Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc. (2009)

Zango, 568 F.3d at 1173 (“[T]he statute plainly immunizes from suit a provider of interactive computer services that makes available software that filters or screens material that the user or the provider deems objectionable.”) (emphasis in the original); 1174 (“According protection to providers of programs that filter adware and malware is also consistent with the Congressional goals for immunity articulated in [47 U.S.C.] § 230 itself.”).

Zango, 568 F.3d at 1173 (“[T]he statute plainly immunizes from suit a provider of interactive computer services that makes available software that filters or screens material that the user or the provider deems objectionable.”) (emphasis in the original); 1174 (“According protection to providers of programs that filter adware and malware is also consistent with the Congressional goals for immunity articulated in [47 U.S.C.] § 230 itself.”).

Our task is strictly limited to determining what the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would do pursuant to Pennsylvania law. 59 See 47 U.S.C. § 230 . 28 information content provider.”60 This section, sometimes referred to as the CDA “safe harbor provision,”61 “precludes courts from entertaining claims that would place a computer service provider in a publisher’s role, and therefore bars lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditiona…

See Zango, Inc. v. Kapersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169 , 1177 n.8 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[A]rguments not raised by a party in an opening brief are waived.”). 4 23-3782 to El Salvador because of gang control and the government’s inability to control the gangs, and the ill treatment of women in El Salvador.

See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (c); Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal of action for injunctive relief where the defendant “is a provider of an ‘interactive computer service’ as defined in the Communications Decency Act of 1996”).

In Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., the Ninth Circuit distinguished between a software user engaging in an activity and a software engaging in the activity. 568 F.3d 1169, 1176 (9th Cir. 2009).

Our task is strictly limited to determining what the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would do pursuant to Pennsylvania law. 59 See 47 U.S.C. § 230 . 28 information content provider.”60 This section, sometimes referred to as the CDA “safe harbor provision,”61 “precludes courts from entertaining claims that would place a computer service provider in a publisher’s role, and therefore bars lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditiona…

Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir.2009) (citing Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir.2003)).

See Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169 , 1177 n.8 (9th Cir. 2009) (“arguments not raised by a party in an opening brief are waived”); see also Pendley v. Colvin, 2016 U.S. Dist.

Judge Fisher expressed concern that extending section 230(c)(2) immunity beyond the facts of the Zango case "could pose serious problems if providers of blocking software were to be given free license to unilaterally block the dissemination of material by content providers." Zango , 568 F.3d at 1178 (Fisher, J., concurring).

See Zango, Inc. 17 v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169 , 1177 n.8 (9th Cir. 2009) (“arguments not 18 raised by a party in an opening brief are waived”); see also Pendley v. Colvin, 2016 19 U.S. Dist.

Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169 , 1177 n.8 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[A]rguments not raised by a party in an opening brief are waived.”).

Thus, Plaintiffs 4 have waived reliance upon the IAPs due to their failure to raise any argument related to the IAPs. 5 See Zango v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169 , 1177 n. 8 (9th Cir. 2009) (“arguments not 6 raised by a party … are waived”); see also In Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1110 , n. 1 7 (9th Cir. 2000) (indicating the court “will not manufacture arguments” for parties). 8 2.

Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169 , 1177 n.8 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[A]rguments not raised by a party in an opening brief are waived.”). 1 including medical records from Dr. Frederic Johnstone, M.D., Dr. Alan Thomas, M.D., Dr. David 2 Millett, M.D., and Dr. George Harper, M.D.

See Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169 , 1177 n.8 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[A]rguments not raised by a party in an opening brief are waived.”). 21 6 Although the ALJ’s decision states that the statements where “consistent with the claimant’s treatment 22 records, examination findings, clinical imaging, and activities” (AR 1053 (emphasis added)), it is clear from the ALJ’s subsequent evaluation of the statements that the ALJ found the statements inconsistent with the …

See Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169 , 1177 n.8 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[A]rguments not raised by a party in an 21 opening brief are waived.”).

Zango, Inc. v. 23 Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169 , 1177 n.8 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[A]rguments not raised by a party 1 in an opening brief are waived.”) Therefore, the ALJ gave specific, clear, and convincing reasons 2 for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her back pain.

Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equip., 7 Inc., 841 F.2d 918 , 924 (9th Cir.1988); Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169 , 1177 8 n.8 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[A]rguments not raised by a party in an opening brief are waived.”). 9 Petitioner claims an exception to this rule applies to his case arguing under Varney v. 10 Secretary of Health & Human Services, 859 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1988), he can raise the issue in 11 his reply because it is a pure question of law, …

See Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169 , 1177 n.8 (9th Cir. 23 2009) (“[A]rguments not raised by a party in an opening brief are waived.”).

See Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169 , 1177 n.8 (9th 24 Cir. 2009) (“[A]rguments not raised by a party in an opening brief are waived.”). 1 November 2008.

See Zango v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169 , 1177 n. 8 (9th Cir. 4 2009) (“arguments not raised by a party in an opening brief are waived”); see also Pendley v. Colvin, 5 2016 U.S. Dist.

Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 9 350 F.3d 925 , 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (when a claim of error is not argued and explained, the argument is 10 waived); Bray v. Comm'r of SSA, 554 F.3d 1219 , 1226 n.7 (9th Cir. 2009) (argument not made in a 11 disability claimant’s opening brief was deemed waived); Zango v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169 , 12 1177 n. 8 (9th Cir. 2009) (“arguments not raised by a party in an opening brief are waived”). 13 b.

The ALJ specifically considered plaintiff’s testimony “that he could not 19 work due to unexpected falling” and “would still fall even with the cane….” (AR 20.) The ALJ 20 discounted plaintiff’s testimony, a determination plaintiff does not challenge in his opening brief. 21 See Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169 , 1177 n.8 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[A]rguments 22 not raised by a party in an opening brief are waived.”) (citing Eberle v. Anaheim, 901 F.2d 814 , 23 818 …

Cal. Mar. 25, 2013) (“Because this argument was 15 not raised in Plaintiff's opening brief, the Court disregards it.”); see also Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky 16 Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169 , 1177 n.8 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[A]rguments not raised by a party in an 17 opening brief are waived.”). 18 Sharks Sports’ dilatory conduct entirely undercuts their argument about the importance of 19 the travel demand raw data.

“Thus, a provider of software or enabling tools that 2 filter, screen, allow, or disallow content that the provider or user considers obscene, lewd, 3 lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable may not be held liable 4 for any action taken to make available the technical means to restrict access to that material, so 5 long as the provider enables access by multiple users to a computer server.” Zango, Inc. v. 6 Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d…

See Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169 , 1177 n.8 (9th Cir. 2009) (“arguments not raised by a party in an opening brief are waived”); see also Pendley v. Colvin, 2016 U.S. Dist. 28 LEXIS 53470 at *22-23 (Dist.

See Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169 , 1177 n.8 (9th Cir. 2009) (“arguments not raised by a party in an opening brief are waived”); see also Pendley v. Colvin, 2016 U.S. Dist. 28 LEXIS 53470 at *22-23 (Dist.

On the contrary, Judge Fisher on the Ninth Circuit expressed concern that such an “unbounded” reading of “otherwise objectionable” would enable content providers to “block content for anticompetitive purposes or merely at its malicious whim, under the cover of considering such material ‘otherwise objectionable.’ ” See Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1178 (9th Cir.2009) (Fisher, J., concurring).

See Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169 , 1177 n.8 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 607 (9th Cir. 2004).

The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question whether “a State that voluntarily provides a subsidy” has standing to challenge a federal change that would expand 20 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), as revised (Nov. 25, 2015). 21 Id. at 162 . 22 Id. at 155-57 . 23 Id. at 154 . 24 Id. at 153 ; see also Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169 , 1177 n.8 (9th Cir. 2009) (“An amicus curiae generally cannot raise new arguments on appeal.” (citations omitted)). 6 its s…

See Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169 , 1176 n.8 (9th Cir. 2009).

“Generally, we do not consider on appeal an issue raised only by an amicus.” United States v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 607 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Swan v. Peterson, 6 F.3d 1373, 1383 (9th Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169 , 1177 n.8 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that “[a]n amicus curiae generally cannot raise new arguments on appeal,” and that “arguments not raised by a party in an opening brief are waiv…

See, e.g., Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2009) (concluding that malware provider who blocked plaintiffʹs software as ʺpotentially maliciousʺ was interactive computer service provider because it ‐ 36 ‐ provided service to consumers by screening for malicious content); Chicago Lawyersʹ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008), as amended (May 2, 2008) (applying definition to Craigslist, a …

See, e.g., Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2009) (concluding that malware provider who blocked plaintiffs software as “potentially malicious” was interactive computer service provider because it provided service to consumers by screening for malicious content); Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008), as amended (May 2, 2008) (applying definition to Craigslist, a classifi…

See 26 Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169 , 1177 n.8 (9th Cir. 2009) 27 (“[A]rguments not raised by a party in an opening brief are waived.”). 1 Act, the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty 2 Act.5 3 Mercedes-Benz removed this action to this Court in May 2024 on the 4 basis of federal question and supplemental jurisdiction.6 Lazorosas filed the 5 instant Motion in September 2024.7 In her Motion, Lazorosas asserts that 6 Mercedes-Benz ca…

See, e.g., Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169 , 1177 n.8 (9th 28 1 the First Amendment claim are not tied to any matter discovered in these alleged late- 2 produced documents.”); see also Mortgage Indus.

See Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169 , 1177 n. 8 (9th Cir.2009) (“arguments not raised by a party in an opening brief are waived”); Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir.2007) ("The district court need not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.”).

See Zango v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1178 (9th Cir.2009) (Fisher, J., concurring) (expressing concern with a rule under which “providers of blocking software [are] given free license to unilaterally block the dissemination of material by content providers under the literal terms of § 230(c)(2)(A).”).