To determine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to probable cause.6 4 (Punctuation omitted.) Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 451 (4) (b) ( 689 SE2d 293 ) (2010). 5 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Jackson v. State, 191 Ga. App. 439, 441 (2) ( 382 SE2d 177 ) (1989). 6 (Citati…

“This Court has consistently held that hearsay testimony by close, personal friends of the unavailable declarant is admissible under the necessity exception.” Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 449 (3) ( 689 SE2d 293 ) (2010) (Citation and punctuation omitted).

“This Court has consistently held that hearsay testimony by close, personal friends of the unavailable declarant is admissible under the necessity exception.” Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 449 (3) ( 689 SE2d 293 ) (2010) (Citation and punctuation omitted).

Taylor v. State, 298 Ga. App. 145, 148 ( 679 SE2d 371 ) (2009); Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 450 ( 689 SE2d 293 ) (2010). 6 2.

Taylor v. State, 298 Ga. App. 145, 148 ( 679 SE2d 371 ) (2009); Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 450 ( 689 SE2d 293 ) (2010). 2.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a criminal defendant “must prove both that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient and that there is a reasonable probability that the trial result would have been different if not for the deficient performance.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 450 (4) ( 689 SE2d 293 ) (2010).

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a criminal defendant “must prove both that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient and that there is a reasonable probability that the trial result would have been different if not for the 3 deficient performance.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 450 (4) ( 689 SE2d 293 ) (2010).

See, e.g., United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 777-78 (6th Cir.2012); United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 950-52 (6th Cir.2004), remanded on unrelated sentencing grcmnds by 543 U.S. 1100 , 125 S.Ct. 1050 , 160 L.Ed.2d 1001 (2005); United States v. Navas, 640 F.Supp.2d 256, 263-64 (S.D.N.Y.2009), rev’d, on other grounds, 597 F.3d 492 (2d Cir.2010); Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448 , 689 S.E.2d 293, 300-01 (2010).

See United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276, 281-285 (II) ( 103 SCt 1081 , 75 LE2d 55) (1983); Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 453-454 (4) (d) ( 689 SE2d 293 ) (2010).

Following the denial of their motion to suppress, the appellants were jointly tried and convicted by a jury, and this appeal followed the denial of their motions for new trial. (a) The first issue presented is whether the State’s actions regarding the GPS tracking device, i.e., attaching the GPS device to Jalim’s truck and then, for over two 6 See Dunivant v. State, 155 Ga. App. 884, 888 (1) ( 273 SE2d 621 ) (1980). 7 See United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276, 281-285 (II) …

Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 451 (4) (b) ( 689 SE2d 293 ) (2010).

“Justification of . . . [an inventory] search . . . is premised upon the validity of 14 Id. at (b) (2). 15 See Hodges v. State, 319 Ga. App. 657, 658 (2) (a) ( 738 SE2d 111 ) (2013) (“It is well settled that grounds which may be considered on appeal are limited to those which were raised at trial, and an objection on a specific ground at trial waives any objection to that evidence on other grounds on appeal”) (punctuation omitted). 16 Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 451 (4) (b…

“It is not enough to show merely that counsel unreasonably failed to inquire into his mental state — he must show a reasonable probability that such an evaluation would have affected the outcome at trial.” Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 450 (4) (a) ( 689 SE2d 293 ) (2010) (citations and punctuation omitted).

Assuming that the facts known to Tomlinson gave a basis for doing so and that his performance was deficient, “it is not enough to show merely that counsel unreasonably failed to inquire into [Woods’s] mental state — he must show a (reasonable probability) that such an evaluation would have affected the outcome at trial.” Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 450 (4) (a) ( 689 SE2d 293 ) (2010) (Citations and punctuation omitted.) No evidence was presented that Woods was incapable of…

See, e.g., Forest, 355 F.3d at 951-52 ; Devega v. State, 689 S.E.2d 293, 300 (Ga. 2010); Stone v. State, 941 A.2d 1238, 1251 (Md.Ct.App. 2008).

“Probable cause exists if the arresting officer has knowledge and reasonably trustworthy information about facts and circumstances sufficient for a prudent person to believe the accused has committed an offense.” Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 451 ( 689 SE2d 293 ) (2010) (quoting Brown v. State, 262 Ga. 728, 729 (2) ( 425 SE2d 856 ) (1993)).

See, e.g., United States v. Forest, 355 F. 3d 942, 950-52 (6th Cir.2004), remanded on unrelated sentencing grounds, 543 U.S. 1100 , 125 S.Ct. 1050 , 160 L.Ed. 2d 1001 (2005); Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448 , 689 S.E. 2d 293, 300-01 (2010); Stone v. State, 178 Md.App. 428 , 941 A. 2d 1238, 1249-50 (2008).

Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 450 (4) (a) (689 *799 SE2d 293) (2010).

Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 449 (3) ( 689 SE2d 293 ) (2010).

(Cit.)” (Cit.)’ [Cit.]” Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 450 (4) ( 689 SE2d 293 ) (2010).

J., and Johnson, J., concur. 1 The record shows that trial counsel did file a motion to suppress, albeit not on the ground urged here. 2 Bishop v. State, 299 Ga. App. 241 ( 682 SE2d 201 ) (2009). 3 Skinner v. State, 297 Ga. App. 828, 828-829 ( 678 SE2d 526 ) (2009). 4 Id. at 829 ; Bishop, supra. 5 Bishop, supra; Hammett v. State, 288 Ga. App. 255, 256-257 (2) ( 653 SE2d 852 ) (2007). 6 Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 451 (4) (b) ( 689 SE2d 293 ) (2010). 7 Harvey v. State, 266 …

J., and Phipps, P. J., concur. 1 Reid v. State, 286 Ga. 484, 485 (1) ( 690 SE2d 177 ) (2010). 2 Tucker v. State, 299 Ga. App. 278, 278-279 (1) ( 683 SE2d 356 ) (2009). 3 Id. at 279 (1). 4 Short v. State, 234 Ga. App. 633, 634 (1) ( 507 SE2d 514 ) (1998). 5 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 6 Stubbs v. State, 201 Ga. App. 546, 547 (1) ( 411 SE2d 525 ) (1991). 7 See Zackery v. State, 286 Ga. 399, 400 (1) ( 688 SE2d 354 ) (2010). 8 (Citation a…

She stated that she was there because she was wanted there.” The officer went on to explain that the victim told him Wood “implied that she had been invited.” But by not making a hearsay *53 objection at the time the testimony was introduced, Wood has waived this issue for purposes of appeal. 1 See Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 449 (3) ( 689 SE2d 293 ) (2010). 3.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 450 (4) (a) ( 689 SE2d 293 ) (2010).

NOTES [1] Viers was tried with his wife, Terena Viers, who was also charged. [2] OCGA § 16-6-22.2(b). [3] OCGA § 16-5-70(b). [4] 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). [5] (Punctuation omitted.) Barnes v. State, 299 Ga.App. 253 , 682 S.E.2d 359 (2009). [6] Dr. Aldridge testified that HV referred to Viers as her "da-da." [7] The State also charged Viers with two counts of aggravated child molestation, but the trial court directed a verdict as to those counts. […

Therefore, Allen “has failed to establish that there is a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been different had his trial counsel requested an evaluation[.]” Id.; see also Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 450 (4) (a) ( 689 SE2d 293 ) (2010); Cormier v. State, 277 Ga. 607, 608-609 (2) (a) ( 592 SE2d 841 ) (2004). (b) Allen next argues that trial counsel was ineffective in that he failed to secure a videography expert to testify at trial.

See Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 449 (3), 689 S.E.2d 293 (2010); Thomason v. State, 281 Ga. 429, 433 (12), 637 S.E.2d 639 (2006); Bell v. State, 278 Ga. 69, 72 (3), 597 S.E.2d 350 (2004); Demons v. State, supra at 727(4), 595 S.E.2d 76 .

See Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448 , 689 S.E.2d 293 (2010); Stone v. State, 178 Md.App. 428 , 941 A.2d 1238 (2008); Osburn v. State, 118 Nev. 323 , 44 P.3d 523 (2002); People v. Gant, 9 Misc.3d 611 , 802 N.Y.S.2d 839 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.2005); State v. Johnson, 190 Ohio App.3d 750 , 944 N.E.2d 270 (2010), appeal docketed, No. 2011-0033, 128 Ohio St.3d 1425 , 943 N.E.2d 572 (Ohio 2011); Foltz v. Commonwealth, 57 Va.App. 68 , 698 S.E.2d 281 (2010), aff'd en banc, 58 Va.App. 107 , 706 S…

See Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 450 (4) (a) ( 689 SE2d 293 ) (2010); Crapps v. State, 329 Ga. App. 820, 827-828 (3) (b) ( 766 SE2d 178 ) (2014).

See Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 451 ( 689 SE2d 293 ) (2010) (“Where probable cause exists, even an illegal, 5 “In addition to arguing that suppression was required by the Fourth Amendment, [Hinkson] also relies on OCGA § 17-4-20 and Article I, Section I, Paragraph XIII of the Georgia Constitution.” White v. State, 307 Ga. 601 , 602 n.2 ( 837 SE2d 838 ) (2020).

See Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448 (4) (a) ( 689 SE2d 293 ) (2010).

See also Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 451 (4) (b) ( 689 SE2d 293 ) (2010) (“Probable cause exists if the arresting officer has knowledge and reasonably trustworthy information about facts and circumstances sufficient for a prudent person to believe the accused has committed an offense.” (Citation and punctuation omitted)).

See also Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 451 (4) (b) ( 689 SE2d 293 ) (2010) (“Probable cause exists if the arresting officer has knowledge and reasonably trustworthy information about facts and circumstances sufficient for a prudent person to believe the accused has committed an offense.” (Citation and punctuation omitted)).

See Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448 (3) ( 689 SE2d 293 ) (2010); Allen, supra, 284 Ga. at 314 .

See Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448 (4) (e) ( 689 SE2d 293 ) (2010) (further questioning by officers does not violate suspect’s rights where suspect, after invoking his right to counsel, voluntarily reinitiates communications with police).

See Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448 (4) (f) ( 689 SE2d 293 ) (2010).

See generally Devega , supra (warrantless monitoring of defendant's cell phone location did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it revealed the same information that could be obtained through visual surveillance).