Sestito v. City of Groton (1979)

But see Sestito v. Groton , 178 Conn. 520 (1979) as to the mandatory compliance with statutes alleged to be breached, here certain traffic statutes applicable to all operators.

A. Affirmative Act Versus Failure to Act It appears that the Supreme Court of Connecticut first recognized the imminent harm to an identifiable person exception in Sestito v. Groton, 178 Conn. 520, 528 (1979), and subsequently applied it in Shore v. Town of Stonington, 187 Conn. 147, 153-54 (1982).

Gaynor v. Union Trust Co., 216 Conn. 458, 467 , 582 A.2d 190 (1990).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Earl B. v. Commissioner of Children & Families, 288 Conn. 163, 178 , 952 A.2d 32 (2008); see also Sestito v. Groton, 178 Conn. 520, 525 , 423 A.2d 165 (1979) (“[t]he use of the disjunctive ‘or’ in the statute clearly indicates that the legislature intended the parts of the statute to be separate and not cumulative”).

See, e.g., Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 309-311 (1982) (jailor’s duty to plaintiff from negligent release of inmate; overruling Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518 [1969], which found no specific duty to stop speeding intoxicated driver); Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School Dist., 22 Cal. 3d 508, 513-520 (1978) (duty to protect student who left school premises from third person); Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 435 (1976) (duty of therapist t…

Plaintiff analogizes her situation to the one in Sestito v. Groton, 178 Conn. 520, 522 (1979), in which police failed to protect an individual gunshot victim, despite watching the victim involved in a brawl outside of a bar and failing to act, because “in this case Plaintiff was readily identifiable to the defendants, as both a domestic violence victim and ultimately the subject of their criminal investigation and arrest.

“We have recognized the existence of such duty in situations where it would be apparent to the public officer that his failure to act would be likely to subject an identifiable person to imminent harm.” Id. at 153 (citing Sestito v. Groton, 178 Conn. 520, 528 (1979)).

See Tango v. New Haven, 173 Conn. 203 , 204–206, 377 A.2d 284 (1977) (reversing judg- ment in favor of defendant on demurrer in negligence action arising from sledding accident at municipal golf course); Fraser v. Henninger, 173 Conn. 52 , 53–54, 61, 376 A.2d 406 (1977) (rendering judgment in connection with negligence action arising out of injuries sustained in basketball game run by municipal recreational pro- gram); cf. Sestito v. Groton, 178 Conn. 520, 523, 526 , 423 A.2…

Albarran has identified just one case in which a Connecticut court has applied the “very limited” identifiable person, imminent harm exception, and that case is distinguishable.10 In Sestito v. City of Groton, the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed a trial court’s decision to award a directed verdict to the defendant officer on plaintiff’s negligence claim. 178 Conn. 520, 529 (1979).

Therefore, whether in addition he had subsumed a specific duty to the plaintiff's decedent was a "factual inquiry that should be left for jury determination." Sestito v. Groton, supra, 528.

The question in each case is whether the facts present a situation where the statute applies, that is, whether a public official’s constant general duty to the public has, in addition, subsumed a specific duty to the individual claiming injury. 2 Cooley [Torts, § 300 (4th ed.) ] It is this factual inquiry that should be left for jury determination, whether the alleged duty to the individual arises from other statutes, regulations, or the common law. 178 Conn, at 527-28 (emph…

In Sestito , the court observed that § 7-108 “is a legislative waiver of sovereign immunity, and therefore must be read narrowly”; the court concluded that because the activities of the men in the parking lot could have been found by a jury to have constituted a “disturbance of the peace” (if not a “mob” or “riot”), it was error to prevent the jury from engaging in that inquiry. 178 Conn, at 524, 525, 423 A.2d 165 .

See Sestito v. Groton, 178 Conn. 520, 527-28 , 423 A.2d 165 (1979)." Burns v. Board of Education, supra, 228 Conn. at 646 , 638 A.2d 1 .

"The immunity from liability for the performance of discretionary acts by a municipal employee is subject to three exceptions or circumstances under which liability may attach even though the act was discretionary: first, where the circumstances make it apparent to the public officer that his or her failure to act would be likely to subject an identifiable person to imminent harm; see, e.g., Sestito v. Groton , 178 Conn. 520 , 528, 423 A.2d 165 (1979) ; second, where a statu…

See Sestito v. Groton, 178 Conn. 520 , 522–23, 423 A.2d 165 (1979) (police officer sat in car and watched drunken brawl unfold until victim was shot).

See Sestito v. Groton, 178 Conn. 520, 528 , 423 A.2d 165 (1979); see also Shore v. Stoning-ton, 187 Conn. 147, 153 , 444 A.2d 1379 (1982).

See Sestito v. Groton, 178 Conn. 520, 528 , 423 A.2d 165 (1979).

See Sestito v. Groton, CT Page 3675 supra, 178 Conn. 520 .

See Shore v. Stonington , 187 Conn. 147 ("Under Sestito [v. Groton , supra] a police officer is liable whenever the circumstances indicate that someone will be severely injured." Id., 160 (Peters, C.J., dissenting)).

Pierre v. Plainfield, supra, 326 Conn. 436 ; see id., 436–37 and n.15 (discussing Sestito v. Groton, 178 Conn. 520 , 423 A.2d 165 (1979), and noting that, ‘‘[o]utside of the schoolchildren context, we have recognized an identifiable person under this exception in only one case that has since been limited to its facts,’’ and, ‘‘although we have addressed claims that a plaintiff is an identifi- able person or member of an identifiable class of foreseeable victims in a number o…

See Sestito v. Groton, [ 178 Conn. 520, 523 , 423 A.2d 165 (1979)].

See Sestito v. Groton, 178 Conn. 520 , 522–23, 527–28, 423 A.2d 165 (1979).

See Sestito v. Groton, 178 Conn. 520 , 522–23, 423 A.2d 165 (1979);8 see also Grady v. Somers, supra, 294 Conn. 353 (discussing restrictive application of exception).

See, e.g., Shore v. Stonington, supra, 187 Conn. 153 (‘‘[w]e have recognized the existence of [a duty of a public official to act] where it would be apparent to the public officer that his failure to act would be likely to subject an identifiable person to imminent harm’’ [citing Sestito v. Groton, 178 Conn. 520, 528 , 423 A.2d 165 (1979)]); Evon v. Andrews, 211 Conn. 501, 505 , 559 A.2d 1131 (1989) (‘‘[t]he immunity from liability for the performance of discretionary acts b…

See Sestito v. Groton, 178 Conn. 520, 522-23, 528 , 423 A.2d 165 (1979).

See Sestito v. Gro-ton, [ 178 Conn. 520, 522-23 , 423 A.2d 165 (1979)] (facts presented jury question in case wherein on-duty town police officer watched and witnessed ongoing brawl in bar’s parking lot but did not intervene until after participant had shot and killed plaintiffs decedent).

See, e.g., Sestito v. Groton, 178 Conn. 520, 525-28 , 423 A.2d 165 (1979).

"The immunity from liability for the performance of discretionary acts by a municipal employee is subject to three exceptions or circumstances under which liability may attach even though the act was discretionary: first, where the circumstances make it apparent to the public officer that his or her failure to act would be likely to subject an identifiable person to imminent harm; see, e.g., Sestito v. Groton , 178 Conn. 520 , 528 , 423 A.2d 165 (1979); second, where a statu…

See Sestito v. Groton, [ 178 Conn. 520, 523 , 423 A.2d 165 (1979)].

“One exception is when ‘it would be apparent to the public officer that his failure to act would be likely to subject an identifiable person to imminent harm.’ [Shore v. Stonington, supra, 187 Conn. 153 ]; see, e.g., Sestito v. Groton, [ 178 Conn. 520, 528 , 423 A.2d 165 (1979)].” 4 (Emphasis added.) Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, supra, 208 Conn. 166 .

Wright v. Brown, 167 Conn. 464 , 471 , 356 A.2d 176 (1975); see also Sestito v. Groton, 178 Conn. 520 , 524 , 423 A.2d 165 (1979).

See Sestito v. Groton, 178 Conn. 520 , 527-28 , 423 A.2d 165 (1979)." Burns v. Board of Education, 228 Conn. 640 , 646 , 638 A.2d 1 (1994).

CT Page 8776 "The immunity from liability for the performance of discretionary acts by a municipal employee is subject to three exceptions or circumstances under which liability may attach even though the act was discretionary: first, where the circumstances make it apparent to the public officer that his or her failure to act would be likely to subject an identifiable person to imminent harm; see, e.g., Sestito v. Groton, 178 Conn. 520 , 528 , 423 A.2d 165 (1979); second, w…

Thus, in a suit under § 7-465 , any municipal liability which may attach is predicated on prior findings of individual negligence on the part of the employee and the municipality's employment relationship with that individual." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wu v. Fairfield , 204 Conn. 435 , 438 , 528 A.2d 364 (1987); see Sestito v. Groton , 178 Conn. 520 , 527-28 , 423 A.2d 165 (1979); Kivlen v. Town of New Fairfield , Superior …

Burns v. Board of Education, 228 Conn. 640, 646 , 638 A.2d 1 (1994); see also Sestito v. Groton, 178 Conn. 520, 527-28 , 423 A.2d 165 (1979).

See Sestito v. Groton, 178 Conn. 520, 527-28 , 423 A.2d 165 (1979).

See Sestito v. Groton, 178 Conn. 520 , 528 , 423 A.2d 165 (1979).

Even if an act is governmental or discretionary, liability may nevertheless attach: “first, where the circumstances make it apparent to the public officer that his or her failure to act would be likely to subject an identifiable person to imminent harm; see, e.g., Sestito v. Groton, 178 Conn. 520, 528 , 423 A.2d 165 (1979); second, where a statute specifically provides for a cause of action against a municipality or municipal official for failure to enforce certain laws; see…

The plaintiffs argue, however, that even if the municipal employees were performing discretionary acts, they fall within one of the three exceptions under which liability may attach even though the act was discretionary, noted in Evon v. Andrews, supra at 505: The immunity from liability for the performance of discretionary acts by a municipal employee is subject to three exceptions or circumstances under which liability may attach even though the act was discretionary: firs…

See Sestito v. Groton, 178 Conn. 520 (1979)." Shore, 187 Conn. at 153 .

Ed. 2d 36 (1986); see Sestito v. Groton, 178 Conn. 520, 522 , 423 A.2d 165 (1979).

See id.

See Sestito v. Groton , 178 Conn. 520 , 527-28 (1979).

See Sestito v. Groton , [ 178 Conn. 520 (1979)].

See Id., 526 .

See Sestito v. Groton , supra, 178 Conn. 520 (plaintiff's decedent shot among mob of men considered sufficiently identifiable victim for purposes of governmental immunity exception); see also Burns v. Board of Education , supra, 228 Conn. 646 ("We have construed [the identifiable person-imminent harm] exception to apply not only to identifiable individuals but also to narrowly defined identified classes of foreseeable victims.").

See Sestito v. Groton, 178 Conn. 520 , 527-28 (1979).

See Sestito v. Groton, 178 Conn. 520 (1979).

See, e.g., Sestito v. Groton, 178 Conn. 520 , 523-24 (1979).

See Sestito v. Groton, 178 Conn. 520 (1979).

Thomas, 28 Conn. Sup. at 508 ; see Wu v. Fairfield, 204 Conn. 435 , 438 (1987) see also Sestito v. Groton, 178 Conn. 520 , 527 (1979).