Hopkins v. O'CONNOR (2007)

I also agree that, ordinarily, the denial of a motion for summary judgment is an interlocutory ruling that does not constitute a final judgment for purposes of appeal; see, e.g., Hopkins v. O’Connor, 282 Conn. 821, 828 , 925 A.2d 1030 (2007) (“[t]he denial of a motion for summary judgment ordinarily is an interlocutory ruling and, accordingly, is not a final judgment for purposes of appeal”); because, as a general matter, the denial of a motion for summary judgment does not …

Hopkins, 282 Conn. at 845 (“We previously have held that the malice required to overcome a qualified privilege in defamation cases is malice in fact or actual malice.”) (emphasis added).

Our Supreme Court has observed that "it is illogical to punish someone criminally for engaging in certain conduct but protect them civilly absolutely and under all circumstances for the same behavior." (Emphasis in original.) Hopkins v. O'Connor , 282 Conn. 821 , 844, 925 A.2d 1030 (2007) ("we reasonably cannot give effect both to the imposition of criminal liability that [the statute] explicitly provides, on the one hand, and to the absolute immunity existing at common law,…

To show the existence of such good faith, the claimant or the claimant’s attorney . . . shall obtain a written and signed opinion of a similar health care provider . . . that there appears to be evidence of medical negligence and includes a detailed basis for the formation of such opinion. . . .” Ordinarily, a plaintiff may not appeal from the denial of a motion for summary judgment, for lack of a final judgment; see, e.g., Hopkins v. O’Connor, 282 Conn. 821, 828 , 925 A.2d …

When a statement is covered by qualified privilege, the plaintiff can prevail only by showing that the statement was made with “malice in fact or actual malice.” Gallo at 464 n. 6, 935 A.2d 103 , quoting Hopkins at 845, 925 A.2d 1030 .

Connecticut’s litigation privilege also protects communications “uttered or published in the course of judicial proceedings” so long as they are “in some way pertinent to the subject of the controversy,” and the privilege “extends not merely to those made directly to a tribunal, but also to those preparatory communications that may be directed to the goal of the proceeding.” Hopkins v. O’Connor, 282 Conn. 821, 830, 832-33 (2007); Sicignano v. Pearce, 228 Conn. App. 648 , 666…

Conn. Feb. 28, 2017) (collecting cases). “[C]ommunications uttered or published in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged so long as they are in some way pertinent to the subject of the controversy.” Hopkins v. O’Connor, 282 Conn. 821, 830-31 (2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Moreover, under the litigation privilege, “in certain situations the public interest in having people speak freely outweighs the risk that individuals will occasionally abuse the privilege by making false and malicious statements.” Deutsche Bank AG, 314 A.3d at 594 (quoting Hopkins v. O'Connor, 925 A.2d 1030, 1042 (Conn. 2007)).

Conn. Aug. 30, 2017). “[A] qualified privilege in a defamation case may be defeated if it can be established that the holder of the privilege acted with malice in publishing the defamatory material.” Gambardella, 969 A.2d at 743 (citing Hopkins v. O’Connor, 925 A.2d 1030, 1046 (Conn. 2007)).

A defamatory statement is “a communication that tends to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.” Hopkins v. O’Connor, 925 A.2d 1030, 1042 (Conn. 2007).

See Hopkins v. O’Connor, 282 Conn. 821 , 830–31 (2007) (“It is well settled that communications uttered or published in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged so long as they are in some way pertinent to the subject of the controversy.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

Statements warranting protection include those made in “‘pleadings or other documents prepared in connection with a court proceeding,’” id. (quoting Derisme, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 337 ), and also “‘preparatory communications that may be directed to the goal of the proceeding.’” Id. (quoting Hopkins v. O'Connor, 282 Conn. 821, 832 (2007)).

Given the lack of allegations by Mr. Coke that Mr. Samalot engaged in “preliminary meetings, conduct [or] activities [that] are directed toward the achievement of the objects of the litigation,” Hopkins v. O’Connor, 282 Conn. 821, 832 (2007), the Court declines to address this argument. jurisdiction over Defendant, and, further, even if it did, Plaintiff’s claims are barred under the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity.

“To establish a prima facie case of defamation, the plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the defendant published a defamatory statement; (2) the defamatory statement identified the plaintiff to a third person; (3) the defamatory statement was published to a thHiordpk pinesr svo. nO;’ Caonndn o(4r) the plaintiff's reputation suffered injury as a result of the statement.” , 282 Conn. 821, 838 (2007).

Second, the communication must be material, pertinent, and relevant to the judicial proceeding.” (quotation and citations .omitted)); Hawkins v. Harris, 141 N.J. 207 , 661 A.2d 284, 289 (1995) (“The absolute privilege applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants.authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action.” (quota…

To establish a prima facie case of defamation, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) the defendant published a defamatory statement; (2) the defamatory statement identified the plaintiff to a third person; (3) the defamatory statement was published to a third person; and (4) the plaintiffs reputation suffered injury as a result of the statement.” Hopkins v. O’Connor, 282 Conn. 821 , 925 A.2d 1030, 1042 (2007) (internal citation omitted).

See also Hopkins v. O’Connor, 282 Conn. at 831 & n.3, 925 A.2d 1030 (citing “significant procedural protections afforded in [court] commitment proceedings”—including rights to be present at hearing, to appointed counsel, and to cross-examination— in identifying such proceedings as “judicial” for purposes of immunity); Vidro v. United States, 720 F.3d at 152 (citing Craig in stating that whether statement is “taken under oath is . . . relevant to whether it deserves an absolu…

See Hopkins v. O'Connor , 282 Conn. 821 , 824, 848 n.12, 925 A.2d 1030 (2007) (explaining that officer who took individual into "involuntary custody and caused him to be transported" to hospital for psychiatric evaluation pursuant to § 17a-503 [a] was "serving less in a law enforcement capacity than in a health and safety capacity").

The plaintiffs claim that, because the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not an appealable final judgment; see Hopkins v. O’Connor, 282 Conn. 821, 828 , 925 A.2d 1030 (2007); and because the judgment of the Appellate Court amounted to a denial of the motion for summary judgment and put this case in the same procedural posture that it would have been in if the trial court had denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the judgment of the Appellate Court is n…

See, e.g., Hopkins v. O’Connor, 282 Conn. 821, 841 , 925 A.2d 1030 (2007) (statement contained in police report that officer was required to prepare in order to commence proceedings before Probate Court for commitment of person with psychiatric disabilities); Craig v. Stafford Construction, Inc., 271 Conn. 78, 95 , 856 A.2d 372 (2004) (citizen complaint that led to police department internal affairs investigation); Kelley v. Bonney, 221 Conn. 549 , Khan v. Jewish Women Inter…

See, e.g., Hopkins v. O’Connor, 282 Conn. 821, 828 , 925 A.2d 1030 (2007) (denial of motion for summary judgment is immediately appealable when motion is predicated upon colorable claim of absolute immunity based on sovereign immunity); Singhaviroj v. Board of Education, 124 Conn. App. 228, 236 , 4 A.3d 851 (2010) (denial of motion for summary judgment is immediately appealable when denial is due to doctrine of collateral estoppel or res judicata); see also State v. Curcio, …

See, e.g., Hopkins v. O’Connor, 282 Conn. 821, 843 , 925 A.2d 1030 (2007) (‘‘[w]hile the legislature’s authority to abrogate the common law is undeniable, we will not lightly impute such an intent to the legislature’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). 5 All references hereinafter to § 12-117a are to the 2023 revision of the statute.

In addition . . . the absolute privilege that is granted to statements made in furtherance of a judicial proceeding extends to every step of the proceeding until final dispo- sition.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kenneson v. Eggert, 196 Conn. App. 773 , 783, 230 A.3d 795 (2020); see also Hopkins v. O’Connor, 282 Conn. 821, 832 , 925 A.2d 1030 (2007) (‘‘[t]he scope of privileged communication extends not merely to those made directly to a tribunal, b…

It extends also to the proceed- ings of many administrative officers, such as boards and commissions, so far as they have powers of discretion in applying the law to the facts [that] are regarded as judicial or [quasi-judicial], in character.’’17 (Internal quo- tation marks omitted.) Kelley v. Bonney, supra, 221 Conn. 566 ; see also Hopkins v. O’Connor, 282 Conn. 821, 839 , 925 A.2d 1030 (2007) (‘‘ ‘judicial proceeding’ has been defined liberally to encompass much more than …

See Hopkins v. O’Connor, 282 Conn. 821 , 838–39, 925 A.2d 1030 (2007).

Once it is deter- mined that a proceeding is [quasi-judicial] in nature, the absolute privilege that is granted to statements made in furtherance of it extends to every step of the proceeding until final disposition.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Craig v. Stafford Construction, Inc., 271 Conn. 78, 84 , 856 A.2d 372 (2004); Kelley v. Bonney, 221 Conn. 549, 565-66 , 606 A.2d 693 (1992) (same); Petyan v. Ellis, supra, 200 Conn. 246 (‘‘[t]his privilege extends to every…

See Hopkins v. O’Connor, 282 Conn. 821, 829 , 925 A.2d 1030 (2007).

Moreover, this court stated that "parties to or witnesses before judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings are entitled to absolute immunity for the content of statements made therein." Id., at 271 , 682 A.2d 148 , citing Petyan v. Ellis , 200 Conn. 243 , 245-46, 510 A.2d 1337 (1986) ; see also Hopkins v. O'Connor , supra, 282 Conn. at 839 , 925 A.2d 1030 ; Kelley v. Bonney , supra, 221 Conn. at 573 -74 , 606 A.2d 693 .

See Hopkins v. O'Connor , supra, 282 Conn. at 832 , 925 A.2d 1030 .

See Hopkins v. O’Connor, 282 Conn. 821, 824 , 848 n.12, 925 A.2d 1030 (2007) (explaining that officer who took individual into ‘‘involuntary custody and caused him to be transported’’ to hospital for psychiatric evalu- ation pursuant to § 17a-503 [a] was ‘‘serving less in a law enforcement capacity than in a health and safety capacity’’).

Statutes are now central to the law in the courts, and judicial lawmaking must take statutes into account virtually all of the time ...." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) C & J Builders & Remodelers, LLC v. Geisenheimer , 249 Conn. 415 , 419-20, 733 A.2d 193 (1999) ; see, e.g., Hopkins v. O'Connor , 282 Conn. 821 , 844-45, 925 A.2d 1030 (2007) (relying on criminal penalty in General Statutes § 17a-504 for wrongful acts in connection with psychiatric com…

See Hopkins v. O’Connor, 282 Conn. 821, 832 , 925 A.2d 1030 (2007) (‘[t]he scope of privileged communication extends not merely to those made directly to a tribunal, but also to those preparatory communications that may be directed to the goal of the proceeding’) . . . .’’ The plaintiffs claim that the trial court erred in not recognizing the exception from absolute immunity for cases in which the plaintiff alleges that the defendant improperly used the judicial system.

See Hopkins v. O’Connor, 282 Conn. 821, 827 , 925 A.2d 1030 (2007) (“[w]here the trial court reaches a correct decision but on mistaken grounds, this court has repeatedly sustained the trial court’s action if proper grounds exist to support it” [internal quotation marks omitted]).

See, e.g., Hopkins v. O'Connor, 282 Conn. 821, 827 , 925 A.2d 1030 (2007); State v. Colon, supra, at 187-88 , 864 A.2d 666 ; State v. Perkins, 271 Conn. 218, 256 , 856 A.2d 917 (2004); Lombardo's Ravioli Kitchen, Inc. v. Ryan, 268 Conn. 222 , 238 n. 12, 842 A.2d 1089 (2004); Levandoski v. Cone, 267 Conn. 651 , 658 n. 5, 841 A.2d 208 (2004); Kelley v. Bonney, supra, at 592 , 606 A.2d 693 ; State v. Ruffin, 206 Conn. 678, 683 , 539 A.2d 144 (1988); Herrmann v. Summer Plaza Cor…

See id. (“The privilege may be lost by unnecessary or unreasonable publication to one for whom the occasion is not privileged.”); see also Hopkins, 282 Conn. at 849 , 925 A.2d 1030 ; Fiondella, Inc. v. Reiner, Reiner & Bendett, No. HHDCV085025357S, 2009 WL 5342490 , at *10 (Conn.Super.Ct.

See Hopkins v. O’Connor, 282 Conn. 821, 827 , 925 A.2d 1030 (2007) (“[wjhere the trial court reaches a correct decision but on mistaken grounds, this court has repeatedly sustained the trial court’s action if proper grounds exist to support it” [internal quotation marks omitted]).

See Hopkins v. O'Connor, 282 Conn. 821 (2007).

See id., 838–39; Pet- yan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243 , 254–55, 510 A.2d 1337 (1986).

See id., 838–39; Pet- yan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243 , 254–55, 510 A.2d 1337 (1986).

See Hopkins, 282 Conn. at 849 .

See ECF 85. may be directed to the goal of the proceeding.'" Tyler v. Tatoian, 164 Conn. App. 82 , 88 (2016) (quoting Hopkins v. O'Connor, 282 Conn. 821, 832 (2007)); see also Alexandru v. Dowd, 79 Conn. App. 434, 438 (2003)("The privilege applies also to statements made in pleadings or other documents prepared in connection with a court proceeding."); Carney v. Amendola, No. CV106003738, 2014 WL 2853836 , at *8 (Conn. Super.

Co., 267 Conn. 210, 217 (2004); accord Hopkins v. O’Connor, 282 Conn. 821, 838 (2007) (same).