United States v. Conston, Inc. (In Re Conston, Inc.) (1995)

Va. 2011) (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Conston, Inc. (In re Conston, Inc.), 181 B.R. 769, 773 (D.

While Hillside may hold claims for post-petition expenses or expenses for goods received by the Debtor within 20 days before the commencement of Leaver I, such claims must be treated as general unsecured claims. 3 See, i.e., In re Conston, Inc., 181 B.R. 769, 781 (D.

Accordingly, priority “tax claims contained in a confirmed reorganization plan” still “embody the characteristics that may entitle them to priority treatment if a second Chapter 11 petition is filed.” United States v. Conston, Inc., 181 B.R. 769, 780 (D.

United States v. Conston, Inc. (In re Conston, Inc.), 181 B.R. 769, 773 (D.Del.1995); see also U.S. Fire Ins.

In re Conston, Inc., 181 B.R. 769, 772-773 (D.Del.1995) (A case examining the effect of chapter 11 discharge on the priority character of income taxes). 3 What, then, is the effect of a discharge if it does not extinguish the debt?

In re Conston, Inc., 181 B.R. 769, 772-73 (1995).

See, e.g., White Farm Equipment, 943 F.2d at 757 [priority claim by IRS for trust fund taxes remains a priority claim in subsequent case]; United States v. Conston, Inc. (In re Conston, Inc.), 181 B.R. 769, 780 (D.Del.1995) [priority income tax claims contained in a confirmed reorganization plan, if the claims retain tax characteristics, may be entitled to priority status in subsequent case].

See In re Larsen, 59 F.3d 783 (8th Cir.1995) (administrative expenses entitled to priority in one bankruptcy not entitled to priority in later bankruptcy); In re Montoya, 965 F.2d 554 (7th Cir.1992) (although IRS claim had priority in first bankruptcy, priority in later bankruptcy had to be newly determined based on applicable time limits and tolling); In re Conston, 181 B.R. 769, 770 (D.Del.1995) (same). *938 The United States argues, in a somewhat different vein, that res …

If the debtor fails to make payments to creditors according to the terms of a confirmed plan, the creditors' remedy "is to enforce the obligations contained in the confirmed plan[,]" rather than revive the original, pre-petition debt. *634 Metex , 510 B.R. at 742 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re Conston, Inc., 181 B.R. 769 , 772-73 (D.

See also In re Conston, Inc., 181 B.R. 769, 776 (D.Del.1995).

See Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 84 , 111 S.Ct. 2150 , 115 L.Ed.2d 66 (1991) (“[A] bankruptcy discharge extinguishes only one mode of enforcing a claim — namely, an action against the debtor in personam.”)-, see also, In re Conston, 181 B.R. 769, 773 (D.Del.1995) (collecting cases).

See In re Conston, Inc., 181 B.R. 769, 772 (D.Del.1995) (finding “discharge ... does not cause the underlying debt to vanish” and IRS priority claim may be asserted in a second Chapter 11 case, because, in part, nothing in the bankruptcy code suggest that confirmation of a reorganization plan relieves the IRS from following its collection procedures) (and cases cited therein).

See In re Conston, Inc., 181 B.R. 769 (D.Del.1995); In re McCormick Road Associates, 127 B.R. 410 (N.D.Ill.1991); In re Sportpages Corporation, 101 B.R. 528 (N.D.Ill.1989). 9 .

In Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 *427 U.S. 78, 86, 111 S.Ct. 2150, 2155 , 115 L.Ed.2d 66 (1991), the Supreme Court held that “[i]n-sofar as the mortgage interest that passes through a Chapter 7 liquidation is enforceable only against the debtor’s property, this interest has the same properties as a nonre-course loan.” The Court held that § 102(2), which defines the term “claim against the debtor” to include “claim against property of the debtor,” was intended by Congress t…