Franklin v. Kellogg Co. (2010)

But see Franklin v. Kellogg, 619 F.3d 604, 619 (6th Cir. 2010).

But see Franklin v. Kellogg, 619 F.3d 604, 619 (6th Cir.2010).

But see Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 619 (6th Cir.2010).

See Spoerle v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 614 F.3d 427, 428 (7th Cir. 2010) (meat production workers’ boots, hard hats, smocks, and hair nets), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 933 , 178 L.Ed.2d 753 (2011); Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 614-15 (6th Cir.2010) (frozen food workers’ uniforms and PPE, including hair nets, safety glasses, ear plugs, and hard hats); Sepulveda v. Allen Family Foods, Inc., 591 F.3d 209, 215-18 (4th Cir.2009) (poultry workers’ PPE), cert. de…

Id. at 619-20.

Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 610 (6th Cir. 2010).

Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 610 (6th Cir. 2010).

Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 611 (6th Cir.2010).

Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 610 (6th Cir.2010).

Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 610 (6th Cir.2010).

Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 610 (6th Cir.2010).

Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 610 (6th Cir.2010).

See Salazar v. Butterball, LLC, 644 F.3d 1130, 1138 (10th Cir.2011); Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 611-12 (6th Cir.2010); Allen v. McWane, Inc., 593 F.3d 449, 458 (5th Cir.2010); Anderson v. Cagle’s, Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 957-58 (11th Cir.2007).

The Sixth Circuit recently analyzed the extent to which the DOL’s 2010 Opinion Letter is entitled to deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 , 65 S.Ct. 161 , 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944) and concluded that it was not entitled to deference because the agency’s position “has changed repeatedly in the last twelve years.” Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 614 (6th Cir.2010) (“[A]n agency interpretation of a relevant provision which conflicts with the agency’s earlier i…

In Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 620 (6th Cir.2010), the Sixth Circuit relied on Steiner, Alvarez, and precedent from other circuits to articulate three factors to determine whether an activity is integral and indispensable to a principal activity or activities.

See Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392-94 , 80 S.Ct. 453 , 4 L.Ed.2d 393 (1960); Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 611 (6th Cir.2010).

Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 612 (6th Cir. 2010). 1.

Id. (citing Salazar v. Butterball, L.L.C., 644 F.3d 1130, 1138-39 (10th Cir.2011); Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 612 (6th Cir.2010); Allen v. McWane, Inc., 593 F.3d 449, 458-59 (5th Cir.2010); Anderson v. Cagle’s, Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 955-59 (11th Cir.2007); Turner v. City of Philadelphia, 262 F.3d 222, 226-27 (3d Cir.2001)). .

Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 620 (6th Cir.2010).

“The overtime-pay exemptions set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 213 are affirmative defenses that defendants must prove.” Hopkins v. Chartrand, 566 F. App’x 445, 448 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 611 (6th Cir. 2010)).

Thus, if a BFC technician participates in a mandatory telephone conference that is part of his “principal activities,” then his commute after that meeting would apparently be compensable time, as part of the employee’s “continuous workday.” Accord Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 618 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[D]uring a continuous workday, any [otherwise non-compensable travel] time that occurs after the beginning of the employee’s first principal activity and before the end o…

First, courts are split as to whether 13 § 203(o) is an affirmative defense that a defendant has the burden to prove, or an element that 14 plaintiffs must show does not apply.74 At least one court in this circuit has interpreted Ninth 15 Circuit precedent to conclude that it is an affirmative defense.75 The parties do not brief this 16 17 18 71 ECF No. 67 at 17. 72 29 U.S.C. § 203 (o). 19 73 ECF No. 60 at 16. 20 74 See, e.g., Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 611 (6th …

As an exclusion under the FLSA, Plaintiffs bear the burden of proof. ., 619 F.3d at 611-612 (because the “changing clothes” provision is under the definitions set forth in § 203, the plaintiff bears the burden to prove that the time should not be excluded under § 203(o)).

Appx. 445, 448 (6th Cir. 2014); Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 611 (6th Cir. 2010).

Defendant relies on the Sixth Circuit’s logic in Franklin v. Kellogg Company, 619 F.3d 604, 617 (6th Cir. 2010), where it examined this statutory language.

In Franklin v. Kellogg Co., a pre-Integ-rity Staffing Solutions casé, the Sixth Circuit adopted a three-part test for determining whether an activity is integral and indispensable, asking: “‘(1) whether the activity is required by the employer; (2) whether the activity is necessary for the employee to perform his or her duties; and [3] whether the activity primarily benefits the employer.’” 619 F.3d 604, 620 (6th Cir.2010) (quoting Bonilla v. Baker Concrete Constr., Inc., 48…

The following decisions concluded that § 203(o) is not an exemption as originally defined under the FLSA: Turner v. City of Phila., 262 F.3d 222, 224 (3d Cir.2001) (“Section 203(o) ... provides a specific exclusion from the calculation of hours worked for clothes and uniform ' change time”); Adams v. United States, 471 F.3d 1321, 1325-26 (Fed.Cir.2006) (“[T]he Portal-to-Portal Act does not create an “exemption” in the same sense as the Supreme Court used in [Corning Glass Wo…

See Perez, 650 F.3d at 366-67 , 2011 WL 2207110, at * 8 (because of the importance of protective gear in ensuring the safety and sanitation of chicken processing, donning and doffing primarily benefit the employer); Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 620 (6th Cir.2010) (“[Bjecause the uniform and equipment ensures sanitary working conditions and untainted products,” donning and doffing primarily benefit the employer.); Ballaris, 370 F.3d at 911 (donning and doffing unifo…

Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 614 (6th Cir.Tenn.2010) (citations and quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original).

See Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604 , 619–20 (6th Cir. 2010) (collecting cases).

See, e.g, Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604 (6th Cir. 2010) (for the time spent walking between the changing room and the time clock, donning and doffing the uniform and equipment was both integral and indispensable to the job … remanding for fact finding on other issues); Gorman v. Consolidated Edison Corp., 488 F.3d 586, 593 (2d Cir. 2007) (donning and doffing is only “integral and indispensable” to a principal activity when the principal activity is performed in a let…

See Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 610 (6th Cir. 2010) (explaining that we review summary-judgment orders de novo).

Compare Perez, 832 F.3d at 125 (holding “that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the plaintiffs’ donning and doffing of uniforms are integral and indispensable to their principal activities”), with Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 620 (6th Cir. 2010) (determining the integral and indispensable question as a matter of law). 11 We do not address two other arguments advanced by Precision, namely that donning and doffing is not compensable under the Department of …

See Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 618 (6th Cir. 2010).

See Franklin, 619 F.3d at 619-20 ; Bonilla v. Baker Concrete Constr., Inc., 487 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir.2007); and Ballaris v. Wacker Siltronic Corp., 370 F.3d 901 (9th Cir.2004).

Put differently, Lee has plausibly alleged Dana Inc, could not have “eliminated [changing into and out of PPE] altogether without impairing the employees’ ability to complete their work.” Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc., 547 U.S. at 35; accord Franklin v. Kellogg, Co., 619 F.3d 604, 620 (6th Cir. 2010) (changing into an out of a uniform and protective equipment was “integral and indispensable” to the employees’ work under 29 U.S.C. § 203 (o) where it protected them from p…

See Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 614 (6th Cir. 2010). the items that Plaintiffs don and doff—earplugs—does not meet the definition of clothes.

See Franklin v. Kellogg Co. , 619 F.3d 604 , 620 (6th Cir. 2010) ; Anderson , 328 U.S. at 692 , 66 S.Ct. 1187 .

See Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604 (6th Cir.2010).

See, e.g., Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 610 (6th Cir.2010) (Section 259(a) is an affirmative defense); accord, Tran v. Thai Civil Action No. H-08-3650, 2010 WL 5232944 at *5 (S.D.Tex.