Wright v. State (1981)

In short, it’s because their statements of the elements required to prove second-degree murder on a principal theory are not neces- sarily inconsistent with the court’s instruction that the state didn’t have to prove that “the defendants had an intent to cause death.” Then-Judge Pariente explained this in her dissenting opinion in Jamerson, 677 So. 2d at 1301 (Pariente, J., dissenting), and the Flor- ida appellate court in Wright v. State, 402 So. 2d 493, 499 (Fla. Dist.

Wright v. State, 402 So.2d 493, 498 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981); Cawthon v. State, 382 So.2d 796, 797 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.), petition for rev. denied, 388 So.2d 1110 (Fla.1980).

Wright v. State, 402 So.2d 493, 498 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981); Cawthon v. State, 382 So.2d 796, 797 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.), petition for rev. denied, 388 So.2d 1110 (Fla.1980).

We note that "duress is not a defense to intentional homicide because ‘duress will never justify the killing of an innocent third party.' ” Henry v. State, 613 So.2d 429 , 432 n.6 (Fla. 1992) (quoting Wright v. State, 402 So.2d 493, 498 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)). .

Code Ann. § 5-2-208 [LexisNexis 2006]); People v. Anderson, 28 Cal. 4th 767, 772 (2002); Wright v. State, 402 So. 2d 493, 497-499 (Fla. Dist.

Wright, 402 So.2d at 498, n. 6 .

See Hunt v. State, 753 So.2d 609 , 613 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 767 So.2d 457 (Fla.2000); Wright v. State, 402 So.2d 493, 498 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) ("`Legal recognition of duress as a defense to crimes other than homicide necessarily assumes a working hypothesis that a harm or crime of greater magnitude is avoided when the subjected person succumbs to the duress.

See Cawthon v. State, 382 So.2d 796 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Wright v. State, 402 So.2d 493, 498 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).

Id. at 498 (footnote omitted.) Other states have also rejected the duress defense in a homicide context either on the basis of common law or statute.

In both Hunt v. State, 753 So. 2d 609, 613 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) and Wright v. State, 402 So. 2d 493, 498 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), the defense of duress was found nonapplicable because the crime charged was homicide.

It is undisputed that “duress is not a defense to intentional homicide because ‘duress will never justify the killing of an innocent third party.’ ” Henry v. State, 613 So.2d 429 , 432 n. 6 (Fla.1992) (quoting Wright v. State, 402 So.2d 493, 498 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)).

See, e.g., Sanders/Miller v. Logan, 710 F.2d 645, 647 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding that the defendant must herself possess a premeditated design to effect death or must have known of the other person’s intent to kill the victim); People v. Robinson, 475 Mich. 1 , 715 N.W.2d 44, 48 (2006) (“We reaffirm that evidence of defendant’s specific intent to commit a crime or knowledge of the accomplice’s intent constitutes sufficient mens rea to convict under our aiding and abetting sta…

This hypothesis disappears when duress is sought to be invoked as a defense in a homicide case.’ ”) (quoting Wright v. State, 402 So. 2d 493, 498 (Fla. Dist.

This hypothesis disappears when duress is sought to be invoked as a defense in a homicide case.'") (quoting Wright v. State, 402 So.2d 493, 498 (Fla.3d Dist.Ct.App.1981)).

As explained in Wright v. State, 402 So.2d 493, 499 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), a person who aids and abets another to commit murder must have the state of mind required for the homicide or must know that the person aided had the requisite state of mind.

M.D.V. v. State, 469 So.2d 944 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); Wright v. State, 402 So.2d 493, 499 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).

Moreover, duress is not a defense to intentional homicide because "duress will never justify the killing of an innocent third party." Wright v. State, 402 So.2d 493, 498 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). [7] State v. Jones, 204 So.2d 515 (Fla. 1967), applied the contemporaneous objection rule to prosecutorial comments. [8] Besides failing for not being made before the trial court, this issue has been decided adversely to Henry's position.

Moreover, duress is not a defense to intentional homicide because "duress will never justify the killing of an innocent third party.” Wright v. State, 402 So.2d 493, 498 (Fla. 3d DCA1981). .

Moreover, duress is not a defense to intentional homicide because "duress will never justify the killing of an innocent third party." Wright v. State, 402 So.2d 493, 498 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). [7] State v. Jones, 204 So.2d 515 (Fla. 1967), applied the contemporaneous objection rule to prosecutorial comments. [8] Besides failing for not being made before the trial court, this issue has been decided adversely to Henry's position.

Moreover, duress is not a defense to intentional homicide because "duress will never justify the killing of an innocent third party." Wright v. State, 402 So.2d 493, 498 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). .

Hall v. State, 136 Fla. 644 , 187 So. 392 (1939); Corujo v. State, 424 So.2d 43, 44 (Fla.2d DCA), review denied, 434 So.2d 886 (Fla. 1983); Wright v. State, 402 So.2d 493, 498 (Fla.3d DCA 1981); Koontz v. State, 204 So.2d 224, 227 (Fla.2d DCA 1967).

See, e.g., Wright, supra, 402 So.2d at 498 n. 8; State v. Proctor, 585 N.W.2d 841, 844 (Iowa 1998); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 382 Mass. 189 , 415 N.E.2d 805 , 813 n. 14 (1981); State v. Dissicini, 316 A.2d 12 , 16 n. * (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div. 1974), aff'd, 66 N.J. 411 , 331 A.2d 618 (1975); Campos, supra, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 908 ; State v. Gay, 334 N.C. 467 , 434 S.E.2d 840 , 854 & n. 3 (1993); State v. Bockorny, 124 Or.App. 585 , 863 P.2d 1296, 1298 (1993), cert. denied, 318 Or.…

See Wright v. State, 402 So.2d 493, 497 (Fla.App.1981) (“An imminent danger is one which cannot be guarded against by calling for the protection of the law”), citing Black’s Law Dictionary 676 (5th Ed.1979).

See Wright v. State, 402 So.2d 493 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) and Cawthon v. State, 382 So.2d 796 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).