Prine v. State (1999)

Although intent must be proved for a conviction in Georgia, a person can be convicted for a general intent offense without direct evidence of intent because "general intent may be inferred from the conduct of the accused.” Prine v. State, 237 Ga.App. 679 , 515 S.E.2d 425, 427 (1999); Cline v. State, 199 Ga.App. 532 , 405 S.E.2d 524, 525 (1991) (noting that criminal intent may be inferred from circumstances connected with the accused's crime); Council of Superior Court Judges…

See United States v. Delgado, supra (stating that the Eleventh Circuit court “look[s] to Beechum, the seminal case in any Eleventh Circuit 404 (b) analysis, and its progeny to discern whether the district judge abused his discretion in admitting . . . other crimes evidence.”). 25 See Prine, supra (“the ‘intent’ required is proved through proof of the commission of the act itself”); see generally Collins v. State, 177 Ga. App. 758, 759 (2) ( 341 SE2d 288 ) (1986). 11 mental s…

See Prine, supra (“the ‘intent’ required is proved through proof of the commission of the act itself”); see generally Collins v. State, 177 Ga. App. 758, 759 (2) ( 341 SE2d 288 ) (1986).

See also McElroy v. State, 244 Ga. App. 500, 503 (2) (b) ( 536 SE2d 188 ) (1999) (defendant must show purposeful discrimination to successfully challenge a jury array); Prine v. State, 237 Ga. App. 679, 680 (1) ( 515 SE2d 425 ) (1999) (“[I]t is the pool of jurors from which the jury sent to be voir dired is drawn that must be representative of the community, not the individual panel sent to a courtroom for voir dire purposes.”) (emphasis in original).

Frost contends that the evidence of intent or knowledge is not relevant because these issues are not elements of DUI less safe, which is a general intent crime, and that there is no requirement of “knowledge that one is driving while under the influence.” See Prine v. State, 237 Ga. App. 679, 680 (2) (a) ( 515 SE2d 425 ) (1999) (to establish DUI, the State must prove (1) driving; (2) after consuming alcohol; (3) to the degree one is less safe).

First, we note that “it is the pool of jurors from which the jury sent to be voir dired is drawn that must be representative of the community, not the individual panel sent to a courtroom for voir dire purposes.” Prim v. State, 237 Ga. App. 679, 680 (1) ( 515 SE2d 425 ) (1999). “[T]he jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably representative …

First, we note that “it is the pool of jurors from which the jury sent to be voir dired is drawn that must be representative of the community, not the individual panel sent to a courtroom for voir dire purposes.” Prine v. State, 237 Ga. App. 679, 680 (1) ( 515 SE2d 425 ) (1999). “[T]he jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably representative…

The trial court virtually admitted enhancing the sentence for that reason during sentencing.” prove malice”). 23 Adams, supra (finding that the prosecutor’s statements – “I suggest to you that everything Derrick Peters told you was credible” and that another witness “told you the truth” – were permissible as conclusions the prosecutor wished the jury to draw from evidence); see Carr, supra; McClain, supra. 24 Specifically, Coghlan cites language of the Sixth Amendment that “…

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Prine v. State, 237 Ga. App. 679, 681 ( 515 SE2d 425 ) (1999).

“DUI is a crime of general, not specific, intent. . . . [T]he intent required is proved through proof of the commission of the act itself.” (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Prine v. State, 237 Ga. App. 679, 680 (2) (a) ( 515 SE2d 425 ) (1999).

“DUI is a crime of general, not specific, *198 intent.” (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Prine v. State, 237 Ga. App. 679, 680 (2) (a) ( 515 SE2d 425 ) (1999).

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Prine v. State, 237 Ga. App. 679, 681 ( 515 SE2d 425 ) (1999).

Co., 190 Ga. App. 485 (1) ( 379 SE2d 188 ) (1989). 4 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Jefferson Pilot, supra at 387 (2). 5 OCGA § 16-2-1. 6 See American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (3rd ed. 1996), p. 441; Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 1993), p. 274. 7 American Family Life Assurance Co. v. Bilyeu, 921 F2d 87 (6th Cir. 1990). 8 Jefferson Pilot, supra at 388. 9 Head v. State, 246 Ga. 360, 362 (3) ( 271 SE2d 452 ) (1980). 10 Prine v. State…

Spivey v. State, 237 Ga. App. 626, 627 (1) ( 516 SE2d 332 ) (1999); Prine v. State, 237 Ga. App. 679, 680, n. 1 ( 515 SE2d 425 ) (1999).

See Prine v. State, 237 Ga. App. 679 (2) (a) ( 515 SE2d 425 ) (1999); OCGA §§ 40-6-391 (a) (1); 16-2-6.6 For DUI per se, which is also a general intent crime, intent may be inferred from showing the defendant drove with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.08 grams or more.

See Prine v. State, 237 Ga. App. 679 (2) (a) ( 515 SE2d 425 ) (1999); OCGA §§ 40-6-391 (a) (1); 16-2-6. 6 For DUI per se, which is also a general intent crime, intent may be inferred from showing the defendant drove with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.08 grams or more.

See Prine v. State, 237 Ga. App. 679, 680 (2) (a) ( 515 SE2d 425 ) (1999).

See Prine v. State, 237 Ga. App. 679, 680 (2) (a) ( 515 SE2d 425 ) (1999).

See generally Prine v. State, 237 Ga. App. 679, 680 (1), n. 1 ( 515 SE2d 425 ) (1999) (reiterating that the burden is on the appellant to show error by the record).