United States v. King (2010)

In reviewing an appeal of a supervised release revocation that challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, “we ask whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 1.

See King, 608 F.3d at 1128 (“A probation officer’s instructions are relevant to whether a supervised release condition gives fair warning of prohibited conduct.”).

Reviewing for abuse of discretion, see United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2010), we affirm.

We review an appeal premised on insufficiency of the evidence by asking whether any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, “could have found the essential elements of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th ** The Honorable Eduardo C.

In evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a supervised release revocation, “we ask whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a supervised release revocation, “we ask whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).

On a sufficiency of the evidence challenge to revocation, we consider whether, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Jeremiah, 493 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2007)).

See also United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[A] Rule 32.1(c) modification—as opposed to a Rule 32.1(b) revocation—does not require an evidentiary hearing or a violation finding.”).

To evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the revocation, we ask whether, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. (quoting United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010)).

App. P. 34(a)(2). revocation, we ask whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation modified).

Sufficient evidence supports the district court’s finding as to Allegation Six. 2 24-4952 A rational trier of fact could have found, by a preponderance of the evidence, see United States v. Richards, 52 F.4th 879 , 888 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010)), that Jones’s substantial withdrawal from a 401(k) account constituted “any material change in [Jones’s] economic cir- cumstances that might affect [her] ability to pay . . . …

United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2010).

“On a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to a 5 23-902 supervised release revocation, we ask whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Jeremiah, 493 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

See, e.g., United States v. Frederickson, 988 F.3d 76, 80 (1st Cir. 2021) (“We recount the facts as presented at [the defendant]’s revocation hearing in the light most favorable to the government, except where presenting conflicting testimony is necessary to understand the legal issues in this appeal.” (citation omitted)); United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010) (“On a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to a supervised release revocation, we ask whether…

E.g., United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 2010).

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence for a supervised release revocation, we consider “whether viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Richards, 52 F.4th 879 , 888 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010)).

United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 4 Appellate Case: 23-2000 Document: 010110977605 Date Filed: 01/03/2024 Page: 5 3.

“On a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to a supervised release revocation, we ask whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

IV Richards recognizes that on a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, the issue is “whether viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010), the district court had sufficient evidence in the record to support its finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Jones violated conditions of his supervised release.

“In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a supervised release revocation, ‘we ask whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.’” Id. at 1145–46 (quoting United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010)). 2 Probation alleged Green violated the terms of his supervised release numerous times starting as …

In addition to the bare words of the probation condition, the probationer may be guided by the further definition, explanations, or instructions of the district court and the probation officer.”); see also United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122 , 1128–29 (9th Cir. 2010) (“A probation officer’s instructions are relevant to whether a supervised release condition gives fair warning of prohibited conduct.”); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 266 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[T]here is no qu…

In evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a supervised release revocation, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and ask whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted).

We ask whether “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Ochoa, 932 F.3d 866, 869 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010)). 1.

“A supervised release condition ‘violates due process of law if it either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.’” United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Soltero, 510 F.3d 858, 866 (9th Cir. 2007)).

United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 2010).

United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010).

In evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a supervised release revocation, “we ask whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted).

On a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to a revocation, we ask whether, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).

A. The District Court Erred in Finding that Ochoa Frequented a Prohibited Place A sufficiency of evidence challenge requires us to ask whether “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Jeremiah, 493 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2007)).

“On a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to a supervised release revocation, we ask whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010).

To determine whether the evidence was sufficient to support a supervised release revocation, “we ask whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted).

Id. at 1145-46 (quoting United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010)).

See United States v. Soltero, 510 F.3d 858, 866 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted); United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 2010).

United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 2010).

When a sufficiency challenge is raised, “we ask whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found *337 the essential elements of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).

STANDARD OF REVIEW “On a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to a supervised release revoca *1036 tion, we ask whether, ‘viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.’ ” United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir.2010) (quoting United States v. Jeremiah, 493 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir.2007)). “ “We review for abuse of discretion…

United States v. Muniz-Jaquez, 718 F.3d 1180, 1182-83 (9th Cir.2013); United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir.2010).

Code § 9A.88.010G) (2014). “[V]iewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government,” we conclude that a “rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a violation [of supervised release] by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir.2010) (quoting United States v. Jeremiah, 493 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir.2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). *633 Even if the district court had erred in its conclu…

See 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (e)(3); United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir.2010).

We review the district court’s imposition of the release condition for abuse of discretion, see United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir.2010), and the underlying Fourth Amendment claim de novo, see United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 959-60 (9th Cir.2013) (en banc). 1.

The Ninth Circuit has rejected a similar due process challenge to Rule 32.1(c), see United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir.2010), but even assuming there was any error, it did not seriously affect the fairness of the proceedings.

In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a supervised release revocation, “we ask whether, ‘viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a violation’ by ‘a preponderance of the evi- *1146 denee.’” United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir.2010) (quoting United States v. Jeremiah, 493 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir.2007)).

THUM evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a violation’ by ‘a preponderance of the evidence.’” United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Jeremiah, 493 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2007)).

Under § 3605, “the transferee court steps into the shoes of the transferor court.” United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir.2010). “[S]ection 3605 expand[s] the power of the transferee court over the supervised offender” as it “was intended to permit the transferee court ‘to exercise all the powers over the ... releasee that are permitted’ by the statutes dealing with supervised releasees.” United States v. Fernandez, 379 F.3d 270, 275 (5th Cir.2004) (quoting S. R…

On a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence supporting a supervised release revocation, “we ask whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Jeremiah, 493 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2007); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (…

A person serving part of a prison sentence on home confinement through residential reentry is under the jurisdiction of the BOP, not the court.2 See United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that an inmate’s placement in pre-release custody at the end of his federal sentence does not begin his supervised release term).

A statute or probation condition is vague under the Due Process Clause if it contains a lack of notice so that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning, United States v. King, 608 F3d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir 2010), or allows those who enforce it to do so in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner.

E.g., United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1128-1129 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Napulou, 593 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2010).