In Re Hubbard (2010)

In re Hubbard, 778 N.W.2d 313, 318 (Minn. 2010); see also id. at 318 n.4 (expressly rejecting an agency’s argument that judicial deference should extend to “the threshold question of whether the legislature has granted an agency the authority to take 5 the action at issue”).

The precise question before this court is, therefore, whether the PUC has the authority to regulate ARCs as it purported to do in the 2010 order. 3 “Whether an administrative agency has acted within its statutory authority is a question of law that we review de novo.” In re Hubbard, 778 N.W.2d 313, 318 (Minn. 2010).

As a threshold matter, although Serafin raised this issue as a question of subject- matter jurisdiction and we requested supplemental briefing on that question and the ALJ’s statutory authority, we conclude that this issue is more appropriately framed solely as a challenge to the scope of the ALJ’s authority under Minn. Stat. § 299A.465. 4 “Administrative agencies are creatures of statute and they have only those powers given to them by the legislature.” In re Hubbard, 778 N…

“Whether an administrative agency has acted within its statutory authority is a question of law that [appellate courts] review de novo.” In re Hubbard, 778 N.W.2d 313, 318 (Minn. 2010).

Cf. In re Hubbard, 778 N.W.2d 313, 321 (Minn. 2010) (holding that while court is reluctant to find implied statutory authority of an administrative agency, agency’s authority need not be given a “cramped reading” and enlargement of powers by implication must be “fairly drawn and fairly evident from the agency’s objectives and powers expressly given by the legislature.” quoting In re N. States Power Co., 414 N.W.2d 383, 387 (Minn. 1987) and Peoples Natural Gas v. Minn. Pub.

Cf. In re Hubbard, 778 N.W.2d 313, 321 (Minn. 2010) (holding that while court is reluctant to find implied statutory authority of an administrative agency, agency’s authority need not be given a “cramped reading” and enlargement of powers by implication must be “fairly drawn and fairly evident from the agency’s objectives and powers expressly given by the legislature.” quoting In re N. States Power Co., 414 N.W.2d 383, 387 (Minn. 1987) and Peoples Natural Gas v. Minn. Pub.

A. “Whether an administrative agency has acted within its statutory authority is a question of law that we review de novo.” In re Hubbard, 778 N.W.2d 313, 318 (Minn. 2010).

“Administrative agencies are creatures of statute and they have only those powers given to them by the legislature.” In re Hubbard, 778 N.W.2d 313, 318 (Minn. 2010).

As we recognized in Dukowitz, after citing a variety of statutes that “explicitly furnished a civil remedy for retaliation,”, the “Legislature’s policy choice to create a civil cause of action for one group of employees .. but not another” demonstrates that.,“the Legislature ‘knows how" to accomplish a particular objective if it wishes to do so.” Dukowitz, 841 N.W.2d at 154 & n.4 (quoting In re Hubbard, 778 N.W.2d 313, 323 (Minn. 2010)).

“Administrative agencies are creatures of statute and they have only those powers given to them by the legislature.” In re Hubbard, 778 N.W.2d 313, 318 (Minn.2010), When “confronted with the threshold question of whether the legislature has granted an agency the authority to take the action at issue,” an appellate court does not “defer to the agency’s [own] determination of [its] authority.” Id. at n. 4.

“Administrative agencies are creatures of statute and they have only those powers given to them by the legislature.” In re Hubbard, 778 N.W.2d 313, 318 (Minn. 2010).

In re Hubbard, 778 N.W.2d 313, 318 (Minn. 2010).

“Whether an administrative agency has acted within its statutory authority is a question of law that we review de novo.” In re Hubbard, 778 N.W.2d 313, 318 (Minn.2010) (quotation omitted).

Administrative agencies are created by statute and “have only those powers given to them by the legislature.” In re Hubbard, 778 N.W.2d 313, 318 (Minn.2010).

Administrative agencies, such as BWSR, are “creatures of statute” and have “only those powers given to them by the legislature.” In re Hubbard, 778 N.W.2d 313, 318 (Minn.2010).

See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 181.13 (a) (explaining that upon a discharged employee’s demand, such employee may recover unpaid wages or commissions as well as “may charge and collect a penalty”); id. § 181.14, subd. 2 (same for employees who quit or resign); see also Lagasse v. Horton, 982 N.W.2d 189 , 199 n.2 (Minn. 2022) (explaining “that the Legislature’s action in one statute but inaction in another shows that the Legislature ‘knows how’ to accomplish a particular objective if…

Comm’n, 358 N.W.2d 639, 642 (Minn. 1984); see also In re Hubbard, 778 N.W.2d 313 , 318 n.4 (Minn. 2010).

See Hubbard , 778 N.W.2d at 321 (stating that a determination of implied authority requires analysis of the statutory scheme).

See In re Hubbard, 778 N.W.2d 313, 323 (Minn.2010) (holding that, where express authority is given in one statute and not in another, the legislature shows it “knows how to grant such authority if it desires”); Martinco v. Hastings, 265 Minn. 490, 497 , 122 N.W.2d 631, 638 (1963) (“If there is to be a change in the statute, it must come from the legislature, for the courts cannot supply that which the legislature purposely omits or inadvertently overlooks.”).

See In re Hubbard, 778 N.W.2d 313, 323 (Minn.2010) (noting that the Legislature's action in one statute but inaction in another shows that the Legislature "knows how” to accomplish a particular objective if it wishes to do so).

Bur., 2002 ND 85, ¶ 10 , 643 N.W.2d 721 ; see also In re Hubbard, 778 N.W.2d 313, 318 (Minn.2010). [¶ 11] We have also said that the Administrative Agencies Practice Act limits a court’s review of an agency’s rule-making proceeding and that “[w]hen an administrative agency adopts rules under the Act, it is acting in a quasi-legislative, not a quasi-judicial, capacity.” See Little v. Traynor, 1997 ND 128, ¶¶ 11, 12 , 565 N.W.2d 766 .

See In re Hubbard, 778 N.W.2d 313 (Minn.2010).

See In re Denial of Certification of Variance Granted to Hubbard, 778 N.W.2d 313, 321 (Minn. 2010) (holding that DNR lacks express or implied authority to certify City of Lake-land’s variance decision).

See In re Denial of Certification of Variance Granted to Hubbard, 778 N.W.2d 313, 321 (Minn. 2010) (holding that DNR lacks express or implied authority to certify City of Lakeland's variance decision).