State v. Byrd (1983)

State v. Byrd, 309 N.C. 132 , 305 S.E.2d 724, 728 (1983), overruled on limited grounds, State v. Childress, 321 N.C. 226 , 362 S.E.2d 263, 267 (1987) (to the extent that Byrd held that in “considering circumstantial evidence an inference may not be made from an inference ... [it is] overruled”).

Evidence of prior crimes cannot be admitted solely because they are “ ‘similar’ ” and “ ‘within a time not too far removed from the crime with which the defendant [is] charged.’ ” State v. Byrd, 309 N.C. 132, 141 , 305 S.E.2d 724, 731 (1983) (alteration in original), overruled on other grounds by State v. Childress, 321 N.C. 226 , 362 S.E.2d 263 (1987).

Furthermore, upon a finding that the child suffered from “battered child syndrome,” a logical presumption is raised “that someone ‘caring’ for the child was responsible for the injuries.” State v. Byrd, 309 N.C. 132, 138 , 305 S.E.2d 724, 729 (1983), overruled on other grounds by State v. Childress, 321 N.C. 226 , 362 S.E.2d 263 (1987).

Every inference must stand upon some clear and direct evidence, and not upon some other inference or presumption.” State v. Byrd, 309 N.C. 132, 139 , 305 S.E. 2d 724, 729 (1983) (quoting State v. Parker, 268 N.C. 258, 262 , 150 S.E. 2d 428, 431 (1966)). *611 The State presented no direct evidence which placed the defendant inside the victim’s house during the nighttime hours of 23 July 1983.

The only logical relevancy these prior convictions had to the crime for which defendant was being tried was that they were “similar” and arguably, albeit attenuated, “not too far removed from the crime with which defendant was charged,” a standard of admission expressly disavowed by our Supreme Court in State v. Byrd, 309 N.C. 132, 141 , 305 S.E. 2d 724, 731 (1983).

See State v. Byrd, 309 N.C. 132, 139-40 , 305 S.E.2d 724, 730 (1983).

See State v. Byrd, 309 N.C. 132 , 305 S.E.2d 724 (1983), overruled on other grounds by State v. Childress, 321 N.C. 226 , 362 S.E.2d 263 (1987) (reversing conviction of involuntary manslaughter based on violation of a child abuse statute due to insufficient evidence of the identity of the perpetrator where there was no evidence establishing the date of injury to the child and where the evidence revealed that adults other than the defendant had been caring for the child).

State v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559 , 247 S.E.2d 905 (1978); see also State v. Byrd, 309 N.C. 132 , 305 S.E.2d 724 (1983), overruled on other grounds by State v. Childress, 321 N.C. 226 , 362 S.E.2d 263 (1987).