United States v. Mejia (2002)

But see United States v. Mejia, 309 F.3d 67, 71 (1st Cir.2002) (finding family ties to the United States to be a “discouraged factor” under the Guidelines).

Narrow exceptions do exist, such as when the sentencing court “bases its decision on a view that it lacks the legal authority to consider a departure,” United States v. Mejia, 309 F.3d 67, 69 (1st Cir.2002), or when the court “base[s] its decision on an error of law,” Woodward, 277 F.3d at 92-93 .

Godin, 489 F.3d at 437 (noting appeals court lacks jurisdiction to review discretionary decision not to depart unless district court committed legal error); United States v. Sanchez, 354 F.3d 70, 76 (1st Cir.2004) (recognizing limited exceptions to rule prohibiting review of sentencing court’s departure decisions); United States v. Mejia, 309 F.3d 67, 70 (1st Cir.2002) (“[W]e review de novo a district court’s determination of its authority to depart, but lack jurisdiction to…

See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Montelongo, 263 F.3d 429, 433 (5th Cir.2001) (holding cultural assimilation is permissible basis for downward departure); United States v. Sanchez-Valencia, 148 F.3d 1273, 1274 (11th Cir.1998) (upholding district court’s recognition of its authority to depart in light of Lipman)', cf. United States v. Mejia, 309 F.3d 67, 71 (1st Cir.2002) (finding that “family ties” such as a claimed cultural connection to the United States is a “discour…

United States v. Mejia, 309 F.3d 67, 70 (1st Cir.2002).

United States v. Mejia, 309 F.3d 67, 70 (1st Cir.2002).

Among potential factors justifying a departure, a “discouraged factor” is one “ ‘not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range.’ ” United States v. Mejia, 309 F.3d 67, 70 (1st Cir.2002)(quoting U.S.S.G. § 5, part *68 H, intro, emt.).

Moreover, our review of the record does not suggest that there are any specific aspects of Sau-cedo-Patino’s employment history or family responsibilities that are so exceptional as to take this case outside the heartland. 5 See United States v. Mejia, 309 F.3d 67, 71 (1st Cir.2002) (reaching the same result on similar facts).

The court commented that it had “rarely encountered a childhood as horrendous as this,” and acknowledged that “the defendant’s situation, as he was growing up, [was] almost unimaginably difficult.” The judge nonetheless rejected Capel-ton’s motion for a downward departure, citing the defendant’s extensive criminal background and his failure to take advantage of numerous opportunities to rehabilitate himself: “I am persuaded ... that the defendant has had an awfully large num…

The standard for departing based on a factor not considered by the Sentencing Commission is more lenient than the standard for departing based on a discouraged factor, United States v. Mejia, 309 F.3d 67, 70 (1st Cir.2002), but the Commission made clear that such departures are to be “highly infrequent.” U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt.

See, e.g., United States v. Mejia, 309 F.3d 67, 70 (1st Cir.2002) (referring to "factors that are either encouraged or discouraged bases for departure"); United States v. Bogdan, 284 F.3d 324, 328 (1st Cir.2002) (referring to "factors that are explicitly or implicitly proscribed by the Sentencing Guidelines as bases for departure"). 20 127 On the other hand, there is some support for the contrary view, inherent in the government's position, that "factor" refers not to the ca…

See, e.g., United States v. Mejia, 309 F.3d 67, 70 (1st Cir.2002) (referring to “factors that are either encouraged or discouraged bases for departure”); United States v. Bogdan, 284 F.3d 324, 328 (1st Cir.2002) (referring to “factors that are explicitly or implicitly proscribed by the Sentencing Guidelines as bases for departure”). 20 On the other hand, there is some support for the contrary view, inherent in the government’s' position, that “factor” refers not to the categ…