Suboh v. District Attorney's Office (2002)
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· 221 citation events
across 15 courts.
Showing the 50 strongest citers on record
(one row per citing case, strongest signal kept).
Treatment trajectory · 2002 → 2026 · click a year to view the case as of then
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Jennings v. Jones (2007)
Attorney’s Office of Suffolk, 298 F.3d 81, 93 (1st Cir.2002).
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Higgins v. Penobscot County Sheriff's Department (2006)
See, e.g., Wilson v. City of Boston, 421 F.3d 45, 52-59 (1st Cir.2005); Riverdale Mills Corp. v. Pimpare, 392 F.3d 55, 60-66 (1st Cir.2004); Suboh v. District Atty’s Office, 298 F.3d 81, 90-96 (1st Cir.2002); Abreu-Guzman v. Ford, 241 F.3d 69, 73-74 (1st Cir.2001).
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DeMayo v. Nugent (2008)
Under this prong, “[w]e consider whether existing case law gave the defendants ‘fair warning that their conduct violated the plaintiffs constitutional rights.’ ” Jennings v. Jones, 499 F.3d 2, 16 (1st Cir.2007) (quoting Suboh v. Disk Attorney’s Office of Suffolk, 298 F.3d 81, 93 (1st Cir.2002)). “[T]he right allegedly violated must be defined at the appropriate level of specificity before a court can determine if it was clearly established.” Riverdale Mills Corp. v. Pimpare,…
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Jennings v. Jones (2007)
Attorney’s Office of Suffolk, 298 F.3d 81, 93 (1st Cir.2002).
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Johnson v. City of Biddeford (2024)
Att'y's Off., 298 F.3d 81, 95 (1st Cir. 2002) ("If the officer's mistake as to what the law requires is reasonable . . . the officer is entitled to the immunity defense." (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 , 205 (2001))); Polanco v. Diaz, 76 F.4th 918, 931 (9th Cir. 2023) (holding that officers were not protected by qualified immunity because they "affirmatively expos[ed] their employees to workplace conditions that they knew were likely to cause serious illness" (emphas…
"If the officer's mistake as to what the law requires is reasonable . . . the officer is entitled to the immunity defense." (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 , 205 (2001))
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Centro de Periodismo Investigativo, Inc. v. FOMB (2022)
Attorney's Office, 298 F.3d 81, 97 (1st Cir. 2002), and Fletcher v. Town of Clinton, 196 F.3d 41, 55 (1st Cir. 1999)); see also Nieves-Márquez, 353 F.3d at 123 .
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Irish v. Fowler (2020)
Att'y's Off. of Suffolk Dist., 298 F.3d 81, 94 (1st Cir. 2002); Dean for & on behalf of Harkness v. McKinney, 976 F.3d 407, 418 (4th Cir. 2020); Cantu v. City of Dothan, 974 F.3d 1217, 1232 (11th Cir. 2020); Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1355 (11th Cir. 2002); Williams v. Strickland, 917 F.3d 763, 770 (4th Cir. 2019); Browder, 787 F.3d at 1082–83.
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Penate v. Hanchett (2019)
Att'y's Office of Suffolk Dist., 298 F.3d 81, 97 (1st Cir. 2002)).
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Perry v. Spencer (2018)
First, a plaintiff must "identify either 'controlling authority' or a 'consensus of cases of persuasive authority' sufficient to send a clear signal to a reasonable official that certain conduct falls short of the - 5 - constitutional norm." Id. (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999)). "[W]e examine 'not only Supreme Court precedent, but all available case law, including both federal cases outside our own circuit, and state court decisions of the state wherein th…
citations omitted
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Morales v. Chadbourne (2015)
Attorney’s Office of Suffolk Dist., 298 F.3d 81, 94 (1st Cir.2002) (“We have no doubt that there is a clearly established constitutional right at stake, although we have found no case exactly on all fours with the facts of this case.”). b.
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Hunt v. Massi (2014)
Attorney’s Office of the Suffolk Dist. 298 F.3d 81, 93 (1st Cir.2002).
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Lorenzo Hall v. Rick Sutton (2014)
Attorney’s Office of Suffolk Dist., 298 F.3d 81, 93 (1st Cir. 2002).
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Hall v. Sutton (2014)
Attorney’s Office of Suffolk Dist., 298 F.3d 81, 93 (1st Cir. 2002).
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Snyder v. Gaudet (2014)
Suboh v. District Attorney’s, 298 F.3d 81, 90 (1st Cir.2002).
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Robinson v. Cook (2013)
Attorney’s Office of Suffolk Dist., 298 F.3d 81, 96 (1st Cir.2002), and the evidence here just clears that bar. 2.
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Lopez v. Massachusetts (2009)
Attorney’s Office, 298 F.3d 81, 97 (1st Cir.2002); see also Fletcher v. Town of Clinton, 196 F.3d 41, 55 (1st Cir.1999). 10 All other circuits have found that pendent jurisdiction exists in at least this situation.
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Guillemard-Ginorio v. Contreras-Gomez (2009)
Attorney’s Office of Suffolk, 298 F.3d 81, 93 (1st Cir.2002)).
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Parker v. Gerrish (2008)
Attorney’s Office, 298 F.3d 81, 90 (1st Cir.2002)).
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Brown v. Daniels (2008)
However, “in those extraordinary situations where deprivation of a protected interest is permitted without pri- or process, the constitutional requirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard are not eliminated, but merely postponed.” Suboh v. District Attorney’s Office of Suffolk, 298 F.3d 81, 92 (1st Cir.2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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Philip v. Cronin (2008)
Attorney’s Office, 298 F.3d 81, 90 (1st Cir.2002).
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Keylon v. City of Albuquerque (2008)
Atty's Office of Suffolk Dist., 298 F.3d 81, 90 (1st Cir.2002) (same as Willingham); Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1318 (11th Cir.2002) (same).
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Asociación De Periodistas De Puerto Rico v. Mueller (2008)
Attorney’s Office, 298 F.3d 81, 90 (1st Cir.2002)). 2 In accordance with the preferred approach in qualified immunity cases, which is to address the considerations sequentially, we begin by discussing the alleged constitutional violations.
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Carter Ex Rel. Caleb O. v. Lindgren (2007)
Attorney’s Office of the Suffolk Dist., 298 F.3d 81, 90 (1st Cir.2002); Hatch v. Dep’t for Children, Youth & Their Families, 274 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir.2001); see also Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 , 119 S.Ct. 1692 , 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999).
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Guillemard-Ginorio v. Contreras-Gomez (2007)
Attorney’s Office, 298 F.3d 81, 90 (1st Cir.2002).
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Asociación De Subscripción Conjunta Del Seguro De Responsabilidad Obligatorio v. Juan A. Flores Galarza (2007)
Attorney's Office of Suffolk, 298 F.3d 81, 93 (1st Cir.2002).
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Asociacion de Sus v. Flores-Galarza (2007)
Attorney's Office of Suffolk, 298 F.3d 81, 93 (1st Cir.2002).
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Asociación De Subscripción Conjunta Del Seguro De Responsabilidad Obligatorio v. Flores Galarza (2007)
Attorney’s Office of Suffolk, 298 F.3d 81, 93 (1st Cir.2002).
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Rodriguez-Marin v. Rivera-Gonzalez (2006)
Attorney’s Office, 298 F.3d 81, 90 (1st Cir.2002).
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Borges-Colon v. Roman-Abreu (2006)
Attorney’s Office, 298 F.3d 81, 90 (1st Cir.2002)).
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Osuji v. Departamento de la Familia (2021)
Attorney's Off. of Suffolk Dist., 298 F.3d 81, 91 (1st Cir. 2002).
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Walden v. City of Providence (2007)
Attorney’s Office, 298 F.3d 81, 90 (1st Cir.2002)).
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Sabey v. Butterfield (2024)
Att’y’s Off., 298 F.3d 81, 91 (1st Cir. 2002).
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Ward v. Petow (2020)
Attorney's Office of Suffolk, 298 F.3d 81, 93 (1st Cir. 2002).
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In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litigation (2015)
Attorney’s Office of Suffolk Dist., 298 F.3d 81, 95 (1st Cir.2002), and in DiFiore, I should have recognized that federal law preempted the entire cause of action.
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Ortiz v. Jimenez-Sanchez (2015)
Attorney’s Office of Suffolk Dist., 298 F.3d 81, 91 (1st Cir.2002).
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Rua v. Glodis (2014)
Suboh v. District Attorney’s Office of Suffolk Dist., 298 F.3d 81, 90 (1st Cir.2002) (internal citations omitted).
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Hunt v. Massi (2014)
The First Circuit has observed that a right is clearly established when there is existing case law giving “the defendants fair warning that their conduct violated the plaintiffs constitutional rights.” Suboh v. District Attorney’s Office of Suffolk District, 298 F.3d 81, 93 (1st Cir.2002); see also Raiche v. Pietroski 623 F.3d 30, 38 (1st Cir.2010) (holding that the right is clearly established if courts have previously ruled that similar conduct was unconstitutional, or if …
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McGunigle v. City of Quincy (2013)
Attorney's Office of Suffolk, 298 F.3d 81, 93 (1st Cir.2002)). .
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B & B Target Center, Inc. v. Figueroa-Sancha (2012)
Attorney’s Office of Suffolk Dist. 298 F.3d 81, 94 (1st Cir.2002).
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Del Toro-Pacheco v. Pereira-Castillo (2009)
Attorney’s Office of Suffolk Dist., 298 F.3d 81, 90 (1st Cir.2002)); see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).
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Natal-Rosario v. Puerto Rico Police Department (2009)
The First Circuit employs a three-part test when determining if a public official is entitled to qualified immunity: “(1) whether plaintiffs allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation; (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation; and (3) whether a similarly situated reasonable official would have understood that the challenged action violated the constitutional right at issue.” Mihos v. Swift, 358 F.3d 91, 102 (1st Cir.…
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Natal-Rosario v. Puerto Rico Police Department (2009)
The First Circuit employs a three-part test when determining if a public official is *204 entitled to qualified immunity: “(1) whether plaintiffs allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation; (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation; and (3) whether a similarly situated reasonable official would have understood that the challenged action violated the constitutional right at issue.” Mihos v. Swift, 358 F.3d 91, 102 (1st…
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HUARBE-VELEZ v. Soto-Santiago (2008)
The First Circuit Court of Appeals employs a three-part test when determining if a public official is entitled to qualified immunity: “(1) whether plaintiffs allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation; (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation; and (3) whether a similarly situated reasonable official would have understood that the challenged action violated the constitutional right at issue.” Mihos v. Swift, 358 F.3d …
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Tavarez-Guerrero v. Toledo-Davila (2008)
The First Circuit employs a three-part test when determining if a public official is entitled to qualified immunity: “(1) whether plaintiffs allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation; (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation; and (3) whether a similarly situated reasonable official would have understood that the challenged action violated the constitutional right at issue.” Mihos v. Swift, 358 F.3d 91, 102 (1st Cir.…
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Pentlarge v. Murphy (2008)
Attorney’s Office of Suffolk, 298 F.3d 81, 93 (1st Cir.2002)).
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Rodriguez Narvaez v. Pereira (2007)
The First Circuit Court of Appeals employs a three-part test when determining if a public official is entitled to qualified immunity: “(1) whether plaintiffs allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation; (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation; and (3) whether a similarly situated reasonable official would have understood that the challenged action violated the constitutional right at issue.” Mihos v. Swift, 358 F.3d …
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Bowler v. Town of Hudson (2007)
Atty’s Office, 298 F.3d 81, 90 (1st Cir.2002)).
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Doe Ex Rel. Doe v. Preston (2007)
Attorney’s Office, 298 F.3d 81, 90 (1st Cir.2002).
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Sueiro Vázquez v. Torregrosa De La Rosa (2006)
The First Circuit employs a three-prong test when determining if a public official is entitled to qualified immunity: “(1) whether plaintiffs allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation; (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation; and (3) whether a similarly situated reasonable official would have understood that the challenged action violated the constitutional right at issue.” Mihos v. Swift, 358 F.3d 91, 102 (1st Cir…
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Sistemas Urbanos, Inc. v. Lugo Ramos (2006)
The First Circuit employs a three-part test when determining if a public official is entitled to qualified immunity: “(1) whether plaintiffs allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation; (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation; and (3) whether a similarly situated reasonable official would have understood that the challenged action violated the constitutional right at issue.” Mihos v. Swift, 358 F.3d 91, 102 (1st Cir.…