United States v. Hubbard (1979)

But see United States v. Hubbard, 474 F.Supp. 64, 79 (D.D.C.1979) (“If the actions do not constitute the tort of conversion, the same actions should not constitute the federal crime of conversion in the absence of some clearer indication of Congressional intent to change the law.”). 6 .

Section 641, the theft statute, contains no standard for determining when a person is to be held criminally liable as one who “converts to his use or the use of another, or without authority, sells, conveys, or disposes of any ... thing of value of the United States.” See United States v. Troung Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 924-25 (4th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1144 , 102 S.Ct. 1004 , 71 L.Ed.2d 296 (1982); United States v. Hubbard, 474 F.Supp. 64, 80 (D.D.C.1979).

United States v. Hubbard, 474 F.Supp. 64, 79-80 (D.D.C.1979) (dicta) Courts which have interpreted other criminal statutes containing phrases similar to "thing of value" have decided that the statutory language included both tangible and intangible property.

E.g., United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 1331, 1337 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 834 , 99 S.Ct. 116 , 58 L.Ed.2d 130 (1978); United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676, 678 (3d Cir.1975); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 366 (9th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 , 96 S.Ct. 777 , 46 L.Ed.2d 638 (1976); United States v. Hubbard, 474 F.Supp. 64, 77 (D.D.C.1979).

In his brief the appellant cites decisions, e. g., United States v. Hubbard, 474 F.Supp. 64, 81 (D.D.C.1979), in which the district judge has granted a motion for a bill of particulars identifying known but unnamed co-conspirators.

The District Court has twice ruled that the charges in the indictment were properly joined. 14 We agree that “the offenses charged in the indictment ... allege the same series of acts or transactions within the requirements of Rule 8(b).” United States v. Hubbard, 474 F.Supp. 64, 87 (D.D.C.1979).

June 16, 1998); United States v. Hubbard, 474 F.Supp. at 83 (“colorful words ... improper where less colorful and more accurate words would suffice”).

As the court stated in United States v. Hubbard, 474 F.Supp. 64, 73 (D.D.C.1979): The Constitution has explicit protections against excessive concentration of power in the federal government.

June 16, 1998); United States v. Hubbard, 474 F.Supp. at 83 (“colorful words ... improper where less colorful and more accurate words would suffice”).

This court has found that “[these terms] may encourage the jury to draw inferences that the defendant [is] believed to be involved in activities not charged in the indictment.” Id. (quoting United States v. Hubbard, 474 F.Supp. 64, 82 (D.D.C.1979) (internal citation omitted)).

United States v. Hubbard, 474 F.Supp. 64, 82-83 (D.D.C.1979) (“various,” “among other things,” “at least,” “besides the defendants,” and “and related matters” stricken).

DeFabritus, 605 F.Supp. at 1547 ; United States v. Hubbard, 474 F.Supp. 64, 82-83 (D.D.C.1979); United States v. Brighton.

See the American College Dictionary, definition of “substance”; Webster’s New World Dictionary of the American Language, definition of “substance.” Unlike an accusation that a defendant acted in a certain way “among others” or acted through “various illegal and unlawful means” or did certain illegal acts “among others,” see, e. g., United States v. Mayo, supra; United States v. Hubbard, 474 F.Supp. 64, 80-81 (D.C.D.C. 1979); United States v. Pope, 189 F.Supp. 12, 25-26 (S.D.…

Apr. 9, 2009) (quoting United States v. Pope, 189 F.Supp. 12, 25 (S.D.N.Y.1960)); see also United States v. DeFabritus, 605 F.Supp. 1538, 1547 (S.D.N.Y.1985); United States v. Hubbard, 474 F.Supp. 64, 82 (D.D.C.1979); United States v. Brighton Building & Maintenance Co., 435 F.Supp. 222, 230 (N.D.Ill.1977), aff 'd 598 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.1979). -However, courts have approved the use of broadening language in the “means” section of indictments because it “goes only to the matt…

Accordingly, as Judge Ellen S. Huvelle observed in United States v. Brodie, the government is not “required to prove how or when the conspiracy was formed, the details of any meeting or when the defendant joined the conspiracy.” 326 F.Supp.2d 83, 91 (D.D.C.2004) (citing United States v. Long, 449 F.2d 288, 294 (8th Cir.1971), United States v. Hubbard, 474 F.Supp. 64, 80-81 (D.D.C.1979), and United States v. Pacheco, 902 F.Supp. 469, 474 (S.D.N.Y.1995)).

See, e.g., United States v. Long, 449 F.2d 288, 294 (8th Cir.1971); United States v. Hubbard, 474 F.Supp. 64, 80-81 (D.D.C.1979); United States v. Pacheco, 902 F.Supp. 469, 474 (S.D.N.Y.1995).

See United States v. Lopez, 147 F.3d 1, 3-5 (1st Cir.1998) (where defendant moved for early Jeneks Act disclosure, government had agreed to produce Jeneks Act material fourteen days before trial, and district court had issued an order stating that "[t]o the extent of [the government's] compliance, the defendant's motion is allowed,” this order was binding on the government (although the government’s eventual failure to comply was held harmless)); United States v. Mavrokordat…

See United States v. Rogers, 617 F.Supp. 1024, 1029 (D.Col.1985) (overt acts in furtherance of conspiracy to be provided in bill of particulars); United States v. Hubbard, 474 F.Supp. 64, 81 (D.D.C.1979) *31 (same).

See United States v. Gatto, 746 F.Supp. 432, 458 (D.N.J.1990) (“The preamble should not contain information beyond what is alleged in the counts, nor should it contain terminology that carries with it connotations of culpable behavior.”), rev’d on other grounds, 924 F.2d 491 (3d Cir.1991); United States v. Hubbard, 474 F.Supp. 64, 83 (D.D.C.1979) (striking from indictment uncharged reference to confrontation between Federal Bureau of Investigation and alleged members of Chur…

Because of this, the court has no problem concluding that there exists a “logical relationship between the acts or transactions,” United States v. Perry, 731 F.2d 985, 989 (D.C.Cir.1984), evidenced by “a consistent, logically interlocked set of goals.” United States v. Hubbard, 474 F.Supp. 64, 86 (D.D.C.1979).

As Judge Richey of this Court said in United States v. Hubbard, 474 F.Supp. 64, 82 (D.D.C.1979), “[rjegardless of their location in the indictment [such words] may encourage the jury to draw inferences that the defendants are believed to be involved in activities not charged in the indictment.” See also, United States v. Freeman, 619 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir.1980); Marsh v. United States, 344 F.2d 317, 320-22 (5th Cir.1965); United States v. Brighton Building and Maintenance Co., …

E.g., United States v. Hubbard, 474 F.Supp. 64, 82 (D.D.C.1979); United States v. Bally Manufacturing Corp., 345 F.Supp. 410 (E.D.La.1972) (replacing the term “racketeering” with “unlawful” in RICO prosecutions).

See Barbieri, 614 F.2d 715, 719 ; United States v. Barrentine, 591 F.2d 1069, 1077 (5th Cir.1979); Thevis, 474 F.Supp. 117, 125 ; United States v. Hubbard, 474 F.Supp. 64, 81 (D.D.C.1979); United States v. Fine, 413 F.Supp. 740, 746 (W.D.Wis.1976); United States v. Burgio, 279 F.Supp. 843, 846 (S.D.N.Y.1968).

See Barbieri, 614 F.2d 715, 719 ; United States v. Barrentine, 591 F.2d 1069, 1077 (5th Cir.1979); Thevis, 474 F.Supp. 117, 125 ; United States v. Hubbard, 474 F.Supp. 64, 81 (D.D.C.1979); United States v. Fine, 413 F.Supp. 740, 746 (W.D.Wis.1976); United States v. Burgio, 279 F.Supp. 843, 846 (S.D.N.Y.1968).

United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1160 (7th Cir.1974); United States v. Hubbard, 474 F.Supp. 64, 87 (D.C.

On the other hand, in United States v. Hubbard, 474 F. Supp. 64, 85 (D.D.C. 1979), the Court made available the services of the U.S. Marshal for transmittal of the defendant’s request for interviews of witnesses in protective custody, stating it was “persuaded” that it would be ‘ ‘ improper f or the prosecution to act as conduit for defense counsel’s request.” A curative instruction by the judge, in open court, directly to the prospective witness would obviously have been mo…

United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d at 54 , United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d at 63, United States v. Heldon, 479 F.Supp. at 323 , United States v. Hubbard, 474 F.Supp. 64, 80-81 (D.D.C.1979).

See United States v. Adamo, 534 F.2d 31, 37 (C.A.3), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 841 , 97 S.Ct. 116 , 50 L.Ed.2d 110 (1976); United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205, 1216 (C.A.3), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914 , 93 S.Ct. 233 , 34 L.Ed.2d 176 (1972); United States v. Hubbard, 474 F.Supp. 64, 72 (D.D.C.1979).

See Allard v. Church of Scientology, 129 Cal.Rptr. 797 (Cal.App.1976), ce rt. denied, 429 U.S. 1091 , 97 S.Ct. 1101 , 51 L.Ed.2d 537 (1977); United States v. Hubbard, 474 F.Supp. 64, 70-71 (D.D.C.1979).

United States v. Hubbard, 474 F.Supp. 64, 86-90 (D.D.C.1979).

United States v. H ubbard, 474 F. Supp. 64, 79 (D .D .C . 1979).

See Id. 86 .

See also United States v. Hubbard, (D.C.D.C. 1979) 474 F.Supp. 64 at 87: “The predominant factor in the analysis of a joinder problem is the commonality of proof.

See e.g., United States v. Hubbard, 474 F.Supp. 64 (D.D.C.1979) (where government represented it would turn over Jencks statements prior to trial, court held it to its promise); United States v. Narciso, supra at 270-71 (E.D.Mich.1976) (ordering pre-trial disclosure of Jencks statements to promote .efficiency and fairness).

See, e.g., Hubbard, 474 F.Supp. at 82 ; United States v. Brighton Bldg. & Maintenance Co., 435 F.Supp. 222, 230 (N.D.Ill.1977), aff'd, 598 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840 , 100 S.Ct. 79 , 62 L.Ed.2d 52 (1979).

See United States v. Hubbard, 474 F.Supp. 64, 71-72 (D.D.C.1979) (single conspiracy although the 59 overt acts constituting the means and objectives “can logically be grouped into separate categories”); United States v. Recognition Equipment, 711 F.Supp. 1, 7-9 (D.D.C.1989) (conspiracy charge included allegations of a kickback scheme, a scheme to replace the Postmaster General, theft of USPS property, mail and wire fraud, and corruption of USPS operations, but the court held…

See United States v. Hubbard, 474 F. Supp. 64 (D.D.C. 1979).

See also United States v. Hubbard, 474 F.Supp. 64, 71-72 (D.D.C.1979); United States v. DiPasquale, 561 F.Supp. 1338, 1348-50 (E.D.Pa.1983).

United States v. Cameron, 460 F.2d 1394 (5th Cir.1972); accord United States v. Hubbard, 474 F.Supp. 64 (D.C.1979).

See also, United States v. Hubbard, 474 F.Supp. 64, 71-72 (D.D.C.1979); United States v. Mitchell, 397 F.Supp. 166, 171 (D.D.C.1974), aff’d on other grounds, 559 F.2d 31 (D.C.Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 , 97 S.Ct. 2641 , 53 L.Ed.2d 250 (1977).

See United States v. Hubbard, 474 F.Supp. 64, 75-77 (D.D.C. 1979).