United States v. Richardson (2010)

Such an approach is warranted because collectors “value their sexually explicit materials highly, rarely if ever dispose of such material, and store it for long periods in a secure place, typically in their homes.” Richardson, 607 F.3d at 370 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Sassani, 139 F.3d 895 (4th Cir. 1998) (unpublished) (collecting cases).

"In the context of child pornography cases, courts have largely concluded that a delay—even a substantial delay— between distribution and the issuance of a search warrant does not render the underlying information stale." United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d at 370 (concluding that lapse of four months did not render probable cause to search for child pornography "stale"); see, e.g.

But when it comes to child sexual abuse material, as the district court recognized, the consensus among courts, including ours, is that “even a substantial delay” between suspect online activity and the issuance of a search warrant 7 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4328 Doc: 54 Filed: 07/25/2025 Pg: 8 of 13 “doesn’t render the underlying information stale.” Bosyk, 933 F.3d at 330 ; see also, e.g., Ebert, 61 F.4th at 401 ; United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 370 (4th Cir. 2010).

United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 364 (4th Cir. 2010).

United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 364 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).

United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 368 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Fowler, 932 F.2d 306, 311 (4th Cir. 1991)).

Accord United States v. Cameron, 699 F.3d 621, 637-38 (1st Cir.2012); United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 366-67 (4th Cir.2010).

Id. (citing United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 363-67 (4th Cir. 2010)). -13- Finally, also on July 2, 2010, Cameron filed a motion in limine to exclude all images and other material provided by Yahoo!, Google, and NCMEC.

But “the existence of probable cause cannot be determined ‘by simply counting the number of days between the occurrence of the facts supplied and the issuance of the affidavit.’” United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 370 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. McCall, 740 F.2d 1331, 1336 (4th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted)).

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable government searches, not those performed “by private individuals acting in a private capacity.” United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 364 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 344 (4th Cir. 2003)).

While “time is a crucial element,” United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 370 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting McCall, 740 F.2d at 1335 ), “the existence of probable cause cannot be determined ‘by simply counting the number of days between the occurrence of the facts supplied and the issuance of the affidavit,’” id. (quoting McCall, 740 F.2d at 1336 ).

The issuing judge must decide whether, under the totality of the circumstances, “there is a ‘fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’” United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 369 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238 ).

We concluded that “[a] reporting requirement, standing alone, does not transform an [ESP] into a government agent whenever it chooses to scan files sent on its network for child pornography.” Id.; see also United States v. -7- Cameron, 699 F.3d 621, 637-38 (1st Cir. 2012) (same); United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 366-67 (4th Cir. 2010) (same).

“When considering a district court’s denial of a suppression motion, we review factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.” United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 369 (4th Cir. 2010).

See Wellman, 663 F.3d at 229 ; United States v. Doyle, 650 F.3d 460, 471 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 370 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Williams, 548 F.3d 311, 319 (4th Cir. 2008); DeQuasie, 373 F.3d at 518-19 ; United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192, 197 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. Blackwood, 913 F.2d 139, 142 (4th Cir. 1990).

“Although there is no question that time is a crucial element of probable cause, [ ] the existence of probable cause cannot be determined by simply counting the number of days between the occurrence of the facts supplied and the issuance of the affidavit.” United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 370 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Fourth Amendment protections apply “when a private individual conducts a search ‘as an instrument or agent of the Government.’ ” United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 364 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Skinner v. Ry.

See United States v. Clark, 668 F.3d 934, 939 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Boilerplate language about the tendencies of child pornography collectors supports probable cause for a search when the affidavit also includes facts that suggest the target of the search has the characteristics of a prototypical child pornography collector.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 371 (4th Cir. 2010) (same); United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d…

See United States v. Clark, 668 F.3d 934, 939 (7th Cir.2012) (“Boilerplate language about the tendencies of child pornography collectors supports probable cause for a search when the affidavit also includes facts that suggest the target of the search has the characteristics of a prototypical child pornography collector.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 371 (4th Cir.2010) (same); United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1…

United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 369 (4th Cir.2010), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 427 , 178 L.Ed.2d 324 (2010).

Collectors of child pornography “value their sexually explicit materials highly, rarely if ever dispose of such material, and store it for long periods in a secure place, typically in their homes.” United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 370 (4th Cir.) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 427 , 178 L.Ed.2d 324 (2010).

See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 625 F.3d 830, 843 (5th Cir.2010); United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 370-71 (4th Cir.2010); United States v. Lewis, 605 F.3d 395, 402 (6th Cir.2010).) When you delete a file, it goes into a “trash” folder, and when you direct the computer to “empty” the trash folder the contents of the folder, including the deleted file, disappear.

Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996); United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 369 (4th Cir.2010).

Probable cause to issue a search warrant “exist[s] where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be searched.” United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 369 (4th Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert, denied, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 427 , 178 L.Ed.2d 324 (2010). “[A] judicial officer issuing a search warrant must simply make a practical, c…

We review the factual findings underlying the denial of a motion to suppress for clear error, United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 369 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 427 , 178 L.Ed.2d 324 (2010), which exists where we are “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed,” United States v. Harvey, 532 F.3d 326, 337 (4th Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).

For a valid subpoena, a party must show that the material subpoenaed meets the requirements of “(1) relevancy; (2) admissibility; [and] (3) specificity.” United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 700 , 94 S.Ct. 3090 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974) (cited with approval in United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 368 (4th Cir. 2010)).

“Although the concept of probable cause defies a precise definition, it ‘exist[s] where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found’ in the place to be searched.” United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 369 (4th Cir.2010) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)).

See, e.g., Richardson, 607 F.3d at 370 (“[C]ollectors and distributors of child pornography value their sexually explicit materials highly, ‘rarely if ever’ dispose of such material, and store it ‘for long periods’ in a secure place, typically in their homes.”) (quoting Lacy, 119 F.3d at 746 ); United States v. Davis, 313 Fed.Appx. 672, 674 (4th Cir.2009) (“[C]hild pornographers keep their contraband for a long time; information a year old is not stale as a matter of law”); …

This is because “collectors and distributors of child pornography value their sexually explicit materials highly, ‘rarely if ever’ dispose of such material, and store it ‘for long periods’ in a secure place, typically in their homes.” United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 370 (4th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted; collecting cases); United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1072 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Collectors act like ‘pack rats’ because they have difficulty obtaining images of…

As the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit noted in United States v. Richardson, “collectors and distributors of child pornography value their sexually explicit materials highly, ‘rarely if ever’ dispose of such material, and store it ‘for long periods’ in a secure place, typically in their homes.” 607 F.3d 357, 370 (4th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted); accord United States v. Raymonda, 780 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 2015) (“ . . . it is well known that images of child pornogr…

Accord United States v. Cameron, 699 F.3d 621, 637-38 (1st Cir.2012); United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 366-67 (4th Cir.2010).

(See Pigott Aff. | 3.) The “Fourth Amendment “‘proscrib[es] only governmental action.’” United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 364 (4th Cir. 2010) (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)). 1!

Last, while Defendants contend that permitting Lawshe’s claims regarding Image Two to proceed would destroy the immunity provided by Congress, which, they say, is “‘clearly’” designed to “‘immuniz[e] civil claims for mistaken and incorrect reports,’” see Synchronoss’s Motion at 5; Verizon’s Motion at 9 (quoting United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 367 (4th Cir. 2010)), Defendants conflate an intent to immunize mistaken reports with an intent to immunize unfounded repor…

Amendment[] safeguards the rights of free speech and assembly by limitations on state action, not on action by the owner of private property used nondisctiminatorily for private purposes only.”’); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (“This Court has . . . consistently construed [the Fourth Amendment] as proscribing only governmental action|.]”); United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 364 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment proscrib[es] only governmen…

Amendment[] safeguards the rights of free speech and assembly by limitations on state action, not on action by the owner of private property used nondisctiminatorily for private purposes only.”’); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (“This Court has . . . consistently construed [the Fourth Amendment] as proscribing only governmental action|.]”); United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 364 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment proscrib[es] only governmen…

We have stated, however, that [t]he substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt, and that the belief of guilt must be particularized with respect to the person to be searched or seized[.] Id. at 370‒71 (citations and quotations marks omitted); see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949); United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 369 (4th Cir. 2010).

All statutory references to 18 U.S.C. section 2258A in this opinion are to the version of the statute effective from 19 December 21, 2018 to the present. 21 “[A] reporting requirement, standing alone, does not transform an [electronic service provider] into a government agent whenever it chooses to scan files sent on its network for child pornography.” Ringland, 966 F.3d at 733, 736 (original bracketed alterations omitted) (quoting U.S. v. Stevenson, 727 F.3d 826, 829 (8th C…

Montgomery No. 26994, 2017-Ohio-851, ¶ 15 (“Collectors of child pornography tend to keep images for a long time, and digital images can be kept forever and can even be recovered after being deleted.” (Emphasis added.)); United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 370-371 (4th Cir.2010) (testimony that “even if a computer file is deleted from a hard drive or other computer media, a computer expert is still likely to retrieve...such files through scientific examination of the c…

See, e.g., United States v. Seiver, 692 F.3d 774, 777 (7th Cir. 2012) ("[S]even months is too short a period to reduce the probability that a computer search will be fruitful to a level at which probable cause has evaporated."); United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 370 (4th Cir. 2010) (rejecting staleness argument in four-month delay); United States v. Lewis, 605 F.3d 395, 402 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding seven months did not render information stale); United States v. Est…

The concept of probable cause “defies a precise definition[.]” United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 369 (4th Cir. 2010).

See United States v. Stevenson , 727 F.3d 826 , 831 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding that AOL searching email for child pornography was based on its own initiative not as government agent); Cameron , 699 F.3d at 637-38 (concluding Yahoo! not acting as government agent when searching for child pornography because it did so for its own interests and government did not control or direct action); Richardson , 607 F.3d at 365-67 (holding AOL not acting as agent of government when it scan…

AOL’s voluntary efforts to achieve a goal that it shares with law enforcement do not, by themselves, transform the company into a government agent.”); United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 366 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding that AOL’s scanning of email communications for child pornography did not trigger the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement because no law enforcement officer or agency asked the provider to search or scan the defendant’s emails).

United States v. Richardson, 607 F3d 357, 364 (4th Cir 2010).

See McKissick, 209 S.W.3d at 215 (holding possession of child pornography was of continuous and protracted nature therefore making passage of time less relevant for purpose of probable cause determination); State v. Cotter, 360 S.W.3d 647 , 653–54 (Tex.App.–Amarillo 2012, no pet.) (holding four-month old information was not stale due to continuing nature of activity of possession of child pornography); see generally United States v. Allen, 625 F.3d 830 , 842–43 (5th Cir.2010…

See, e.g., United States v. Conlan, 786 F.3d 380, 384 , 388 & n.17 (5th Cir. 2015) (upholding plain view seizure of laptop and cellphones by an officer lacking probable cause where detective who instructed the officer to seize the laptop and cellphones had probable cause); United States v. Banks, 514 F.3d 769, 776 (8th Cir. 2008) (upholding plain view seizure of defendant’s gun case, based on probable cause to believe the case held a gun and was therefore evidence of the cri…

Indeed, there is a "widespread view among the courts ... that 'collectors ... of child pornography value their sexually explicit materials highly, "rarely if ever" dispose of such material, and store it "for long periods" in a secure place. ...'" United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 370 (4th Cir.2010) (quoting United States v. Lacy, 119 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir.1997), and collecting cases).

See McKissick, 209 S.W.3d at 215 (holding possession of child pornography was of continuous and protracted nature therefore making passage of time less relevant for purpose of probable cause determination); State v. Cotter, 360 S.W.3d 647 , 653–54 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, no pet.) (holding four-month old information was not stale due to continuing nature of activity of possession of child pornography); see generally United States v. Allen, 625 F.3d 830 , 842–43 (5th Cir. 20…

United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 369 (4th Cir.2010), The Court finds that the redacted Application provided no probable cause to conclude that a search of Maple Ridge Apartment # 10 would lead to the discovery of the controlled substance oxycodone or any controlled substances at all.

(Carrington, at p. 163; Gibson, at p. 380; Jones, at p. 741.) “In the context of child pornography cases, courts have largely concluded that a delay—even a substantial delay—between distribution and the issuance of a search warrant does not render the underlying information stale.” (U.S. v. Richardson (4th Cir. 2010) 607 F.3d 357, 370 [ 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 11928 ]; see, e.g., U.S. v. Lacy (9th Cir. 1997) 119 F.3d 742, 745-746 [affidavit provided non-stale information despit…

Cf. United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 362-63 (4th Cir.2010).