Commonwealth v. Majorana (1983)

See Commonwealth v. Majorana, 503 Pa. 602, 609 , 470 A.2d 80, 83-84 (1983) (“in an enlightened age a complaining witness’ prior consensual sexual activity is simply not relevant to show present consent.”); see also Commonwealth v. Reefer, 393 Pa.Super 193, 196, 573 A.2d 1153, 1154 (1990) (testimony concerning sexual contacts not “in any way relevant” to show consent). 10 By excluding from trial evidence of the victim’s past sexual conduct, the possibility of confusion and pr…

In Majorana , the defendant had made a specific offer to prove through the testimony of an identified third person that the semen and sperm detected in the victim's body, which had been offered as evidence to corroborate the victim's testimony, had actually come from a separate source. 470 A.2d at 81, 84 .

Commonwealth v. Majorana, 503 Pa. 602, 609 , 470 A.2d 80, 84 (1983).

Our Supreme Court has held the law does not prohibit relevant evidence that "directly negates the act of intercourse with which a defendant is charged." Commonwealth v. Majorana, 503 Pa. 602, 611 , 470 A.2d 80, 84 (1983); see also Commonwealth v. Widmer, 446 Pa.Super. 408, 410 , 667 A.2d 215, 216 (1995).

However, the statute will not preclude the admission of evidence which is exculpatory in nature, “which directly negates the act of intercourse with which a defendant is charged.” Commonwealth v. Majorana, 503 Pa. 602, 611 , 470 A.2d 80, 84 (1983).

In Majorana , this author dissented, stating: “the majority has now taken the first step to water [the Rape Shield Law] down and allow the evil and harm of introducing evidence of a woman’s past sexual conduct to creep back into the courtroom.” 503 Pa. at 613 , 470 A.2d at 85 (Larsen, J., dissenting).

See: Commonwealth v. Majorana, 503 Pa. 602, 610 , 470 A.2d 80, 84 (1983); Commonwealth v. Green, 290 Pa.Super. 76, 84-85 , 434 A.2d 137, 141 (1981); Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 256 Pa.Super. 259, 273-274 , 389 A.2d 1113, 1120 (1978); Commonwealth v. Honeycutt, 227 Pa.Super. 265, 270 , 323 A.2d 775, 778 (1974).

As Commonwealth v. Majorana makes clear, once a criminal defendant 72 See Commonwealth v. Majorana, 470 A.2d 80, 84 (Pa. 1983) (“The second stage (18 Pa.C.S. § 3104(b)) requires a defendant who seeks to introduce evidence of past sexual conduct under the consent exception in Section 3104(a) to ‘file a written motion and offer of proof at the time of trial’ at which time the court will determine ‘if the motion and proof are sufficient on their faces.’ If so, the court will ho…

With respect to the constitutional exceptions, our Supreme Court has held the law does not prohibit relevant evidence that "directly negates the act of intercourse with which a defendant is charged." Commonwealth v. Majorana, 470 A.2d 80, 84 (Pa. 1983).

Aug. 27, 2019). 199 Commonwealth v. Majorana, 470 A.2d 80, 83 (Pa. 1983). 200 Id. at 83–84. 201 Wall, 606 A.2d at 455 (citing Majorana, 470 A.2d at 83–84). purpose of the Rape Shield Law is to prevent a trial from shifting its focus from the culpability of the accused toward the virtue and chastity of the victim.”202 The state’s legitimate interests in promoting fairness and reliability in rape trials by excluding prejudicial and irrelevant evidence about the victim’s chasti…

In addition to the specific exception related to the consent of the victim contained in the statute itself, our courts have found additional exceptions: Our Supreme Court has held the law does not prohibit relevant evidence that “directly negates the act of intercourse with which a defendant is charged.” Commonwealth v. Majorana, 503 Pa. 602, 611 , 470 A.2d 80, 84 (1983); see also Commonwealth v. Widmer, 446 Pa.Super. 408, 410 , 667 A.2d 215, 216 (1995).

Commonwealth v. Mayorana, 503 Pa. 602 , 470 A.2d 80, 84 (1983).

Likewise, in Commonwealth v. Mayorana, 503 Pa. 602, 609-611 , 470 A.2d 80, 84 (1983), the defendant had made a specific offer to prove through the testimony of an identified third person that the semen and sperm detected in the victim’s body, which had been offered as evidence to corroborate the victim’s testimony, had actually come from a separate source two hours before the victim was allegedly raped. ¶ 23 Here, it is clear that appellant was on a “fishing expedition,” wit…

Cf. Bobb v. United States, 758 A.2d 958, 960 (D.C.2000) (recounting that rape defendant testified at pre-trial hearing that he had had consensual sex with the complainant approximately four or five times); State v. Atkinson, 276 Kan. 920 , 80 P.3d 1143, 1147, 1150-51 (2003) (where defendant credibly testified that he had engaged in sexual intercourse with victim hours before alleged rape, court should have permitted defendant to cross-examine victim at trial on this possible…

Our Supreme Court has held the law does not prohibit relevant evidence that “directly negates the act of intercourse with which a defendant is charged.” Commonwealth v. Majorana, 503 Pa. 602, 611 , 470 A.2d 80, 84 (1983); see also Commonwealth v. Widmer, 446 Pa.Super. 408, 410 , 667 A.2d 215, 216 (1995).

We stated that “[a]dmitting such evidence for the limited purpose of denying the act charged properly balances the laudable goals of the statute and an accused’s fundamental right to present in defense his own version of the facts under both the Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of our Pennsylvania Constitution.” 503 Pa. at 603 , 470 A.2d at 81 (footnote omitted).

This distinction is without meaning as this Court stated "the rape shield rule's protections are inapplicable, where `[t]he act offered in explanation was not a prior separate incident but an alternative account of the events of that evening offered to counter the prosecution's medical testimony.'" Id. at 912 ; (quoting Commonwealth v. Majorana, 503 Pa. 602 , 470 A.2d 80, 85 (1983)).

Furthermore, courts have stated that the rape shield rule's protections are inapplicable, where "[t]he act offered in explanation was not a prior "separate incident" but an alternative account of the events of that evening offered to counter the prosecution's medical testimony." Commonwealth v. Majorana, 503 Pa. 602 , 470 A.2d 80, 85 (1983).

This distinction is without meaning as this Court stated "the rape shield rule's protections are inapplicable, where '[t]he act offered in explanation was not a prior separate incident but an alternative account of the events of that evening offered to counter the prosecution's medical testimony.'" Id. at 8; (quoting Commonwealth v. Majorana, 470 A.2d 80, 85 (Pa. 1983)). ¶8.

Furthermore, courts have stated that the rape shield rule's protections are inapplicable, where "[t]he act offered in explanation was not a prior "separate incident" but an alternative account of the events of that evening offered to counter the prosecution's medical testimony." Commonwealth v. Majorana, 470 A.2d 80, 85 (Pa. 1983).

Where the defendant claims to have had no contact with the complainant, we do not think rule 404(c)(1) was intended to bar the admission of evidence which is “directly relevant to negate the act with which the defendant is charged.” Commonwealth v. Majorana, 470 A.2d 80, 81 (Pa.1983).

To hold otherwise would contravene the well recognized evidentiary principle of res inter alios acta, which provides that “a thing or event which occurs at a time different from the time in issue is generally not admissible to prove what occurred at the time in issue.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 1178 (5th Ed.1979); see also Commonwealth v. Mayorana, 503 Pa. 602, 605 , 470 A.2d 80, 81 (1983) (observing that the rule of res inter alios acta underlies judicial concepts of relevanc…

To that end, limited exceptions to the broad exclusion of the rape shield law have arisen to demonstrate the rape shield law "will bow to a defendant's right to confront and cross-examine when a specific proffer demonstrates *369 that the proposed inquiry is intended to elicit relevant evidence, which is more probative than prejudicial, and which is not cumulative of other evidence available without encroaching upon Rape Shield law protections." Nieves, supra at 288 , 582 A.…

See Commonwealth v. Majorana, 503 Pa. 602 , 470 A.2d 80 (1983).

See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 536 Pa. 153, 158 , 638 A.2d 940, 942 (1994) (citing Commonwealth v. Majorana, 503 Pa. 602 , 470 A.2d 80 (1983)).

See, Commonwealth v. Majorana, 503 Pa. 602 , 470 A.2d 80 (1983).

See Deel v. State, 481 So.2d 15 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); see also Commonwealth v. Majorana, 503 Pa. 602 , 470 A.2d 80 (1983); People v. Mikula, 84 Mich. App. 108 , 269 N.W.2d 195 (1978).

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Majorana, 470 A.2d 80, 84-85 (Pa. 1983).

See Commonwealth v. Al/burn, 721 A.2d 363, 367 (Pa. Super. 1998).' With respect to the constitutional exceptions, our Supreme Court has held the law does not prohibit relevant evidence that "directly negates the act of intercourse with which a defendant is charged." Commonwealth v. Majorana, 470 A.2d 80, 84 (Pa. 1983).