Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC (2005)

But see Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 443 , 125 S.Ct. 1788 , 161 L.Ed.2d 687 (2005) (stating that “while the use of “requirements” in a preemption clause could affect both statutory and common law claims, this was not “invariably” the case”).

See Bates, 544 U. S., at 438 (“[M]anufacturers have a continuing obligation to adhere to FIFRA’s labeling require- ments”).

Cf. Bates, 544 U. S., at 451 (“ ‘[T]he specter of dam age actions may provide manufacturers with added dy namic incentives to continue to keep abreast of all possible injuries stemming from use of their product[s] so as to forestall such actions through product improvement’ ”); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U. S. ___ , ___ (2009) (slip op., at 22– —————— vaccine designs only if and when manufacturers come forward with a proposal”); Jones v. Lederle Labs., 695 F. Supp. 700, 711 (EDNY …

Cf. Bates v. Dow Agro-­sciences LLC, 544 U. S. 431, 444 (2005) (“Rules that require manufacturers to design reasonably safe products ... plainly do not qualify as requirements for ‘labeling or packaging.’ None of these common-law rules requires that manufacturers label or package their products in any particular way”).

As the Supreme Court stated in Silkwood , "[i]t is difficult to believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct." 464 U.S. at 251 , 104 S.Ct. 615 ; see also Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC., 544 U.S. 431, 450 , 125 S.Ct. 1788 , 161 L.Ed.2d 687 (2005) ("[I]t seems unlikely that Congress considered a relatively obscure provision like § 136v(b) to give pesticide manufacturers virtual immunity from certain fo…

See, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 448 , 125 S.Ct. 1788 , 161 L.Ed.2d 687 (2005) (“a state cause of action that seeks to enforce a federal requirement ‘does not impose a requirement that is different from, or in addition to, requirements under federal law.’ ”) (internal quotation marks omitted), quoting Lohr, 518 U.S. at 513 , 116 S.Ct. 2240 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Lohr, 518 U.S. at 495 , 116 S.Ct. 2240 (majority opinio…

Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 , 125 S.Ct. 1788 , 161 L.Ed.2d 687 (2005) ("In areas of traditional state regulation, we assume that a federal statute has not supplanted state law unless Congress has made such an intention clear and manifest.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

See § 136v(b); cf. Bates, 544 U.S. at 451 (“Private remedies that enforce federal misbranding requirements would seem to aid, rather than hinder, the functioning of FIFRA.”); Indian Brand Farms, Inc. v. Novartis Crop Prot.

See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 , 125 S.Ct. 1788, 1801 (2005) (“The long history of tort litigation against manufacturers of poisonous substances adds force to the basic presumption against pre-emption.”).

See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 , 125 S.Ct. 1788, 1801 (2005) ("The long history of tort litigation against manufacturers of poisonous substances adds force to the basic presumption against pre-emption.").

Conrail nonetheless argues imposing liability for a pre-conveyance personal injury would violate “the policy goals underlying the Rail Act,” particularly that of giving Conrail a “fresh start.” Ray responds Conrail has not shown that immunity from liability for such a personal injury claim is sufficiently important to the purpose of the Rail Act as to overcome what he characterizes as “the strong presumption that Congress would not eliminate the possibility of a remedy for i…

Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) (“In areas of traditional state regulation, we assume that a federal statute has not supplanted state law unless Congress has made such an intention clear and manifest.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

As the Supreme Court stated in Silkwood, “[i]t is difficult to believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct.” 464 U.S. at 251 ; see also Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC., 544 U.S. 431, 450 (2005) (“[I]t seems unlikely that Congress considered a relatively obscure provision 49 like § 136v(b) to give pesticide manufacturers virtual immunity from certain forms of tort liability.”).

We will cite to the current regulations except as otherwise noted. 10 This conclusion is in line with recent Supreme Court decisions that have interpreted broad language in preemption clauses to reach state common-law claims See, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 443 , 125 S.Ct. 1788 , 161 L.Ed.2d 687 (2005) ("[T]he term `requirements' ... reaches beyond positive enactments, such as statutes and regulations, to embrace common-law duties."); Cipollone v. Ligg…

The Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, which involved a provision requiring that states “not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging [pesticides] in addition to or different from those required under” federal law. 544 U.S. 431, 436 (2005) (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b)).

That dynamic is operationalized by the “presumption against pre-emption.” See, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005).

That dynamic is operationalized by the “presumption against pre-emption.” See, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005).

That dynamic is operationalized by the “presumption against pre-emption.” See, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005).

See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009); Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005); see also Moore v. Trader Joe’s Co., 4 F.4th 874 , 880 (9th Cir. 2021) (affirming dismissal of state law claims on the basis that the complaint failed to state a claim and declining to reach federal preemption).

It is well-established that, “[i]n areas of traditional state regulation, we assume that a federal statute has not supplanted state law unless Congress has made such an intention ‘clear and manifest.’” Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) (quoting N.Y.

Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005).

Cf. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 448 (2005) (“To be sure, the threat of a damages remedy will give manufacturers an additional cause to comply, but the requirements imposed on them under state and federal law do not differ.”); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 495 (1996) (“Nothing in [21 U.S.C.] § 360k denies Florida the right to provide a traditional damages remedy for violations of common-law duties when those duties parallel federal requirements.”); W…

Cf. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 448 (2005) (“To be sure, the threat of a damages remedy will give manufacturers an additional cause to comply, but the requirements imposed on them under state and federal law do not differ.”); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 495 (1996) (“Nothing in [21 U.S.C.] § 360k denies Florida the right to provide a traditional damages remedy for violations of common-law duties when those duties parallel federal requirements.”); W…

See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 544 u.S. 431, 442, 125 S. Ct. 1788 , 161 L.

Cal. 2019) (following Ansagay analysis in rejecting defense of implied preemption under FIFRA); see also Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 458 (2005) (“Because we need only determine the ordinary meaning of [FIFRA] § 136v(b), the majority rightly declines to address respondent’s argument that petitioners’ claims are subject to other types of pre-emption.”) (Thomas, J., concurring).

See Bates, 544 U.S. at 440 (“Congress addressed this problem by authorizing EPA to waive data requirements pertaining to efficacy, thus permitting the agency to register a pesticide without confirming efficacy claims made on its label.”).

Ed. 2d at 602–03 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 23 enacted an express pre-emption [sic] provision at some point during the FDCA’s 70–year history”); see also Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 451 , 125 S. Ct. 1788, 1802 , 161 L.

See id.; Moore, 332 S.W.3d at 756 ; MAI-Civil 25.05; Carson, 92 F.4th at 992 ; see also Bates, 544 U.S. at 447 (“state law need not explicitly incorporate FIFRA’s standards as an element of a cause of action in order to survive pre- emption”).

See Bates, 544 U.S. at 446 (“[N]egligent-failure-to-warn claims are premised on common-law rules that qualify as ‘requirements for labeling or packaging.’”).

Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 , 125 S.Ct. 1788 , 161 L.Ed.2d 687 (2005) (“In areas of traditional state regulation, we assume that a federal statute has not supplanted state law unless Congress has made such an intention clear and manifest.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 , 116 S.Ct. 2240 , 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996) (“In all preemption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress has ‘legislated ... in a field which the States have traditionally occupied,’ we ‘start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress’ ”); see also Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 4…

See id. at 276-77 (citing Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 444 , 125 S.Ct. 1788 , 161 L.Ed.2d 687 (2005) (“None of these common-law rules requires that manufacturers label or package their products in any particular way.”)).

See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 487 , 116 S.Ct. 2240 , 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996) (plurality opinion) (“It is, to say the least, ‘difficult to believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct.’ ”) (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 , 104 S.Ct. 615 , 78 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984)); Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 , 125 S.Ct. 1788 , 161 L.Ed.2d 687 (2005) (“If Congress…

Carson v. Monsanto Company, 92 F.4th 980, 990-91 (11th Cir. 2024) (citing Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 447 (2005)).

LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 437 (2005)).

See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 574 , 129 S.Ct. 1187 ; Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 448 , 125 S.Ct. 1788 , 161 L.Ed.2d 687 (2005) (“[Although [the federal act] does not provide a federal remedy to farmers and others who are injured as a result of a manufacturer’s violation of [the act’s] labeling requirements, nothing [in the statute] precludes States from providing such a remedy.”); Olivares v. PNC Bank, Civ.

Id. (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 , 112 S.Ct. 2608 , 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992)); see also Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 , 125 5.

See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, — U.S. —, -, 125 S.Ct. 1788, 1802 , 161 L.Ed.2d 687 (2005) (“If Congress had intended to deprive injured parties of a long available form of compensation, it surely would have expressed that intent more clearly.”).

Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 445 (2005) (citing 8 Presumably, the only behavioral shift sought by Plaintiffs in this case is for BP and the other Defendants to stop deceiving the public about fossil fuels. 38 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524).

“Preemption analysis is guided by the presumption that a federal statute does not displace local law ‘unless Congress has made such an intention clear and manifest.’” U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Manufacturing Co. LLC v. City of New York, 708 F.3d 428, 432 (2d Cir. 2013), 12 quoting Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005).

A “requirement” is “a rule of law that must be obeyed.” Bates v. Dow Agrosciences L.L.C., 544 U.S. 431, 445 (2005).

“The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every preemption case,” id. at 76 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 .S. 470, 485 (1996)), and “when the text of a pre-emption clause is susceptible to more than one plausible reading, courts ordinarily ‘accept the reading that disfavors preemption,” id. at 77 (quoting Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005)).

For a state requirement to be parallel, as opposed to “different from, or in addition to,” a federal requirement under § 360k(a)(1), “the plaintiff must show that the requirements are ‘genuinely equivalent.’ ” McMullen, 421 F.3d at 489 (quoting Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 454 (2005) (Emphasis in original)); accord Laverty, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 1031 .

“The United States Supreme Court has expressly noted that, because ‘the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt’ state law.” FreeEats.com, ¶ 20 (quoting Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005)). [¶16] Summit Carbon Solutions argues North Dakota courts lack jurisdiction over this declaratory judgment action under a provision in the Safe Drinking Water Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. §…

The terms of art employed by Congress are likewise expansive; as the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized, the federal legislature resorts to the term “requirement” to describe “a rule of law that must be obeyed,” Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 445 (2005), a meaning which “reaches beyond positive enactments, such as statutes and regulations, to embrace common-law duties,” id. at 443 .

A federal statute which overrides a state’s “requirements,” preempts not only statutory law and regulations but also covers “common-law duties.” Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 443 (quoting Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 443 (2005)).

Farina, 625 F.3d 116 (“The presumption applies with particular force in fields within the police power of the state . . . .”); Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) (“In areas of traditional state regulation, we assume that a federal statute has not supplanted state law unless Congress has made such an intention clear and manifest.”) (citations and internal quotations omitted).

Id. (alterations accepted); see also Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 448 (2005) ("[A] state cause of action that seeks to enforce a federal requirement does not impose a requirement that is 'different from, or in addition to,' requirements under federal law.") (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Supreme Court has frequently recog- nized “that a provision pre-empting state ‘requirements’ pre- empt[s] common-law duties.” Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 324 (2008); see Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 444 (2005) (“[T]he term ‘requirements’ . . . reaches beyond pos- itive enactments, such as statutes and regulations, to embrace common-law duties.”).

Moreover, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held “that a provision pre-empting state ‘requirements’ pre-empt[s] com- mon-law duties.” Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 324 (2008); see Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 444 (2005) (“[T]he term ‘requirements’ . . . reaches beyond positive enactments, such as statutes and regulations, to embrace common-law duties.”).