McConkey v. Van Hollen (2010)

The greater the need for future guidance, the greater "the extent to which public interest would be enhanced by reviewing the case." Snohomish County v. Anderson, 881 P.2d 240, 244 (Wash. 1994) (emphasis omitted); McConkey v. Van Hollen, 783 N.W.2d 855, 861 (Wis. 2010) (applying the doctrine because "as a law development court, we think it prudent that the citizens of Wisconsin have this important issue of constitutional law resolved").

The purpose of our standing doctrine is two-fold: “[1] ensuring that the issues and arguments presented will be carefully developed and zealously argued,” and “[2] informing the court of the consequences of its decision.” McConkey v. Van Hollen, 2010 WI 57, ¶16, 326 Wis. 2d 1, 783 N.W.2d 855.

"The inquiry is 'whether the legislature in the formation of the question acted reasonably and within their constitutional grant of authority and discretion.'" McConkey, 326 Wis. 2d 1, ¶40 (quoting Milwaukee All., 106 Wis. 2d at 604 ). ¶168 The legislature's discretion is broad, but it is not unlimited.

The dissent disagrees with the characterization of § 14 as a tack on, but it does not explain how the provisions of § 14 are incidental to or necessarily connected with each other or with the first 13 sections of Amendment A. As the case cited by the dissent explained, distinct propositions need not be submitted separately “when an overall change might be impossible to effectuate if the voters could choose to adopt certain parts of the proposed amendment and not others.” See…

Because our state constitution lacks the jurisdiction-limiting language of its federal counterpart, "standing in Wisconsin is not a matter of jurisdiction, but of sound judicial policy." McConkey, 326 Wis. 2d 1, ¶15 (citing Zehetner v. Chrysler Fin.

McConkey v. Van Hollen, 2010 WI 57, ¶¶ 7-8 , 326 Wis. 2d 1 , 783 N.W.2d 855, 858-59 (holding that there was no violation of the "separate amendment rule," the constitution's requirement that voters must be allowed to vote separately on separate amendments). ¶ 12.

However, “[t]he law of standing in Wisconsin is construed liberally, and ‘even an injury to a trifling interest’ may suffice.” McConkey, 326 Wis. 2d 1, ¶15 (quoted source omitted).

See McConkey v. Van Hollen, 2010 WI 57, ¶¶12 , 14 n.5, 326 Wis. 2d 1 , 783 N.W.2d 855 .

See McConkey v. Van Hollen, 2010 WI 57, ¶16 , 326 Wis. 2d 1 , 783 N.W.2d 855 .

See McConkey v. Van Hollen, 2010 WI 57, ¶15 , 326 Wis. 2d 1 , 783 N.W.2d 855 ("standing in Wisconsin is not a matter of jurisdiction, but of sound judicial policy").

See McConkey v. Van Hollen, 2010 WI 57, ¶ 15 , 326 Wis. 2d 1 , 783 N.W.2d 855 ("standing in Wisconsin is not a matter of jurisdiction, but of sound judicial policy"); see also State v. Castillo, 213 Wis. 2d 488, 492 , 570 N.W.2d 44 (1997) (appellate courts need not address non-dispositive issues).

Workers Union Loc. 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 555-56 (1996) (explaining that requiring that an “association plaintiff be organized for a purpose germane to the subject of its member’s claim raises an assurance that the association’s litigators will themselves have a stake in the resolution of the dispute, and thus be in a position to serve as the defendant’s natural adversary”); see also McConkey, 326 Wis. 2d 1, ¶16 . ¶38 Moreover, suggesting that ordinance chang…

See McConkey, 326 Wis. 2d 1, ¶15 (quoting Fox v. DHSS, 112 Wis. 2d 514, 524 , 334 N.W.2d 532 (1983)). ¶18 In resolving standing challenges, Wisconsin courts may also consider judicial efficiency.

See McConkey, 326 Wis. 2d 1, ¶15 (quoting Fox v. DHSS, 112 Wis. 2d 514, 524 , 334 N.W.2d 532 (1983)). ¶18 In resolving standing challenges, Wisconsin courts may also consider judicial efficiency.

See, e.g., McConkey, 326 Wis. 2d 1 , ¶ 15 n.7; First Nat'l Bank, 95 Wis. 2d at 308 n.4; Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, 69 Wis. 2d at 11 .