Equicor, Inc. v. Stamey (1995)
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See, e.g., South, 177 S.E. at 502 ("If the insured is so incapacitated that substantially all of the material activities of any [employment approximating the same livelihood as the insured's ordinary employment] are reasonably closed to him, he is totally disabled within the meaning of the policy.” (emphasis added)); Johnson, 20 S.E.2d at 764 (stating that "total disability under the policy exists only when the insured is incapacitated to perform substantially all of the dut…
stating that under Barron and other precedent, " 'total disability' requires only that the insured be unable to perform substantial portions of his ordinary employment or any other employment approximating the same livelihood ...”
See Equicor, Inc. v. Stamey, 216 Ga.App. 375 , 454 S.E.2d 550, 552 (1995) (“[Disability exists if the condition of the insured prevents him from performing a substantial portion of the duties of his occupation or such other line of work as he might reasonably be expected to follow, considering his education, experience, age, and natural ability.”) (citing Mut.
“[Disability exists if the condition of the insured prevents him from performing a substantial portion of the duties of his occupation or such other line of work as he might reasonably be expected to follow, considering his education, experience, age, and natural ability.”
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Baumann v. Snider (2000)
I don’t specify it as general or special or nominal, because ... the law infers some damage from the invasion of a property right.” 18 Barnett v. Morrow, 196 Ga. App. 201, 202 ( 396 SE2d 11 ) (1990). 19 See Kent v. Brown, 238 Ga. App. 607, 613 (2) (g) ( 518 SE2d 737 ) (1999) (questions concerning bad faith, stubborn litigiousness, and unnecessary trouble and expense, under OCGA § 13-6-11, are generally questions for the jury to decide); Equicor, Inc. v. Stamey, 216 Ga. App. …
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Florida International Indemnity Co. v. Osgood (1998)
Corp. v. Edwards, 207 Ga. App. 296, 299 (3) ( 427 SE2d 789 ) (1993). 22 Collins, supra, 258 Ga. at 238 (3); Equicor, Inc. v. Stamey, 216 Ga. App. 375, 378-379 (3) ( 454 SE2d 550 ) (1995); Nat.
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Parker v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America (1997)
Instead, an insured is considered to be totally disabled only if he is unable to perform “some substantial part of the duties of his profession or of such other work, if any, approximating the same livelihood, as he might be fairly expected to follow in view of his station, circumstances, and physical and mental capabilities.” (Emphasis omitted.) Id. at 8; Equicor, Inc. v. Stamey, 216 Ga. App. 375, 377 ( 454 SE2d 550 ) (1995); Franklin Life Ins.
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Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance v. Woodall (2003)
See Vulcan, 191 Ga.App. at 86 , 380 S.E.2d 751 (applying O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6); see also Equicor, Inc. v. Stamey, 216 Ga.App. 375, 378 , 454 S.E.2d 550 (1995) (upholding award under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11). *1381 Still, nothing legally inhibited MMLIC from bringing a declaratory judgment action earlier {e.g., right after 2/5/01, the date Woodall was disbarred, if not earlier).
upholding award under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11