City of Clermont v. Rumph (1984)

"While the substantive rights of the parties in a workers' compensation case are determined by the law in effect at the time of the claimant's injury, this rule does not apply to procedural enactments." See City of Clermont v. Rumph, 450 So.2d 573, 575 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).

Lucie County Sheriff's Dep't, 599 So.2d 1353, 1355 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (explaining that an amendment to the method of obtaining wage loss was procedural where it altered "an evidentiary vehicle which supports such a claim."), review denied, 613 So.2d 6 (Fla.1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 913 , 113 S.Ct. 2350 , 124 L.Ed.2d 258 (1993); City of Clermont v. Rumph, 450 So.2d 573, 575 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (characterizing as procedural, a "burden-of-proof enactment").

Quoting City of Clermont v. Rumph, 450 So.2d 573, 576 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).

A claimant had the burden to prove that a compensable injury was “an element in the causal chain resulting in or contributing to wage loss.” City of Clermont v. Rumph, 450 So.2d 573, 576 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).

See, e.g., Brosnan v. Sourbeck Roofing, Inc., 578 So.2d 460, 462 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Minton-Sun, Inc. v. Hills, 563 So.2d 162, 164 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Edwards v. Caulfield, 560 So.2d 364, 374-75 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); City of Clermont v. Rumph, 450 So.2d 573, 576 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 458 So.2d 271 (Fla. 1984).

"While the substantive rights of the parties in a workers' compensation case are determined by the law in effect at the time of the claimant's injury, this rule does not apply to procedural enactments." City of Clermont v. Rumph, 450 So.2d 573, 575 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 458 So.2d 271 (Fla. 1984).

See Hinds v. Orlando Concrete Contractors, 454 So.2d 81 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (JCC's findings on adequacy of work search are factual findings and will go undisturbed absent a showing of abuse of discretion); City of Clermont v. Rumph, 450 So.2d 573, 577 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (an unavailing work search, sufficiently extensive and intensive, may meet the statutory requirements for prima facie proof of causation), rev. denied, 458 So.2d 271 (Fla. 1984).

City of Clermont v. Rumph, 450 So.2d 573, 575 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), review denied, 458 So.2d 271 (Fla. 1984).

However, to establish entitlement, a claimant need only show that a compensable injury was “an element in the causal chain resulting in or contributing to wage loss.” City of Clermont v. Rumph, 450 So.2d 573, 576 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).

Quoting City of Clermont v. Rumph, 450 So.2d 573, 576 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).

A claimant in a workers' compensation case bears the burden of presenting evidence that his or her compensable physical limitation is "an element in the causal chain resulting in or contributing to the wage loss." City of Clermont v. Rumph, 450 So.2d 573 at 576 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).

City of Clermont v. Rumph, 450 So.2d 573, 576 (Fla. 1st DCA) p.f.r.d. 458 So.2d 271 (Fla. 1984).

City of Clermont v. Rumph, 450 So.2d 573, 577 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) p.f.r.d. 458 So.2d 271 (Fla. 1984).

We later reaffirmed this position in our construction of the 1983 amended statute in City of Clermont v. Rumph, 450 So.2d 573, 576 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), pet. for rev. den. 458 So.2d 271 (Fla.1984), interpreting the amendment as “precluding an award of wage loss benefits when predicated solely on economic considerations unrelated to a claimant’s physical limitations by ordinary proximate cause standards.” (e.s.) Rumph emphasized that a claimant’s right to wage-loss under the s…

NOTES [1] This showing requires "evidence indicating that the compensable physical limitation is a contributing causative factor in the wage loss claimed." City of Clermont v. Rumph, 450 So.2d 573, 576 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (e.s.).

City of Clermont v. Rumph, 450 So.2d 573, 576 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Williams Roofing, Inc. v. Moore, 447 So.2d 968, 972 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).

Id. at 464–66; see also City of Clermont v. Rumph, 450 So. 2d 573, 575 (Fla 1st DCA 1984) (finding change in employee’s burden of proof to be procedural and subject to retroactive application).

See Terners of Miami Corp. v. Freshwater, 599 So.2d 674, 675 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) ("While the substantive rights of the parties in a workers' compensation case are determined by the law in effect at the time of the claimant's injury, this rule does not apply to procedural enactments.") (quoting City of Clermont v. Rumph, 450 So.2d 573, 575 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), rev. denied, 458 So.2d 271 (Fla.1984)); Sullivan v. Mayo, 121 So.2d 424 (Fla.1960), cert. denied, 133 So.2d 647 (Fla.…

See Kerce v. Coca-Cola — Foods Division, 389 So.2d 1177 (Fla.1980). 450 So.2d at 576 . .

See e.g., City of Clermont v. Rumph, 450 So.2d 573 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 458 So.2d 271 (Fla. 1984).

See GCC Beverages v. Simmons, 571 So.2d 59 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (1990 amendment to section 440.15(3)(b)2. prescribing a minimum of five job contacts in each biweekly period *1039 was a substantive amendment which would not be applicable to an earlier injury); see also City of Clermont v. Rumph, 450 So.2d 573, n. 4 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), petition for review denied 458 So.2d 271 (Fla. 1984) (even procedural burden of proof enactments may not be applicable to periods of claimed wa…

See City of Clermont v. Rumph, 450 So.2d 573 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), pet. for rev. denied, 458 So.2d 271 (Fla.1984).

See Regency Inn v. Johnson, 422 So.2d 870 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); see also City of Clermont v. Rumph, 450 So.2d 573 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).

See City of Clermont v. Rumph, 450 So.2d 573, 576 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).

See City of Clermont v. Rumph, supra. While there is hardly any doubt that his disability is permanent, albeit partial, and because of his injury he is no longer able to work in his previous trade, i.e. carpentry, painting or sandblasting, it is equally clear that he was able to work as a draftsman or as a job estimator during the spring of 1983.

See City of Clermont v. Rumph, 450 So.2d 573 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), pet. for rev. denied 458 So.2d 271 (Fla. 1984); Williams Roofing, Inc. v. Moore, 447 So.2d 968 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).