United States v. Parsons (1998)

Defendant’s intentional theft of $238,340 from the estate is an “intended loss,” see id. §2B1.1, comment. (n.3(A)(ii)), and the payments she made to the estate during the civil suit do not diminish her culpability for the underlying fraud, see, e.g., United States v. Parsons, 141 F.3d 386, 392-93 (1st Cir. 1998) (“Loss is a proxy for the seriousness of the offense” and “a defrauder cannot purchase a shorter term by a belated return of the proceeds[.]”).

The other circuits, however, have generally held that "a release by the victim does not preclude or cap restitution of losses as part of criminal sentencing in a case where there is no double recovery." United States v. Parsons, 141 F.3d 386, 393 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Savoie, 985 F.2d 612, 619 (1st Cir. 1993)); see also United States v. Sheinbaum, 136 F.3d 443, 448 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding "that district courts possess the discretion to impose restituti…

United States v. Parsons, 141 F.3d 386, 392 (1st Cir. 1998).

See United States v. Bryant, 655 F.3d 232, 254 (3d 7 Cir. 2011) (“[W]here offsets are claimed, such as for compensation that the victim gets from other sources, other Courts of Appeals have concluded that it is the defendant’s burden to prove those offsets.” (citations omitted)); see also United States v. Sizemore, 850 F.3d 821, 828 (6th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he burden of proving an offset should lie with the defendant.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)); United States…

See, e.g., United States v. Rizk, 660 F.3d 1125, 1137 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Gallant, 537 F.3d 1202, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Karam, 201 F.3d 320 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Parsons, 141 F.3d 386, 393 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v. Sheinbaum, 136 F.3d 443, 448-49 (5th Cir. 1998).

Id. at 1041 (citing United States v. Parsons, 141 F.3d 386, 393 (1st Cir.1998); United States v. Sheinbaum, 136 F.3d 443, 448 (5th Cir.1998); United States v. Vetter, 895 F.2d 456, 459 (8th Cir.1990); United States v. Hairston, 888 F.2d 1349, 1355 (11th Cir.1989); United States v. Cloud, 872 F.2d 846, 854 (9th Cir.1989)). 5 We further noted that all of these cases relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 , 107 S.Ct. 353 , 93 L.Ed.2d 216 (198…

Defendant’s intentional theft of $238,340 from the estate is an “intended loss,” see id. § 2B.1, comment. (n.3(A)(ii)), and the payments she made to the estate during the civil suit do not diminish her *930 culpability for the underlying fraud, see, e.g., United States v. Parsons, 141 F.3d 386, 392-93 (1st Cir.1998) (“Loss is a proxy for the seriousness of the offense” and “a defrauder cannot purchase a shorter term by a belated return of the proceeds[.]”).

Private parties cannot simply agree to waive the application of a criminal statute.” 985 F.2d at 619 (citation omitted); cf. United States v. Parsons, 141 F.3d 386, 393 (1st Cir.1998) (“[A] release by the victim does not preclude or cap restitution of losses as part of criminal sentencing in a case where there is no double recovery.”).

Cf. United States v. Geevers, 226 F.3d 186, 193 (3d Cir.2000) (in check kiting scheme, government can make prima facie case that intended loss is full value of checks, and defendant has burden to introduce evidence to the contrary); see also United States v. McCormac, 309 F.3d 623, 628-29 (9th Cir.2002) (reading note 2E(ii) to Guideline § 2B1.1 as only applicable to calculation of actual loss unless defendant anticipated collateral would be seized and holding that where defe…

The Trustee also cites the following cases where courts have referred to “loan disbursements” or disbursement of loans: Bank Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 171 F.3d 779, 782 (2d Cir.1999) (using the specific term “loan disbursements”); United States v. Symington, 195 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir.1999) (stating that “Mounts 13 to 15 alleged that Symington ... [submitted] materially false requests for disbursements on loans”); United States v. Parsons, 141 F.3d …

United States v. Parsons, 141 F.3d 386, 390 (1st Cir. 1998) (“It is counsel’s job on appeal to mine the record and prove the alleged error, not to offer suggestive hints and leave the rest of the work to a busy court.”); Rodríguez-Machado v. Shinseki, 700 F.3d 48, 50 (1st Cir. 2012) (“[D]oing [Plaintiff’s] work for her is not an option, since that would divert precious judge- time from other litigants who could have their cases resolved thoughtfully and expeditiously because…

United States v. Parsons, 141 F.3d 386, 390 (1st Cir. 1998) (“It is counsel’s job on appeal to mine the record and prove the alleged error, not to offer suggestive hints and leave the rest of the work to a busy court.”); Rodríguez-Machado v. Shinseki, 700 F.3d 48, 50 (1st Cir. 2012) (“[D]oing [Plaintiff’s] work for her is not an option, since that would divert precious judge-time from other litigants who could have their cases resolved thoughtfully and expeditiously because …

United States v. Parsons, 141 F.3d 386, 390 (1st Cir. 1998) (“It is counsel’s job on appeal to mine the record and prove the alleged error, not to offer suggestive hints and leave the rest of the work to a busy court.”); Rodríguez-Machado v. Shinseki, 700 F.3d 48, 50 (1st Cir. 2012) (“[D]oing [Plaintiff’s] work for her is not an option, since that would divert precious judge-time from other litigants who could have their cases resolved thoughtfully and expeditiously because …

United States v. Parsons, 141 F.3d 386, 390 (1st Cir. 1998) (“It is counsel’s job on appeal to mine the record and prove the alleged error, not to offer suggestive hints and leave the rest of the work to a busy court.”); Rodríguez-Machado v. Shinseki, 700 F.3d 48, 50 (1st Cir. 2012) (“[D]oing [Plaintiff’s] work for her is not an option, since that would divert precious judge-time from other litigants who could have their cases resolved thoughtfully and expeditiously because …

The other circuits, however, have generally held that “a release by the victim does not preclude or cap restitution of losses as part of criminal sentencing in a case where there is no double recovery.” United States v. Parsons, 141 F.3d 386, 393 (1st Cir.1998) (citing United States v. Savoie, 985 F.2d 612, 619 (1st Cir.1993)); see also United States v. Sheinbaum, 136 F.3d 443, 448 (5th Cir.1998) (concluding “that district courts possess the discretion to impose restitution …

See United States v. Karam, 201 F.3d 320, 326-27 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Parsons, 141 F.3d 386, 393 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v. Sheinbaum, 136 F.3d 443, 449 (5th Cir. 1998).

See Quillen, 335 F.3d at 226 (explaining that the district court may order restitution under the MVRA “provided that the defendant is not required to compensate the victim twice for the same loss”); United States v. Fore, 169 F.3d 104, 110 (2d Cir.1999) (reversing a restitution order granting double recovery); United States v. Parsons, 141 F.3d 386, 393 (1st Cir.1998); United States v. Menza, 137 F.3d 533, 539 (7th Cir.1998); United States v. West Indies Transp., Inc., 127 F…

See United States v. Karam, 201 F.3d 320, 328 (4th Cir.2000); United States v. Parsons, 141 F.3d 386, 393 (1st Cir.1998); United States v. Sheinbaum, 136 F.3d 443, 447-48 (5th Cir.1998).

See United States v. Parsons, 141 F.3d 386, 390 (1st Cir.1998).

See United States v. Parsons, 141 F.3d 386, 390 (1st Cir. 1988).

See United States v. Parsons, 141 F.3d 386, 390-91 (1st Cir. 1998) (explaining that out- of-court statements are admissible to demonstrate the motive of one who heard the statement). -10- scored somewhat lower than Enchauste and Roldán with regard to the 60 points allocated to the written and oral questions.

See United States v. Parsons, 141 F.3d 386, 390-91 (1st Cir.1998) (explaining that out-of-court statements are admissible to demonstrate the motive of one who heard the statement). 2 .

See United States v. Parsons, 141 F.3d 386, 390 (1st Cir.1998) (“It is counsel’s job on appeal to mine the record and prove the alleged error, not to offer suggestive hints and leave the rest of the work to a busy court.”); United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.1990) (explaining that “a litigant has an obligation to spell out its arguments squarely and distinctly, or else forever hold its peace”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

See United States v. Parsons, 141 F.3d 386 , 392 n. 1 (1st Cir.1998).

Intended loss need not be determined with precision; “[t]he court need only make a reasonable estimate of the loss, given the available information.” United States v. Pervaz, 118 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir.1997) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1, cmt. (n.8)); see also United States v. Parsons, 141 F.3d 386, 392 (1st Cir.1998) (loss is a proxy for the seriousness of the offense).

See United States v. Parsons, 141 F.3d 386, 393 (1st Cir.1998).

See United States v. Parsons, 141 F.3d 386, 393 (1st Cir. 1998).

See, e.g., U.S. v. Parsons, 141 F.3d 386, 393 (1st Cir.1998) (stating that a prior civil settlement will bar criminal restitution where there is indication that the settlement compensated the victim for a loss and the restitution order would result in double recovery); People v. Hoisington, 902 P.2d 887, 888 (Colo.App.1995) (stating that “while restitution is not intended as a substitute for a civil damages action, funds recovered by the victim in a civil proceeding prior to…

See U.S. v. Parsons , 141 F.3d 386 (1st Cir. 1998); U.S. v. Savoie , 985 F.2d 612 (1st Cir. 1993); U.S. v. Cloud , 872 F.2d 846, 853-54 (9th Cir. 1989).

See U.S. v. Parsons, 141 F.3d 386 (1st Cir.1998); U.S. v. Savoie, 985 F.2d 612 (1st Cir.1993); U.S. v. Cloud, 872 F.2d 846, 853-54 (9th Cir.1989).