In Re Interest of LD (1986)

More importantly for the present case that is before us by virtue of the opinion of the Court of Appeals assailing the shortcomings of the supplemental petition relative to Lerry, we have noted that "it is the adjudication that a child is a juvenile, as characterized in § 43-247, which vests subject matter jurisdiction in a juvenile court, not the petition by which an adjudication is requested." See In re Interest of L.D. et al., 224 Neb. 249, 259-60 , 398 N.W.2d 91, 98 (198…

More importantly for the present case that is before us by virtue of the opinion of the Court of Appeals assailing the shortcomings of the supplemental petition relative to Lerry, we have noted that “it is the adjudication that a child is a juvenile, as characterized in § 43-247, which vests subject matter jurisdiction in a juvenile court, not the petition by which an adjudication is requested.” See In re Interest of L.D. et al., 224 Neb. 249, 259-60 , 398 N.W.2d 91, 98 (198…

It has been held that “the Nebraska Juvenile Code must be liberally construed to accomplish its purposes serving the best interests of juveniles within the act.” In re Interest of L.D. et al., 224 Neb. at 257, 398 N.W.2d at 97.

In Nebraska, before Burries, verification was generally a “formal matter” and “as any other formal matter, an absence of, or defect in, verification [was] waived by failure to make a proper and timely objection.” In re Int. of L.D., 398 N.W.2d 91, 98 (Neb. 1986).

Section 23-168.04 provides in relevant part that “[a]ny person or persons, jointly or severally, aggrieved by any decision of *628 the board of adjustment. . . may present to the district court for the county a petition, duly verified, setting forth that such decision is illegal, in whole or in part, and specifying the grounds of the illegality.” We have previously held that verification “ ‘is a purely procedural direction which is formal but does not go to the essence of th…

“This is not to say that a juvenile court may exercise such jurisdiction at the whim of the judge, but only after a proposed change is brought before the court with appropriate pleadings, notice, and a hearing with evidence which justifies a change in placement.” In re Interest of David C., ante at 210, 572 N.W.2d at 400 . *690 Moreover, in In re Interest of L.D. et al., 224 Neb. 249, 262 , 398 N.W.2d 91, 100 (1986) (juvenile court had no power under § 43-295 to review evide…

Stat. § 43-274 (Reissue 1993) provides in significant part: “The county attorney . . . may file with the clerk of the court having jurisdiction in the matter, a petition in writing specifying which subdivision of section 43-247 is alleged, setting forth the facts verified by affidavit...” In In re Interest of L.D. et al., 224 Neb. 249, 258 , 398 N.W.2d 91, 98 (1986), a case where the sufficiency of an unverified petition was considered, the Supreme Court stated, “[W]e find t…

In re Interest of L.D. et al., 224 Neb. 249, 261 , 398 N.W.2d 91, 99 (1986).

In re Interest of L.D. et al., 224 Neb. 249, 256 , 398 N.W.2d 91, 97 (1986).

Co. v. Jones , 798 S.W.2d 719 , 721 (Mo. 1990)]; see also In re Interest of L.D. , 224 Neb. 249 , 398 N.W.2d 91 , 98 (1986).

See In re Interest of L.D. et al., 224 Neb. 249, 258 , 398 N.W.2d 91, 98 (1986): “A petition, as a pleading, is a plaintiff’s or claimant’s written statement of fact which invokes the jurisdiction of a court, sets out a cause of action, and seeks relief.” See, also, Paxton v. State, 59 Neb. 460 , 81 N.W. 383 (1899). “ ‘Proper pleading requires a petition to state in logical and legal form the facts which constitute the plaintiff’s cause of action, define the issues to which …

See In re Interest of L.D. et al., 224 Neb. 249 , 398 N.W.2d 91 (1986).

See, also, In re Interest of L.D. et al., 224 Neb. 249 , 398 N.W.2d 91 (1986) (adjudication under § 43-247(1), (2), (3)(b), and (4) is akin to cases brought under Nebraska Criminal Code or other statutes specifying criminal offenses). [4] Gabriel argues only that the State did not present suf- ficient evidence to prove that he committed sexual assault in the first degree.

See In re Interest of L.D. et al., 224 Neb. 249 , 398 N.W.2d 91 (1986).

Ordinarily, however, the verification does not “constitute a part of the pleading itself but, rather, goes to the form of the pleading.” Id.; see also In re Interest of L.D., 398 N.W.2d 91, 98 (Neb. 1986).

See In re Interest of L.D. et al., 224 Neb. 249 , 398 N.W.2d 91 (1986).

See In re Interest of L.D. et al., 224 Neb. 249 , 398 N.W.2d 91 (1986).

See In re Interest of L.D. et al., 224 Neb. 249 , 398 N.W.2d 91 (1986) (preponderance of evidence sufficient to support adjudication that juvenile was within purview of § 43-247(3)(a)).

See In re Interest of L.D. et al., 224 Neb. 249 , 398 N.W.2d 91 (1986).

See In re Interest of L.D. et al., 224 Neb. 249 , 398 N.W.2d 91 (1986) (proceedings in juvenile court involve impressionable children in their formative years, not impersonal flotsam and jetsam adrift on a sea of indecision or, much worse, societal insensitivity or apathy).

See In re Interest of L.D. et al., 224 Neb. 249 , 398 N.W.2d 91 (1986) (proceedings in juvenile court involve impressionable children in their formative years, not impersonal flotsam and jetsam adrift on a sea of indecision or, much worse, societal insensitivity or apathy).