Missouri Ass'n of Club Executives, Inc. v. State (2006)

X, § 22(a). -31- and did not affect the validity of the original decades-old language.15 See Mo. Ass’n of Club Executives v. Missouri, 208 S.W.3d 885, 888-89 (Mo. 2006) (en banc) (challenged provisions could be severed); Weinschenk v. Missouri, 203 S.W.3d 201, 219-21 (Mo. 2006) (en banc) (provisions were not severable).

The 2000 modification merely added language to the ordinance and did not affect the validity of the original decades-old language. 15 See Mo. Ass’n of Club Executives v. Missouri, 208 S.W.3d 885, 888-89 (Mo.2006) (en banc) (challenged provisions could be severed); Weinschenk v. Missouri, 203 S.W.3d 201, 219-21 (Mo.2006) (en banc) (provisions were not severable).

Similarly, in Missouri Association of Club Executives, the bill originally purported to specifically enact “four new sections related to intoxication-related traffic offenses, with penalty provisions.” 208 S.W.3d at 887 (emphasis omitted).

Dillon would thwart the purposes of article III, section 21 to “facilitate orderly procedure, avoid surprise, and prevent ‘logrolling,’ in which several matters that would not individually command a majority vote are rounded up into a single bill to ensure passage” and to “keep individual members of the legislature and the public fairly apprised of the subject matter of pending laws.” Missouri Ass’n of Club Executives v. State, 208 S.W.3d 885, 888 (Mo. banc 2006) (quoting St…

“An act of the legislature carries a strong presumption of constitutionality.” Missouri Ass’n of Club Executives v. State, 208 S.W.3d 885, 888 (Mo. banc 2006).

In fact, the alterations are more similar to those upheld in Club Executives, 208 S.W.3d at 888 (finding amendments relating to “certain non-traffic related alcohol offenses, such as the sale of alcohol to minors,” were germane to an original purpose relating to alcohol-related traffic offenses).

“This Court liberally interprets the procedural limitation of original purpose,” id. at 317 , and “[t]his Court resolves all doubts in favor of the procedural and substantive validity of legislative acts.” Mo. Ass’n of Club Execs. v. State, 208 S.W.3d 885, 888 (Mo. banc 2006).

“This Court liberally interprets the procedural limitation of original purpose,” id. at 317 , and “[t]his Court resolves all doubts in favor of the procedural and substantive validity of legislative acts.” Mo. Ass’n of Club Execs. v. State, 208 S.W.3d 885, 888 (Mo. banc 2006).

The original bill title was related to “intoxication-related traffic offenses,” while the bill as enacted concerned “alcohol-related offenses.” Id. at 887 (emphasis omitted).

The original bill title was related to “intoxication-related traffic offenses,” while the bill as enacted concerned “alcohol-related offenses.” Id. at 887 (emphasis omitted).

It contains more than one subject because its minimum wage provision does not fairly relate to its original purpose. 8 See Stroh Brewery Co. v. State, 954 S.W.2d 323, 325 (Mo. banc 1997) (section 23 serves to “facilitate orderly procedure, avoid surprise, and prevent ‘logrolling,’ in which several matters that would not individually command a majority vote are rounded up into a single bill to ensure passage”); Mo. Ass’n of Club Execs., Inc. v. State, 208 S.W.3d 885, 888 (Mo.…

Mo. Ass’n of Club Exec. v. State, 208 S.W.3d 885, 889 (Mo. banc 2006).

Missouri Ass’n of Club Executives v. State, 208 S.W.3d 885, 888 (Mo. banc 2006).

Missouri Ass’n of Club Executives, Inc. v. State, 208 S.W.3d 885, 888 (Mo. banc 2006).