Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks (2009)

Mr. Shores does not pursue those arguments on appeal. 11 Appellate Case: 24-1345 Document: 17 Date Filed: 04/29/2026 Page: 12 In addition, “a statute of limitations is subject to tolling.” Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1097 (10th Cir. 2009).

We conclude that the District Court was correct to dismiss the complaint because Mote’s claims are time barred. 1 Ordinarily, the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and is subject to waiver, see Chainey v. Street, * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. 1 We therefore do not need to reach the District Court’s alternative rationale, based on issue preclusion, fo…

We conclude that the District Court was correct to dismiss the complaint because Mote’s claims are time barred. 1 Ordinarily, the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and is subject to waiver, see Chainey v. Street, * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. 1 We therefore do not need to reach the District Court’s alternative rationale, based on issue preclusion, fo…

“Like dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6), we review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2) in an in forma pauperis proceeding.” Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1094 (10th Cir. 2009).

A court may sua sponte dismiss an untimely complaint if “it is clear from the face of the complaint that there are no meritorious tolling issues, or the court has provided the 2 plaintiff notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue.” Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1097 (10th Cir. 2009); see also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 , 214–15 (2007) (explaining that a complaint whose allegations show that they are clearly time-barred is subject to dismissal for failure…

Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198 , 209–10 (2006); Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1097 (10th Cir. 2009).

Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1097 (10th Cir. 2009).

See Duarte v. City of Stockton, 60 F.4th 566 , 571-73 (9th Cir. 2023); Mitchell v. Kirchmeier, 28 F.4th 888 , 895-96 (8th Cir. 2022); Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1095 (10th Cir. 2009); S.E. v. Grant 4 In Tim T., a case that predated Rodriguez, the SJC made clear that, under Section 87, a court cannot place a criminal defendant on pretrial probation, with the understanding that successful completion of the probation will result in dismissal of the charges, withou…

Vasquez 3 Appellate Case: 24-3148 Document: 14-1 Date Filed: 06/04/2025 Page: 4 Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1094 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing Perkins v. Kan.

Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1094 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing Perkins v. Kansas Dep’t of Corrections, 165 F.3d 803, 806 (10th Cir. 1999)).

For these characterizations, the parties appear to rely on their arguments involving the statement of a valid claim. 4 See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214 , 1217–1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (applying the “same standard of review for dismissals under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) that we employ for Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim”); see also Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1094 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e review de novo a district co…

Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1097 (10th Cir. 2007).2 In a memorandum filed by Williams in this Court, Williams argues that he is entitled to a certificate of appealability.

See Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006); see also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007); Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1097 (10th Cir. 2009).

He alleges violations of “the law about unfair housing.” Id. at 3 . “[W]e review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2) in an in forma pauperis proceeding.” Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1094 (10th Cir. 2009).

We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint in an in forma pauperis proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2).1 Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1094 (10th Cir. 2009).

II Any complaint filed pursuant to the IFP provisions of § 1915(a) is subject to sua sponte dismissal if the court determines that complaint “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii). “[W]e review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal pursuant to . . . § 1915(e)(2) in an [IFP] proceeding.” Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1094 (10th Cir. 2009).

Although the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that ordinarily must be pleaded and is subject to waiver, see Chainey v. Street, 523 F.3d 200, 209 (3d Cir. 2008), untimeliness can justify sua sponte dismissal where “it is clear from the face of the complaint that there are no meritorious tolling issues, or the court has provided the plaintiff notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue.” Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1097 (10th Cir. 2009); see…

“Like dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6), we review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2) in an in forma pauperis proceeding.” Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1094 (10th Cir. 2009).

See Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006); see also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007); Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1097 (10th Cir. 2009).

See Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006); see also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007); Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1097 (10th Cir. 2009).

Fund, LLC, 749 F.3d 1180, 1184 (10th Cir. 2014) (Rule 12(b)(6)); Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1094 (10th Cir. 2009) (§ 1915(e)(2)).

See Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006); see also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007); Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1097 (10th Cir. 2009).

See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007); Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1097 (10th Cir. 2009); cf. Bethel v. Jendoco Const. Corp., 570 F.2d 1168 , 1174 (3d Cir. 1978) (recognizing that a “limitations defense may be raised on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), but only if ‘the time alleged in the statement of a claim shows that the cause of action has not been brought within the statute of limitations’”) (citation omitted).

See Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006); see also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007); Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1097 (10th Cir. 2009).

See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007); Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1097 (10th Cir. 2009). 3 affirm a district court for any reason supported by the record.” Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2011).

See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 214-15 (2007); Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1097 (10th Cir. 2009); see generally Acequia, Inc. v. Prudential Ins.

State Police, 88 F.3d 188 , 190 3 Ordinarily, the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and is subject to waiver, see Chainey v. Street, 523 F.3d 200, 209 (3d Cir. 2008), but untimeliness may justify sua sponte dismissal where, as here, “it is clear from the face of the complaint that there are no meritorious tolling issues.” Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1097 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 2007)…

While in some circumstances it may be appropriate for a district court to dismiss a complaint sua sponte based on the statute of limitations, it should not do so “unless it is clear from the face of the complaint that there are no meritorious tolling issues, or the court has provided the plaintiff notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue.” Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1097 (10th Cir. 2009).

Cf. Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1097 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 2007)).

While a District Court possesses the authority to sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s § 1983 action on the basis of the statute of limitations, it may not do so unless “it is clear from the face of the complaint that there are no meritorious tolling issues, or the court has provided the plaintiff notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1097 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing Abbas v. Lt.

Cf. Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1095 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding Heck did not bar § 1983 claim claiming plaintiffs signature had been forged on agreement resulting in deferred prosecution, because under Kansas law, there was “no related underlying conviction that could be invalidated by [a] § 1983 [suit]”).

See e.g., Taylor v. Gregg, 36 F.3d 453 , 455–56 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that pretrial diversion programs are not favorable terminations); Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1095 (10th Cir. 2009) (“The diversion agreements resulted in deferral of prosecution of the offenses at issue.

Bd. of Educ., 544 F.3d 633, 639 (6th Cir. 2008); Mitchell v. Kirchmeier, 28 F.4th 888, 895 (8th Cir. 2022); Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1095 (10th Cir. 2009); McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007).

"If the allegations [of a complaint] show that relief is barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim." Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1096 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted).

Cf. Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1095 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding Heck did not bar § 1983 claim claiming plaintiff’s signature had been forged on agreement resulting in deferred prosecution, because under Kansas law, there was no related underlying conviction that could be invalidated by [a] § 1983 [suit]).

Cf. Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1095 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding Heck did not bar § 1983 claim claiming plaintiff’s signature had been forged on agreement resulting in deferred prosecution, because under Kansas law, there was no related underlying conviction that could be invalidated by [a] § 1983 [suit]).

Personal Involvement 5 The Court recognizes that the statute of limitations is tolled during the time inmates exhaust their administrative remedies, Pearson v. Secretary Department of Corrections, 775 F.3d 598 (3d Cir. 2015), and that courts “may not sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s § 1983 action on the basis of the statute of limitations unless it is clear from the face of the complaint that there are no meritorious tolling issues, or the court has provided the plaintiff not…

As the court stated in Rode: 4 The Court recognizes that the statute of limitations is tolled during the time inmates exhaust their administrative remedies, Pearson v. Secretary Department of Corrections, 775 F.3d 598 (3d Cir. 2015), and that courts “may not sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s § 1983 action on the basis of the statute of limitations unless it is clear from the face of the complaint that there are no meritorious tolling issues, or the court has provided the plain…

Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 214-15 (2007); Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1096 (10th Cir. 2009).

Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 214-15 (2007); Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1096 ( 10" Cir. 2009).

Generally, the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and is subject to waiver, see Chainey v. Street, 523 F.3d 200, 209 (3d Cir. 2008), but a court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint as untimely where “it is clear from the face of the complaint that there are no meritorious tolling issues, or the court has provided the plaintiff notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue.” Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1097 (10th Cir. 2009) …

Co., 816 F.3d 666, 671 (10th Cir. 2016); see Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1096-97 (10th Cir. 2009) (“if the allegations show that relief is barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim”).

Compl, ECF No. 13, at 14.) “When a district court believes it is likely that a pro se prisoner’s § 1983 complaint is dismissible on the basis of the state’s statute of limitations, the court may issue a show cause order giving the plaintiff an opportunity to explain why the statute of limitations should not be tolled.” Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1097 (10th Cir. 2009).

See Varnell, 756 F.3d at 1216 ; see also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 , 214–15 (2007) (case may be dismissed where affirmative defense appears on the face of the complaint); Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1096 (10th Cir. 2009) (same).

See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 214-15 (2007)(stating that claims are properly dismissed where affirmative defense is clear on the complaint’s face); Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1096 (10th Cir. 2009); Varnell v. Dora Consol.

“If the allegations [of a complaint] show that relief is barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim.” Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1096 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

DeGIUSTI Chief United States District Judge 1 “IT]f the allegations [of a complaint] show that relief is barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim.” Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1096-97 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation omitted).

See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007); Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1186 (10th Cir. 2010); Pace v. Swerdlow, 519 F.3d 1067, 1073 (10th Cir. 2008). 2 “(T/f the allegations [of a complaint] show that relief is barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim.” Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1096-97 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation omitted). > “A dismissal wi…

The Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have concluded that does not bar a subsequent lawsuit after disposition of a criminal case through a pretrial diversion agreement that ultimately results in the dismissal of criminal charges. , 544 F.3d 633 , 637–39 (6th Cir. 2008) (Kentucky juvenile pretrial diversion program); , 589 F.3d 1091, 1095 (10th Cir. 2009) (Kansas pretrial diversion program); , 483 F.3d 1231 , 1250–51 (11th Cir. 2007) (Florida pretrial intervention program);…

Bd. of Educ., 544 F.3d 633, 637-39 (6th Cir. 2008) (Kentucky juvenile pretrial diversion program); Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1095 (10th Cir. 2009) (Kansas pretrial diversion program); McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1250-51 (11th Cir. 2007) (Florida pretrial intervention program); see also Butts v. City of Bowling Green, 374 F.Supp.2d 532, 537 (W.D.