Green v. State (1992)

“If neces- sary, the plain and ordinary meaning of the word can be ascer- tained by reference to a dictionary.” Green v. State, 604 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992); see also State v. Kinchen, 490 So. 2d 21, 22 (Fla. 1985) (using dictionary definition to define “fairly” in the context of the “fairly susceptible test,” a common law standard about comments on the defendant’s failure to testify, where prior court had not de- fined the word “fairly” when creating the test); State v. Gri…

Second, the court applied the principle of ejusdem generis, which provides that "where an enumeration of specific things is followed by *491 some more general word, the general word will usually be construed to refer to things of the same kind or species as those specifically enumerated." Id. (quoting Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 472 (Fla.1992) ).

When a term is not defined within a statute, a fundamental construction tool requires giving a statutory term its "plain and ordinary meaning." Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992); Dianderas v. Fla. Birth Related Neurological, 973 So.2d 523, 527 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).

See id. ("If necessary, the plain and ordinary meaning of the word can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary.").

If necessary, the plain and ordinary meaning of the word can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary.” Green v. State, 604 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992) (internal citation omitted).

Fundamentally, statutory construction demands "that we give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, unless the words are defined in the statute or by the clear intent of the legislature." Green v. State, 604 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992).

When necessary, the plain and ordinary meaning of words can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary.”) (first quoting Green v. State, 604 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992); and then Seagrave v. State, 802 So. 2d 281, 286 (Fla. 2001)) (emphasis added).

Consequently, "the plain and ordinary meaning of [a] word can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary." Sieniarecki v. State, 756 So. 2d 68, 75 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Green v. State, 604 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992)).

Although neither of the two statutes defines the word “person,” it must be given its “plain and ordinary meaning.” Green v. Siaie, 604 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992). ln common understanding, “person” refers to a “human being,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1686 (1993 ed.), which is not occupation-specific and plainly includes human beings serving as law enforcement officers.

Green v. State, 604 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992).

"When a term is undefined by statute, '[o]ne of the most fundamental tenets of statutory construction' requires that we give a statutory term 'its plain and ordinary meaning.' " Rollins v. Pizzarelli, 761 So. 2d 294, 298 (Fla. 2000) (alteration in original) (quoting Green v. State, 604 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992)).

“One of the most fundamental tenets of statutory construction requires that we give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, unless words are defined in the statute or by the clear intent of the legislature.” Id. (quoting Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992)). “[I]t is axiomatic that all parts of a statute must be read together in order to achieve a consistent whole.

See Green v. State, 604 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992) ("[W]e give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, unless the words are defined in the statute or by the clear intent of the legislature."); State, Dep't of Health & Rehab.

In other -words, the tools must be “objects which actually facilitate the breaking and entering.” Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992) (holding that gloves are not burglary tools).

We must “give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, unless the words are defined in the statute or by the clear intent of the legislature.” Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992) (citing Se.

The language must be given “its plan and ordinary meaning.” Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992).

Ctr., Inc. v. See, 79 So.3d 1, 9 (Fla.2012); see State v. Mitro, 700 So.2d 643, 645 (Fla.1997); Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992).

We must “give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, unless the words are defined in the statute or by the clear intent of the legislature.” Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992) (citing Se.

Dist., 774 So.2d at 915 . “[T]he plain and ordinary meaning of [a] word can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary.” Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992).

Tillman v. State, 934 So.2d 1263, 1269 (Fla.2006), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Motes v. State, 37 So.3d 301 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992).

Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992).

We must “give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, unless the words are defined in the statute or by the clear intent of the legislature.” Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992) (citing Se.

See Daniels v. Fla. Dep’t of Health, 898 So.2d 61, 64 (Fla.2005) (when a statute is clear and unambiguous, courts will not look behind the statute’s plain language or resort to rules of construction); Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992) (“If necessary, the plain and ordinary meaning of the word can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary.” (citation omitted)).

Bd., 975 So.2d 1116, 1122 (Fla.2008) ("It is appropriate to refer to dictionary definitions when construing statutes or rules.”); Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992) ("If necessary, the plain and ordinary meaning of the word can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary.”). .

Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992).

When a term is not defined within a statute, a fundamental construction tool requires giving a statutory term its "plain and ordinary meaning." Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992); Dianderas v. Fla. Birth Related Neurological, 973 So.2d 523, 527 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).

When a term is undefined by statute, "[o]ne of the most fundamental tenets of statutory construction" requires that we give a statutory term "its plain and ordinary meaning." Green. v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992).

We must then give that language its plain and ordinary meaning, “unless the words are defined in the statute or by the clear intent of the legislature.” Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992).

Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992)(citing Southeastern Fisheries Ass’n, Inc. v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 453 So.2d 1351 (Fla.1984)).

Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992).

Further, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that in the absence of a statutory definition, courts can resort to definitions of the same term found in case law." Rollins v. Pizzarelli, 761 So.2d 294, 298 (Fla.2000) (quoting Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992)); see also Level 3 Communications, LLC, 841 So.2d at 452 n. 4.

Seagrave v. State, 802 So.2d 281, 286 (Fla.2001) (citation omitted) (quoting Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992)).

Complicating the analysis in the instant matter is the fact that the sales and use tax statute does not define the term "intrastate." However, as we have determined, When a term is undefined by statute, "[o]ne of the most fundamental tenets of statutory construction" requires that we give a statutory term "its plain and ordinary meaning." Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992).

One maxim of statutory construction, ejusdem generis, dictates that when "an enumeration of specific things is followed by some more general word, the general word will usually be construed to refer to things of the same kind or species as those specifically enumerated." Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992).

"One of the most fundamental tenets of statutory construction requires that we give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, unless the words are defined in the statute or by the clear intent of the legislature." Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992).

"One of the most fundamental tenets of statutory construction requires that we give statutory language its *317 plain and ordinary meaning, unless words are defined in the statute or by the clear intent of the legislature." Id. (citing Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992)).

Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992).

"One of the most fundamental tenets of statutory construction requires that we give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, unless words are defined in the statute or by the clear intent of the legislature." Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992).

"One of the most fundamental tenets of statutory construction requires that we give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, unless words are defined in the statute or by the clear intent of the legislature." Seagrave v. State, 802 So.2d 281, 286 (Fla.2001)(quoting Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992)).

Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992) (citation omitted).

"One of the most fundamental tenets of statutory construction requires that we give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, unless words are defined in the statute or by *205 the clear intent of the legislature." Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992).

Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992).

In Green v. State, relied upon by Wilson , the Florida Supreme Court determined that a pair of gloves would not be viewed as burglary tools under a statutory scheme prohibiting possession of "`any tool, machine, or implement with intent to use the same, or allow the same to be used, to commit any burglary....'" 604 So.2d 471, 472 (Fla.1992) (quoting *246 § 810.06, Fla. Stat. (1989)).

See L.B. v. State, 700 So.2d 370, 372 (Fla.1997); Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992).

In Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992), the court stated that "[o]ne of the most fundamental tenets of statutory construction requires that we give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, unless the words are defined in the statute or by the clear intent of the legislature." See also Raulerson v. State, 763 So.2d 285 (Fla.2000).

In Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992), the court stated that “[o]ne of the most fundamental tenets of statutory construction requires that we give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, unless the words are defined in the statute or by the clear intent of the legislature.” See also Raulerson v. State, 763 So.2d 285 (Fla.2000).

See, e.g., Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992) ("Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, where an enumeration of specific things is followed by some more general word, the general word will usually be construed to refer to things of the same kind or species as those specifically enumerated").

Second, the principle of statutory construction known as ejusdem generis provides that "where an enumeration of specific things is followed by some more general word, the general word will usually be construed to refer to things of the same kind or species as those specifically enumerated." Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 472 (Fla.1992).

See generally Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992) ("Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, where an enumeration of specific things is followed by some more general word, the general word will usually be construed to refer to things of the same kind or species as those specifically enumerated").

See L.B. v. State, 700 So.2d 370 , 372 (Fla.1997); Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992).