State v. Johnson (1985)

State v. Johnson, 68 Haw. 292 , 711 P.2d 1295, 1298 (1985).

The ICA also ruled that State v. Johnson, 68 Haw. 292, 297 , 711 P.2d 1295, 1299 (1985), which held that “[w]ithout express legislative authority, the court cannot delegate the sentencing function to another person or entity,” did not retroactively apply to Rapozo’s sentence.

See 2020 WL 2846618 at *3; see also State v. Johnson, 68 Haw. 292, 297 , 711 P.2d 1295, 1299 (1985) ("Without express legislative authority, the court cannot delegate the sentencing function to another person or entity.") Because under Thompson, the circuit court's error in failing to calculate credit for time served affected Preble's substantial rights, i.e., his constitutional guarantee against multiple punishments for the same offense, we exercise our discretion to review…

See 2020 WL 2846618 at *3; see also State v. Johnson, 68 Haw. 292, 297 , 711 P.2d 1295, 1299 (1985) ("Without express legislative authority, the court cannot delegate the sentencing function to another person or entity.") Because under Thompson, the circuit court's error in failing to calculate credit for time served affected Preble's substantial rights, i.e., his constitutional guarantee against multiple punishments for the same offense, we exercise our discretion to review…

As a result, absent an apparent abuse of discretion, State v. Johnson, 68 Haw. 292, 296 , 711 P.2d 1295, 1298 (1985), or the court committing "a plain and manifest abuse of discretion in its decision[,]" State v. Fry, 61 Haw. 226, 231 , 602 P.2d 13, 17 (1979), such as when the court "rigidly appl[ies] sentencing guidelines promulgated without legislative authority[,]" State v. Nunes, 72 Haw. 521, 524 , 824 P.2d 837, 839 (1992), the sentencing court will not be reversed.

For this reason, among others, HRS § 706-605(1)(d) limits restitution orders to "an amount the defendant can afford to pay." See State v. Johnson, 68 Haw. 292, 297 , 711 P.2d 1295, 1299 (1985); Murray, 63 Haw. at 25 , 621 P.2d at 343 .

"Where a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation, the court will look to the intent of the legislature." State v. Johnson, 68 Haw. 292, 296 , 711 P.2d 1295, 1298 (1985) (citation omitted). 1.

(Farmer does not argue that she was entitled to have a jury — as opposed to the judge — make this determination.45) 44 See, e.g., Ex Parte Stutts, 897 So.2d 431, 433-34 (Ala. 2004) (upholding restitution award exceeding the criminal mischief limit despite the defendant’s acquittal of the higher degree of offense, noting the different burdens of proof); State v. Fancher, 818 P.2d 251, 252 (Ariz. App. 1991) (“Because restitution is neither punishment nor an element of the offe…

“The legislature prescribes penalties for criminal offenses and its inclination has been to vest in the courts ‘wide latitude in the selection of penalties from those prescribed and in the determination of their severity.’ ” Kumukau, 71 Haw. at 224 , 787 P.2d at 686 *129 (quoting State v. Johnson, 68 Haw. 292, 296 , 711 P.2d 1295, 1298 (1985)).

Cf. State v. Gaylord, 78 Hawai'i 127, 152-153 , 890 P.2d 1167, 1192-93 (1995): For this reason, among others, HRS § 706-605(l)(d) limits restitution orders to “an amount the defendant can afford to pay.” See State v. Johnson, 68 Haw. 292, 297 , 711 P.2d 1295, 1299 (1985); [State v. ]Murray, 63 Haw. [12,] 25, 621 P.2d [334,] 343 [(1980)].

“Under ordinary sentencing procedures, the court is ‘afforded wide latitude in the selection of penalties from those prescribed and in the determination of their severity.’” Okumura, 78 Hawai'i at 413 , 894 P.2d at 110 (quoting State v. Johnson, 68 Haw., 292, 296 , 711 P.2d 1295, 1298 (1985)).

Ct. App. 1996); State v. Johnson, 711 P.2d 1295, 1298 (Haw. 1985); State v. Terpstra, 546 N.W.2d 280, 284 (Minn. 1996); People v. Meade, 600 N.Y.S.2d 353, 354 (App. Div. 1993); State v. Selland, 772 P.2d 534, 536 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989).

The Propriety of Defendant’s Sentence HRS § 706-605(l)(d) (1993) provides, in relevant part, as follows: (1) Except as provided in parts II and IV of this chapter and subsection (2) of this section and subject to the applicable provisions of this Code, the court may sentence a convicted defendant to one or more of the following dispositions: [[Image here]] (d) To make restitution in an amount the defendant can afford to pay; provided that if the court orders, in addition to …

This authority is normally undisturbed on review in the absence of an apparent abuse of discretion or unless applicable statutory and constitutional commands have not been observed.” State v. Johnson, 68 Haw. 292, 296 , 711 P.2d 1295, 1298 (1985) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Freitas, 61 Haw. 262, 277 , 602 P.2d 914, 925 (1979) (“The ultimate question of whether the defendant should be sentenced to an extended term under HRS § 706-662 is discreti…

HRS § 706-606 describes the factors to be considered by the court in imposing a particular sentence. 1 “The legislature prescribes penalties for criminal offenses and its inclination has been to vest in the courts ‘wide latitude in the selection of penalties from those prescribed and in the determination of their severity.’ ” State v. Kumukau, 71 Haw. 218, 224 , 787 P.2d 682, 686 (1990) (quoting State v. Johnson, 68 Haw. 292, 296 , 711 P.2d 1295, 1298 (1985)).

See State v. Johnson, 68 Haw. 292, 297-98 , 711 P.2d 1295, 1299 (1985) (holding that “it is incumbent upon the trial court to enter into the record findings of fact and conclusions that the manner of payment is reasonable and one which [defendant can afford”).

See State v. Tui, 138 Hawaiʻi 462, 468, 382 P.3d 274, 280 (2016). 16 See supra note 8. 20 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** restitution statute, however, we stated, “[t]he total amount of the restitution ordered by the trial court should be the actual loss or damage incurred by the victim.” State v. Johnson, 68 Haw. 292, 295 , 711 P.2d 1295, 1298 (1985) (emphasis added) (citing HRS §§ 706–605(1)(e), 706–624(2)(i)).17 The plain language of…

See State v. Johnson, 68 Haw. 292 , 711 P.2d 1295 (1985).