Clark v. State (1983)

In contrast the Florida courts, from which Oklahoma adopted the "unnecessarily torturous to the victim” standard, have expressly held that the suffering of a surviving victim is not a proper consideration in deciding whether a murder is "especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel." Clark v. State, 443 So.2d 973, 977 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210 , 104 S.Ct. 2400 , 81 L.Ed.2d 356 (1984); Riley v. State, 366 So.2d 19, 21 (Fla.1978).

Sec. 921.141(5)(c) (Supp.1976-1977) which provided, "[t]he defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons." 1 Justices Marshall and Brennan concurred in the judgment, reiterating their belief that "the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 433 , 100 S.Ct. 1767 2 In contrast the Florida courts, from which Oklahoma adopted the "unnecessarily torturous to the…

Godfrey [v. Georgia ], 446 U.S. [420] at 429, 432, 100 S.Ct. 1759 , 64 L.Ed.2d 398 [(1980) ]." 443 So.2d at 973 (emphasis in original).

Similarly, in Clark v. State, 443 So. 2d 973, 977 (Fla. 1983), the Florida court again said: Directing a pistol shot to the head of the victim does not establish a homicide as especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.

Similarly, in Clark v. State, 443 So. 2d 973, 977 (Fla. 1983), the Florida court again said: Directing a pistol shot to the head of the victim does not establish a homicide as especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.

Ault, 866 So.2d at 686 (citing Clark v. State, 443 So.2d 973, 978 (Fla.1983); Menendez v. State, 419 So.2d 312, 314-15 (Fla.1982)).

We have repeatedly rejected defendants' claims that "the aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed in the course of committing a specified felony is unconstitutional because it constitutes an automatic aggravator and does not narrow the class of persons eligible for the *47 death penalty." Ault v. State, 866 So.2d 674, 686 (Fla.2003); see also Hitchcock v. State, 755 So.2d 638, 644 (Fla.2000); Blanco v. State, 706 So.2d 7, 11 (Fla.1997); Banks v. State, 700 So.2…

Clark v. State, 443 So.2d 973, 976 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210 , 104 S.Ct. 2400 , 81 L.Ed.2d 356 (1984).

See Mills v. State, 476 So.2d 172, 178 (Fla.1985); see also Clark v. State, 443 So.2d 973, 978 (Fla.1983) (rejecting equal protection challenge to aggravating factor of murder committed during commission of a felony).

See Clark v. State, 443 So.2d 973, 976 (Fla.1983) ("The burden is upon the state in the sentencing portion of a capital felony trial *734 to prove every aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt.").

See, e.g., Clark v. State, 443 So.2d 973, 978 (Fla.1983); Menendez v. State, 419 So.2d 312, 314-15 (Fla.1982).

See Blanco v. State, 452 So.2d 520 (Fla. 1984). [21] See Clark v. State, 443 So.2d 973 (Fla.1983). [22] The majority opinion fails to address this situation. [23] In Jackson v. State, 648 So.2d 85 (Fla. 1994), we struck down the "cold, calculated, and premeditated" (CCP) jury instruction, which gave content to the underlying CCP aggravator, because the instruction essentially encompassed every premeditated murder.

See Clark v. State, 443 So.2d 973, 977 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210 , 104 S.Ct. 2400 , 81 L.Ed.2d 356 (1984); Riley v. State, 366 So.2d 19 (Fla. 1978).

See Clark v. State, 443 So.2d 973 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 2400 , 81 L.Ed.2d 356 (1984); Johnson v. State, 442 So.2d 185 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 2182 , 80 L.Ed.2d 563 (1984); Vaught v. State, 410 So.2d 147 (Fla. 1982).

See Clark v. State, 443 So.2d 973 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 2400 , 81 L.Ed.2d 356 (1984); Johnson v. State, 442 So.2d 185 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 2182 , 80 L.Ed.2d 563 (1984); Vaught v. State, 410 So.2d 147 (Fla.1982).

See Clark v. State, 443 So.2d 973 (Fla. 1984).