Cluster 1998
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· 39 citation events
across 12 courts.
Showing the 20 strongest citers on record
(one row per citing case, strongest signal kept).
Treatment trajectory · 2011 → 2026 · click a year to view the case as of then
201120182026
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Simply Wireless, Inc v. T-Mobile US, Inc (2024)
And a trial court assessing a summary judgment motion should “consider evidence and testimony regarding . . . practices that occurred before or after the three-year statutory period to infer . . . intent to resume use during the three-year period.” See Crash Dummy Movie, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 601 F.3d 1387, 1392 (Fed.
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Simply Wireless, Inc v. T-Mobile US, Inc (2024)
And a trial court assessing a summary judgment motion should “consider evidence and testimony regarding . . . practices that occurred before or after the three-year statutory period to infer . . . intent to resume use during the three-year period.” See Crash Dummy Movie, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 601 F.3d 1387, 1392 (Fed.
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Cervejaria Petropolis Sa v. Ambev S.A. (2019)
This “creates a rebuttable pre- sumption that the trademark owner has abandoned the mark without intent to resume use.” Crash Dummy Movie, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 601 F.3d 1387, 1391 (Fed.
citation omitted
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To-Ricos, Ltd. v. Productos Avicolas del Sur, Inc. (2024)
Of course, courts may consider evidence "regarding [a mark owner's] practices that occurred before or after the three-year statutory period to infer [an owner's] intent to resume use during the three-year period." Crash Dummy Movie, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 601 F.3d 1387, 1392 (Fed.
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Wi-Lan Inc. v. Sharp Electronics Corporation (2021)
Case: 20-1041 Document: 73 Page: 8 Filed: 04/06/2021 8 WI-LAN INC. v. SHARP ELECTRONICS CORPORATION other qualified witness.” Crash Dummy Movie, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 601 F.3d 1387, 1392 (Fed.
citing Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)
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Christian Faith Fellowship Church v. Adidas AG (2016)
Cir. 2012) (citing Crash Dummy Movie, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 601 F.3d 1387, 1390 (Fed.
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Cutino v. Nightlife Media, Inc. (2014)
Crash Dummy Movie, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 601 F.3d 1387, 1391 (Fed.Cir.2010). 4 .
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Yellowbook Inc. v. Steven Brandeberry (2013)
Crash Dummy Movie, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 601 F.3d 1387, 1391 (Fed.Cir.2010).
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Coach Services, Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC (2012)
Crash Dummy Movie, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 601 F.3d 1387, 1390 (Fed.Cir.2010) (citing Chen v. Bouchard, 347 F.3d 1299, 1307 (Fed.Cir. 2003)).
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Dalton v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd. (2011)
Crash Dummy Movie, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 601 F.3d 1387, 1390 (Fed.Cir.2010) (citing Chen v. Bou-chard, 347 F.3d 1299, 1307 (Fed.Cir.2003)).
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Simply Wireless, Inc. v. T-Mobile US, Inc. (2022)
Crash Dummy Movie, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 601 F.3d 1387, 1391 (Fed.
noting that the senior user acquired marks in February 1997 through an assignment but did not begin selling toys using the mark until December 2003
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GSH Trademarks Limited v. Sia \Baltmark Invest\"" (2021)
Prima facie evidence of abandonment “creates a rebuttable presumption that the trademark owner has abandoned the mark without intent to resume use.” Crash Dummy Movie, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 601 F.3d 1387, 1391 (Fed.
citing On-Line Careline, 229 F.3d at 1087
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Metzinger v. United States (2025)
Evid. 803(6); Crash Dummy Movie, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 601 F.3d 1387, 1392 (Fed.
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The Scotts Company LLC v. SBM Life Science Corp. (2025)
Furthermore, “[a] showing of a prima facie case creates a rebuttable presumption that the trademark owner has abandoned the mark without intent to resume use.” Crash Dummy Movie, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 601 F.3d 1387, 1391 (Fed.
Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 16:18; see also Crash Dummy Movie, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 601 F.3d 1387, 1391 (Fed.
“cancellation of a trademark registration does not necessarily translate into abandonment of common law trademark rights.”
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IOW LLC v. Breus (2019)
Cal. 2014) (ruling on motion to dismiss citing Chance, Rearden, and 16 Brookfield, not clearly distinguishing between use to support priority or registration). 17 Moreover, many courts and the McCarthy treatise have recognized the difference 18 between use that supports priority and use needed for registration, and have found that 19 actual use of a mark is required for registration even if a lesser showing establishes priority. 20 This distinction makes sense under general …
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IOW LLC v. Breus (2019)
Cal. 2014) (ruling on motion to dismiss citing Chance, Rearden, and 2 Brookfield, not clearly distinguishing between use to support priority or registration). 3 Moreover, many courts and the McCarthy treatise have recognized the difference 4 between use that supports priority and use needed for registration, and have found that 5 actual use of a mark is required for registration even if a lesser showing establishes priority. 6 This distinction makes sense under general trade…
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In Re Mousa (2012)
See In re Aoyama, 656 F.3d 1293, 1296 (Fed.Cir.2011); See Falko-Gunter Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed.Cir.2006). “[T] he possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.” Crash Dummy Movie, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 601 F.3d 1387, 1390 (Fed.Cir.2010) (quoting Consolo v. Fed.
See Crash Dummy Movie, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 601 F.3d 1387, 1390 (Fed.
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Spin Master, Ltd. v. Zobmondo Entertainment, LLC (2012)
See Crash Dummy Movie, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 601 F.3d 1387, 1391 (Fed.Cir.2010); Natural Answers, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 529 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir.2008).