Department of Transportation v. Brown (1995)

Id. at 817.

Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 218 Ga. App. 178, 183-184 (6) ( 460 SE2d 812 ) (1995) (“Because a jury could find an individual liable as a joint tortfeasor, the state can be liable in the same manner.”)- Therefore, contrary to the State Defendants’ argument, the State employees’ negligence is not required to be independent of Elliott’s for the State employee’s negligence to result in a waiver of sovereign immunity. 5 I also cannot agree that the State employees had no duty to wa…

Although evidence of similar collisions has been admitted in the past to show the Georgia DOT's knowledge of the need for traffic control devices, see Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 218 Ga.App. 178, 183 (4), 460 S.E.2d 812 (1995), the decision to exclude evidence is reviewed for abuse of the trial court's discretion.

It is true that we have held that negligent-design claims must be supported by expert testimony or “other competent evidence.” See, e.g., Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 218 Ga. App. 178, 179 (1) ( 460 SE2d 812 ) (1995) (“The highway design exception to the Georgia Tort Claims Act requires that expert testimony or other competent evidence be submitted to show that the plan or design was not prepared in substantial compliance with generally accepted engineering or design standards…

All the Justices concur. 1 The jury acquitted Dunagan on charges of driving under the influence of alcohol and serious injury by vehicle based on driving under the influence of alcohol. 2 As already stated, the focus of this appeal is to consider whether evidence of design defects in the intersection was properly excluded; however, it should be noted that in a civil context, the Court of Appeals has recognized that “[ejvidence of other accidents or near accidents at the same…

In addition, both the county and the DOT have pending motions for summary udgment on the city’s cross-claims for indemnification. 5 Dept. of Transp. v. Cox, 246 Ga. App. 221, 222 ( 540 SE2d 218 ) (2000). 6 Murray v. Dept. of Transp., 240 Ga. App. 285 ( 523 SE2d 367 ) (1999). 7 Bd. of Regents &c. of Ga. v. Daniels, 264 Ga. 328, 329 ( 446 SE2d 735 ) (1994). 8 Dept. of Transp. v. Dupree, 256 Ga. App. 668, 671 (1) ( 570 SE2d 1 ) (2002). 9 Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 218 Ga. App. …

This exception “requires that expert testimony or other competent evidence be submitted to show that the plan or design was not prepared in substantial compliance with generally accepted engineering or design standards [in effect] at the time [the road was constructed].” Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 218 Ga. App. 178, 179 ( 460 SE2d 812 ) (1995), aff'd, 267 Ga. 6 ( 471 SE2d 849 ) (1996).

Council, 222 Ga. App. 400, 404 (3) ( 474 SE2d 220 ) (1996). 8 Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 218 Ga. App. 178, 183 (4) ( 460 SE2d 812 ) (1995). 9 Xiong v. Lankford, 226 Ga. App. 126, 128 (2) ( 485 SE2d 534 ) (1997). 10 Johnson v. Knebel, 267 Ga. 853, 855 (1) ( 485 SE2d 451 ) (1997). 11 In re Copelan, 250 Ga. App. 856, 866 ( 553 SE2d 278 ) (2001). 12 American Golf Corp. v. Manley, 222 Ga. App. 7 ( 473 SE2d 161 ) (1996). 13 Golden Peanut Co. v. Bass, 249 Ga. App. 224, 236 (2) ( 54…

(Citations omitted.) Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, supra, 218 Ga. App. at 178-179 (1).

Svcs., 271 Ga. 890 -891 ( 525 SE2d 83 ) (2000), citing OCGA § 50-21-23 (a). 7 218 Ga. App. 178, 183-184 (6) ( 460 SE2d 812 ) (1995). 8 220 Ga. App. 342, 345 (2) ( 469 SE2d 446 ) (1996). 9 OCGA § 51-12-32. 10 Id.; State Farm Fire &c.

The same grounds were raised by motions for directed verdict at trial, which were also denied. “ ‘After verdict and judgment, it is too late to review a judgment denying a summary judgment, for that judgment becomes moot when the court reviews the evidence upon the trial of the case.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Brown Realty Assoc. v. Thomas, 193 Ga. App. 847 (1) ( 389 SE2d 505 ) (1989).” Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 218 Ga. App. 178, 179 (1) ( 460 SE2d 812 ) (1995).

Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 218 Ga. App. 178, 180 (2) ( 460 SE2d 812 ) (1995).

See OCGA § 50-21-23 (a); Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 218 Ga. App. 178, 183-184 (6) ( 460 SE2d 812 ) (1995); Johnson v. Landing, 157 Ga. App. 313, 317 (2) ( 277 SE2d 307 ) (1981).

“The scope of the discretionary function exception urged by [the dissent], which would include any decision affected by ‘social, political, or economic factors,’ is so broad as to make the exception swallow the waiver.” Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 267 Ga. 6, 7 (1) ( 471 SE2d 849 ) (1996); accord Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 218 Ga. App. 178, 180-182 (2) ( 460 SE2d 812 ) (1995).

Compare Georgia Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 218 Ga.App. 178 , 460 S.E.2d 812 (1995), aff'd. 267 Ga. 6 , 471 S.E.2d 849 (1996).

See Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 218 Ga. App. 178, 179 (1) ( 460 SE2d 812 ) (1995).

See Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 218 Ga. App. 178 (1) ( 460 SE2d 812 ) (1995); Lynch v. Ga. Power Co., 185 Ga. App. 256 (1) ( 363 SE2d 777 ) (1987).

Compare Ga. Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 218 Ga. App. 178, 183 (4) ( 460 SE2d 812 ) (1995) (“Evidence of other accidents or near 5 accidents at the same intersection at other times under the same or similar circumstances are admissible to show the existence of a dangerous condition.” (citation omitted)).

See also Horton v. City of Atlanta, 159 Ga. App. 832, 834 ( 285 SE2d 210 ) (1981). 20 189 Ga. App. 687 ( 377 SE2d 504 ) (1988). 21 Id. at 687-688 (1). 22 171 Ga. App. 636 ( 320 SE2d 601 ) (1984). 23 Id. at 639 . 24 Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 218 Ga. App. 178 -179 (1) ( 460 SE2d 812 ) (1995), aff'd, 267 Ga. 6 ( 471 SE2d 849 ) (1996). 25 OCGA § 50-21-24 (8), (9). 26 (Footnotes omitted.) Magueur v. Dept. of Transp., 248 Ga. App. 575, 577-578 ( 547 SE2d 304 ) (2001). 27 Murray v…

See, e.g., Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 218 Ga. App. 178, 183 (4) ( 460 SE2d 812 ) (1995); Tahamtan v. Tahamtan, 204 Ga. App. 680, 682 (4) ( 420 SE2d 363 ) (1992).

See also Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 218 Ga. App. 178, 183 (4) ( 460 SE2d 812 ) (1995).

See Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 218 Ga. App. 178, 179 (1) ( 460 SE2d 812 ) (1995). 4.