Jackson v. State (1993)

Jackson v. State, 615 So.2d 850, 851 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993).

A defendant’s “sentence is properly what the trial court intended it to be.” See Jackson v. State, 615 So.2d 850, 851 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (citing Gonzales v. State, 488 So.2d 610 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), disapproved of on other grounds by, Frey v. State, 708 So.2d 918 (Fla.1998)).

Cf. Jackson v. State, 615 So.2d 850, 851 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (ordering correction of orally pronounced sentence to comport with intent, clearly established in record, of trial court and counsel for the State and defendant).

See Jackson v. State, 615 So.2d 850, 850-51 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (finding that court’s ambiguous oral pronouncement could be resolved where its intent was discernible from the record as a whole).

See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 615 So.2d 850 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (approving sentence which required the defendant to serve the jail term for the second count of a two-count conviction between the jail term and probationary period for the first count); Hatton v. State, 689 So.2d 1195 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (affirming a two-count sentence which required the defendant to serve three months in county jail followed by two years probation on Count I, to run concurrent with his Count II …

See Jackson v. State, 615 So.2d 850 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (holding that when a trial judge’s oral pronouncement of a sentence is ambiguous, but the judge’s intention is discernible from the record, the proper sentence is what the judge intended it to be).

See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 615 So.2d 850 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Nobles v. State, 605 So.2d 996 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).

Flowers; see also Jackson v. State, 615 So.2d 850 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (a defendant's sentence is whatever the trial court intended it to be).

See Jackson v. State, 615 So.2d 850 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993).

See Gates v. State, 535 So.2d 359 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); see also Jackson v. State, 615 So.2d 850 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Newton v. State, 603 So.2d 558 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).