Pitts v. Pastore (1990)

See also Heath v. First Nat’l Bank in Milton, 213 So.2d 883, 887-88 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968) (a mortgage against a homestead is void if it is not joined by the mortgagor’s spouse); Clemons v. Thornton, 993 So.2d 1054 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (“A purported transfer of the homestead, not in compliance with constitutional requirements, is void.”); Gotshall v. Taylor, 196 So.2d 479, 481 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967) (“If the requirements of the Constitution and the statutes are not complied with in…

X, §4(c), Fla. Const. (“The owner of homestead real estate, joined by the spouse if married, may alienate homestead by mortgage, sale, deed or gift . . .); Pitts v. Pastore, 561 So. 2d 297, 301 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (holding that a mortgage is ineffectual as a lien until such time as either the spouse joins in the alienation or the time Kenneth Smith executed the mortgage.

The warranty contained in TD Bank’s mortgage was “effective as an expression of an intention to create a lien on the mortgagor’s interest for the debt.” Id.; see also Pitts, 561 So. 2d at 301-02 (“Just as a mortgage of jointly owned property can attach as a mortgage lien of after-acquired property when the mortgagor receives sole title, this mortgage lien attached when the property's homestead status came to an end.”).

X, § 4(a)(1), (c) Fla. Const.; Taylor v. Maness, 941 So. 2d 559, 563-64 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (recognizing that, even if the spouse owns only a beneficial interest and not title interest in the residence constituting his or her homestead, the spouse must join in the conveyance or encumbrance of the homestead property); see also Pitts v. Pastore, 561 So. 2d 297, 301 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (“[T]he mortgage is ineffectual as a lien until such time as either the spouse joins in the ali…

A mortgage is an executory contract “in which one generally promises to allow a future sale of real property if a debt is not paid,” and “[i]t is also a specific lien on the property described in the mortgage.” Pitts v. Pastore, 561 So.2d 297, 301 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (citing § 697.02, Fla. Stat. (1987)).

Co. v. Williams, 84 Fla. 157 , 92 So. 876 , 877 (1922) (noting the general doctrine that “where a mortgage upon real estate contains full covenants of warranty, title acquired to the mortgaged property the mortgagor after the execution of the mortgage inures to the benefit of the mortgagee”); Pitts, 561 So.2d at 301 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (noting “[i]t is well established that one can enter into a mortgage agreement to create a lien against property which the mortgagor will only…

X, §4(c), Fla. Const. (“The owner of homestead real estate, joined by the spouse if married, may alienate homestead by mortgage, sale, deed or gift . . .); Pitts v. Pastore, 561 So. 2d 297, 301 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (holding that a mortgage is ineffectual as a lien until such time as either the spouse joins in the alienation or the property loses its homestead status.).

Id. 5 A mortgage of homestead property is not void when signed by only one spouse, but it is “ineffectual as a lien until such time as either the spouse joins in the alienation or the property loses its homestead status.” Pitts v. Pastore, 561 So. 2d 297, 301 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).

Rose v. Lurton Co., 149 So. 557, 558 (Fla. 1933) (“a mortgage on after- acquired property of the mortgagor will be held valid, and enforceable between the parties to it, by a suit for foreclosure.”); Pitts v. Pastore, 561 So. 2d 297, 301 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (“It is well established that one can enter into a mortgage agreement to create a lien against property which the mortgagor will only acquire in the future.”).

Ct. App. 2006) (“the owner of homestead real estate must, if married, be joined by his or her spouse in order to alienate the homestead”); Pitts v. Pastore, 561 So.2d 297, 300 (Fla. Dist.

See Zipperer, 41 F.3d at 623 (stat ing that “a mortgagee ... is in essence a party to a security contract”); Pitts v. Pastore, 561 So.2d 297, 300 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (stating that “a mortgage is an exec-utory contract”).

It is also a specific lien on the property described in the mortgage.” Pitts v. Pastore, 561 So.2d 297, 301 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).

Taylor v. Maness, 941 So.2d 559, 564 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); Pitts v. Pastore, 561 So.2d 297, 300 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Jameson v. Jameson, 387 So.2d 351, 353 (Fla.1980).

Houck also relies on Monte v. Tipton, 612 So.2d 714, 716 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Pitts v. Pastore, 561 So.2d 297, 299 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); and Smith v. Branch, 391 So.2d 797, 798 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), in which this court determined that the twenty-year "statute of limitations" under section 95.281 precluded dismissal of the foreclosure actions.

Nevertheless, because we think it clear that compounding interest upon default was error, see Pitts v. Pastore, 561 So.2d 297, 302 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (requiring express provision for compound interest); Lyons v. Wyman, 658 So.2d 1104, 1105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (trial court improperly compounded interest when the parties did not expressly agree to compound interest), we need to determine whether the doctrine of law of the case leaves us room to rectify this error by directing …

See Pitts v. Pastore, 561 So. 2d 297, 301 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).

See Pitts v. Pastore, 561 So.2d 297, 302 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).

See Pitts v. Pastore, 561 So.2d 297 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).

See Pitts v. Pastore, 561 So.2d 297 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 563 So.2d 633 (Fla.1990).