Orme v. State (2009)

Orme v. State (Orme III), 25 So. 3d 536, 542-43 (Fla. 2009).

Orme v. State, 25 So. 3d 536, 547-48 (Fla. 2009). “[T]he determination of mitigating and aggravating circumstances and the respective weight assigned to each [are] within the trial court’s discretion . . . .” Griffin v. State, 820 So. 2d 906, 913 (Fla. 2002).

Orme v. State (Orme III), 25 So.3d 536, 542-43 (Fla. 2009).

The focus of the HAC aggravating circumstance is on the circumstances of the murder, particularly the suffering of the victim, as a finding of HAC can only be supported if the murder was “conscienceless or pitiless and unnecessarily torturous to the victim.” Orme v. State, 25 So.3d 536, 551 (Fla. 2009) (quoting Guzman v. State, 721 So.2d 1155, 1159 (Fla. 1998)).

See generally Orme v. State, 25 So. 3d 536, 548 (Fla. 2009) (“We find that although the trial court’s treatment of this mitigator was improper, the error was harmless given the severity of the three aggravators in the case and other relatively weak mitigation.”); Doorbal v. State, 837 So. 2d 940, 959 (Fla. 2003) (determining “that even if any error occurred in not admitting the letters [during the penalty phase], which it did not, such error was harmless”).

“Except as expressly provided in an act of the Legislature . . . amendment of a criminal statute operates prospectively . . . .” § 775.022(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (2023). “[U]nder the rules of statutory construction, there must be a clear expression of intended retrospective application.” Orme v. State, 25 So. 3d 536, 547 (Fla. 2009).

Orme v. State, 25 So. 3d 536, 542-43, 553 (Fla. 2009).

We have explained that “[t]he HAC aggravator is proper ‘only in torturous murders—those that evince extreme and outrageous depravity as exemplified by either the desire to inflict a high degree of pain or utter indifference to or enjoyment of the suffering of another.’ ” Orme v. State, 25 So. 3d 536, 551 (Fla. 2009) (quoting Guzman v. State, 721 So. 2d 1155, 1159 (Fla. 1998)).

Campbell also requires the trial court’s order to: “(2) assign a weight to each aggravating factor and mitigating factor properly established; (3) weigh the established aggravating circumstances against the established mitigating circumstances; and (4) provide a detailed explanation of the result of the weighing process.” Rogers v. State, 285 So. 3d 872 , 889 (Fla. 2019) (quoting Orme v. State, 25 So. 3d 536, 547-48 (Fla. 2009)). 7.

See Orme v. State, 25 So. 3d 536, 547 (Fla. 2009) (“[U]nder the rules of statutory construction, there must be a clear expression of intended retrospective application.”); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 261 (2012) (“As a general, almost invariable rule, a legislature makes law for the future, not for the past. . . .

In doing so, we recognized that a trial judge “may not preclude from consideration any evidence regarding a mitigating circumstance that is proffered by a defendant in order to receive a sentence of less than death.” However, there are circumstances where although a mitigator may be relevant and must be considered by the trial judge because it is generally recognized as a mitigator, the judge “may determine in the particular case at hand that it is entitled to no weight for …

PROPORTIONALITY Although Snelgrove did not challenge the proportionality of the death sentence, “proportionality of the death sentence is an issue that this court must review in every death penalty case.” Orme v. State, 25 So.3d 536, 553 (Fla.2009).

Although Caylor asserts in the "Proportionality” section of his brief that the murder was not HAC, his statements during his police interview, as well as the testimony of the medical examiner, establish that the victim was strangled to death and that she was conscious when the attack began. ”[B]ecause strangulation of a conscious victim involves foreknowledge and the extreme anxiety of impending death, death by strangulation constitutes prima facie evidence of HAC.” Orme v. …

See Orme v. State, 25 So.3d 536, 550 (Fla.2009) ("Orme's motivation to kill Redd was, at least in part, due to his desire to obtain her money, jewelry, and car so he could ride around town, purchase more drugs, and party with the another [sic] woman all night.

See Orme v. State, 25 So.3d 536, 550 (Fla.2009) (finding primary motive for beating, rape, and murder was anger at victim for flushing defendant’s cocaine down the toilet, but subsequent theft of victim’s car and valuables in order to ride around and obtain more drugs supported pecuniary gain aggravator).

See Orme v. State, 25 So.3d 536, 549 (Fla.2009) (“Even though the trial court erred in its treatment of this mitigator, we find the error harmless.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 3391 , 177 L.Ed.2d 309 (2010); Taylor v. State, 855 So.2d 1, 30 (Fla.2003) (“[EJven if the trial judge erred in rejecting this factor as nonmitigating or in failing to assign it any weight, any error would be harmless, given the minimal amount of mitigation this factor would have provided.”).

See Orme v. State, 25 So.3d 536, 549 (Fla.2009) (“Even though the trial court erred in its treatment of this mitigator, we find the error harmless.

See Orme v. State, 25 So.3d 536, 550 (Fla.2009) (concluding that the trial court did not err in finding the pecuniary gain aggravator where the defendant beat, raped, and murdered the victim after she flushed his cocaine down the toilet), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 3391 , 177 L.Ed.2d 309 (2010).