Leeth v. Commonwealth (1982)
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· 142 citation events
across 8 courts.
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Lee v. Commonwealth (1994)
“The test is less stringent than probable cause.” Leeth, 223 Va. at 340, 288 S.E.2d at 478 ; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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Baldwin v. Commonwealth (1992)
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); see Zimmerman v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 609, 611-12 , 363 S.E.2d 708, 709 (1988); Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340 , 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982).
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Ford v. Commonwealth (1998)
See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340 , 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982) (a stop requires a less stringent test than probable cause); DePriest, 4 Va.App. at 584 , 359 S.E.2d at 543 .
a stop requires a less stringent test than probable cause
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Welshman v. Commonwealth (1998)
Applying this standard, the Supreme Court of the United States and Virginia courts have repeatedly held that a constitutionally valid seizure less intrusive than an arrest requires either (1) reasonable, articulable suspicion that a crime is being or has been committed, see, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (explaining that an investigatory stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), “requ…
citing Brown, 443 U.S. at 51 , 99 S.Ct. 2637
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Commonwealth v. Knoppel (1993)
Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340 (1982), citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979).
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Hogan v. Commonwealth (1992)
See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340 , 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982).
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Brown v. Commonwealth (1992)
However, those articulable facts were, as required by the Virginia Supreme Court in Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340 , 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982), “particularized and objective.” In Williams, police had been informed that the defendant possessed contraband and was engaged in the distribution of that contraband.
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Jacques v. Commonwealth (1991)
In order to determine what cause is sufficient to authorize police to stop a person, cognizance must be taken of the “totality of the circumstances — the whole picture.” Assessing that whole picture, “the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340, 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982) (citations omitted).
citations omitted
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Lansdown v. Commonwealth (1983)
Hence, the defendant concludes, his detention was “unjustified and unlawful.” Missouri’s concessions, however, obviously were the result of an after-the-fact appraisal of the situation, and they neither lessen the fact that he did have ample cause to stop the van nor take away from his on-the-scene concern for his safety and his fear that the van’s occupants might have weapons “to make an assault on [him].” In determining whether to detain the defendant, Missouri was entitle…
“In order to determine what cause is sufficient to authorize police to stop a person, cognizance must be taken of the ‘totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.’” Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340 (1982) (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417 ).
quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417
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Kalen Terrell Reagins v. Commonwealth of Virginia (2023)
“In order to determine what cause is sufficient to authorize police to stop a person, cognizance must be taken of the ‘totality of the circumstances – the whole picture.’” Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340 (1982) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).
quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)
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Commonwealth of Virginia v. Maurice D. Gaskins (2011)
“In order to determine what cause is sufficient to authorize police to stop a person, cognizance must be taken of the ‘totality of the circumstances -- the whole picture.’” Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340 , 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982) (citing Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417 ).
citing Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417
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Williams v. WARDEN OF SUSSEX I STATE PRISON (2009)
Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340 , 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982), citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979).
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Marc Joseph Stout v. Commonwealth of Virginia (2009)
“In order to determine what cause is sufficient to authorize police to stop a person, cognizance must be taken of the ‘totality of the circumstances – the whole picture.’” Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340 , 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).
quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)
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Commonwealth of Virginia v. Jermaine Marvin Moody (2008)
Based on all these circumstances, the police had probable cause to believe that the weapon found on the wheel had previously been hidden in Moody’s waistband. 4 See e.g., Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 339 , 288 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1982) (finding an officer had probable cause to stop a driver for using a radar detector based on the driver’s actions even though the officer had not observed the radar detector).
finding an officer had probable cause to stop a driver for using a radar detector based on the driver’s actions even though the officer had not observed the radar detector
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Demetres Jerrod Rudolph v. Commonwealth of Virginia (2008)
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979); Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340 , 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982) (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981)); Giles v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 519, 523 , 529 S.E.2d 327, 329 (2000) (citing Jacques v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 591, 593 , 405 S.E.2d 630, 631 (1991)).
citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981)
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Commonwealth of Virginia v. Marquis D. Granger (2008)
“In order to determine what cause is sufficient to authorize police to stop a person, cognizance must be taken of the ‘totality of the circumstances – the whole picture.’” Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340 , 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982) (citing Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417 ).
citing Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417
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Commonwealth v. Ronald Lewis Scott Snyder (2007)
“In order to determine what cause is sufficient to authorize police to stop a person, cognizance must be taken of the ‘totality -7- of the circumstances -- the whole picture.’” Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340 , 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982) (citing Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417 ).
citing Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417
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Richard Calvert Croson v. Commonwealth (2007)
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). “[A] person may be detained briefly for questioning by an officer who has ‘“a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity.”’” Zimmerman v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 609, 611 , 363 S.E.2d 708, 709 (1988) (quoting Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340 , 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982) (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979))). “[W]hen a court reviews whether an officer …
quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979)
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Philip Nelson Crozier, s/k/a Phillip Nelson Crozier v. Commonwealth and City of Virginia Beach (2007)
“In order to determine what cause is sufficient to authorize police to stop a person, cognizance must be taken of the ‘totality of the circumstances – the whole picture.’” Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340 , 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982) (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417 ). -3- In Ewell v. Commonwealth, 254 Va. 214, 217 , 419 S.E.2d 721 , 723 (1997), the Virginia Supreme Court held that an off-duty police officer working as a security guard in an apartment complex was not …
quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417
In order to determine what cause is sufficient to authorize police to stop a person, cognizance must be taken of the “totality of the circumstances -- the whole picture.” Assessing that whole picture, “the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340 , 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981)).
quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981)
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Giles v. Commonwealth (2000)
In order to determine what cause is sufficient to authorize police to stop a person, cognizance must be taken of the “totality of the circumstances — the whole picture.” Assessing that whole picture, “the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” Jacques v. Commonwealth, 12 Va.App. 591, 593 , 405 S.E.2d 630, 631 (1991) (citing Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340 , 288 S.E.2d 475, …
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Shawn Aubrey Jones v. Commonwealth of Virginia (1998)
Id. at 247 , 462 S.E.2d at 112 (quoting Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340 , 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982) (emphasis added)).
emphasis added
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Parker v. Commonwealth (1998)
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981); see Ewell v. Commonwealth, 254 Va. 214, 217 , 491 S.E.2d 721, 722-23 (1997); Zimmerman v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 609, 612 , 363 S.E.2d 708, 709 (1988); Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340 , 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982).
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Ewell v. Commonwealth (1997)
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); *217 see Baldwin v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 191, 195 , 413 S.E.2d 645, 647 (1992); Zimmerman v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 609, 611-12 , 363 S.E.2d 708, 709 (1988); Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340 , 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982).
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Dwight Antoine Bushnell v. Commonwealth (1995)
The standard for reasonable suspicion "is less stringent than probable cause." Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340 , 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982).
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Barrett v. Commonwealth (1995)
We also noted that the detention would have been justified if the police officer had “a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity.” Id. at 611 , 363 S.E.2d at 709 (quoting Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340 , 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982) (emphasis added)).
emphasis added
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Freeman v. Commonwealth (1995)
A police officer may stop the driver or occupants of an automobile for investigatory purposes if the officer has “a reasonable articulable suspicion, based upon objective facts, *661 that the individual is involved in criminal activity.” Jacques v. Commonwealth, 12 Va.App. 591, 593 , 405 S.E.2d 630, 631 (1991) (quoting Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340 , 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982) (citations omitted)).
citations omitted
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Brown v. Commonwealth (1994)
While stopping a motor vehicle and detaining its occupants constitutes a seizure, “even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the [resulting] detention [is quite] brief,” Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340 , 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982), Trooper Gladden did not stop the vehicle occupied by Brown.
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Commonwealth v. Fullard (1994)
Goodwin v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 363, 366 , 398 S.E.2d 690, 692 (1990); Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340 , 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982).
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Barrett v. Commonwealth (1993)
An officer may conduct a valid automobile stop if he has “a reasonable [articulable] suspicion, based upon objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity.” Jacques v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 591, 593 , 405 S.E.2d 630, 631 (1991) (quoting Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340 , 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982) (citations omitted)); see Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31 .
citations omitted
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Phillips v. Commonwealth (1993)
Id. at 21-22 ; Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340 , 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982); Williams v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 53, 65, 354 S.E.2d 79, 85-86 (1987).
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Layne v. Commonwealth (1992)
For an investigative detention to be valid, “the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis [under the totality of the circumstances] for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340 , 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982).
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Goodwin v. Commonwealth (1990)
Since the record does not indicate otherwise, we assume the trial court also found there was a “stop” or “detention.” We must next decide whether the police had proper grounds for stopping Goodwin. 2 “In order to determine what cause is sufficient to authorize police to stop a person, cognizance must be taken of the ‘totality of the circumstances — the whole picture.’ Assessing that whole picture, ‘the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for sus…
quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981)
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Commonwealth v. Folley (1990)
The applicable standard to authorize a stop is that "the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity." Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340 , 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981)).
quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981)
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Taylor v. Commonwealth (1990)
Taylor first argues that the officers could not lawfully stop and detain him under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) because they lacked a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting [Taylor] of criminal activity.” Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340 , 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982) (citation omitted).
citation omitted
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Zimmerman v. Commonwealth (1988)
Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340 , 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982), citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979).
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Williams v. Commonwealth (1987)
“In order to determine what cause is sufficient to authorize police to stop a person, cognizance must be taken of the ‘totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.’ Assessing that whole picture, ‘the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.’ ” Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340 , 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982)(quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981)).
quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981)
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Lowe v. Commonwealth (1985)
Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340 , 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982), citing Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653 .
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Sattler v. Commonwealth (1995)
See Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340-41 , 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982) (holding that because the officer possessed probable cause, he could search the car for a radar detector).
holding that because the officer possessed probable cause, he could search the car for a radar detector
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Whitfield v. Commonwealth (2003)
Accord Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340 , 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982).
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Vesselin A. Panajotov v. Commonwealth of Virginia (2002)
See also Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 339 , 288 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1982).
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Amy Michelle Nelson v. Commonwealth (1997)
See Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340 , 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982).
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Mejia v. Commonwealth (1994)
See Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340 , 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982); Williams v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 53, 65 , 354 S.E.2d 79, 85-86 (1987). 1 In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the United States Supreme Court “held that whether the stop was justified is dependent upon whether ‘the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search [would] “warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief” that the action was appropriate.’” Quigley v. Common…
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Commonwealth v. Claytor (1991)
See, Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 339-40 , 288 S.E.2d 475 (1982); K.