Bocova v. Gonzales (2005)

See Desta, 365 F.3d at 748 (“If an alien is eligible for a stay of removal, he is necessarily eligible for a stay of voluntary departure.”); but see Bocova, 412 F.3d at 270 (concluding that “there may be cases in which an alien is entitled to a stay of removal but not a stay of voluntary departure”); Alimi, 391 F.3d at 892-93 (same).

Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 263 (1st Cir.2005).” Against this backdrop, the IJ held that the encounters described “amount[ed] to no more than a series of isolated altercations with a disgruntled neighbor and ... a group of boys who bullied younger children.” The IJ explicitly considered the psychologist’s report 2 but concluded that the trauma Mejilla-Romero had experienced was not shown to be connected to Hubert or the gang, particularly given the trauma Mejilla-Romer…

Sompotan, 533 F.3d at 71 ; see, e.g., Bocova, 412 F.3d at 263 (“[Mistreatment ordinarily must entail more than sporadic abuse in order to constitute persecution....

At the time, the Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits incorporated a request for a stay of the voluntary departure period into requests for stay of removal, see Macotaj v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 464, 467 (6th Cir. 2005); Rife v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 606, 616 (8th Cir. 2004); Desta v. Ashcroft, 365 F.3d 741, 745-56 (9th Cir. 2004), whereas the First and Seventh Circuits rejected that view and required an explicit and particularized request for a stay of voluntary departure, see Bocova…

Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 263 (1st Cir.2005).

"An important factor in determining whether [mistreatment amounts to persecution] is whether the mistreatment can be said to be systematic rather than reflective of a series of isolated incidents." Touch v. Holder, 568 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir. 2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 263 (1st Cir. 2005)).

See, e.g., Touch v. Holder, 568 F.3d 32, 39-40 (1st Cir.2009); Topalli v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 128, 132 (1st Cir.2005); Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 263-64 (1st Cir.2005).

Mar. 14, 2014); Sunarto Ang, 723 F.3d at 11 ; Decky v. Holder, 587 F.3d 104, 111 (1st Cir.2009); Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 263-64 (1st Cir.2005), superceded in part on other grounds as recognized by Ivanov v. Holder, 736 F.3d 5, 20 (1st Cir.2013).

See, e.g., Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 332 (2d Cir.2006); Obale v. Att’y Gen., 453 F.3d 151, 157 (3d Cir.2006); Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 267-68 (1st Cir. 2005) (rejecting the government’s argument as “sheer persiflage”); Lopez-Chavez v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir.2004); Rife v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 606, 615-16 (8th Cir.2004); Nwakanma v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 325, 327 (6th Cir.2003) (per curiam).

In determining whether alleged incidents rise to the level of persecution, one important factor is whether “the mistreatment can be said to be systematic rather than reflective of a series of isolated incidents.” Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 263 (1st Cir.2005).

See, e.g., Harutyunyan v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 64, 66, 68 (1st Cir.2005) (upholding denial of relief even though alien had been threatened and beaten and his place of business burned to the ground); Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 263-64 (1st Cir.2005) (affirming denial of relief even though alien was subjected to sporadic detentions and beatings).

See Amouri, 572 F.3d at 35 ; Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 264 (1st Cir.2005); Makhoul, 387 F.3d at 82 .

We reverse only if “ ‘any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’ ” Tobon-Marin v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 28, 30 (1st Cir.2008) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b)(4)(B)). “[V]acatur requires that the evidence point unerringly in the opposite direction.” Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 262 (1st Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

At the time, the Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits incorporated a request for a stay of the voluntary departure period into requests for stay of removal, see Maeotaj v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 464, 467 (6th Cir.2005); Rife v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 606, 616 (8th Cir.2004); Desta v. Ashcroft, 365 F.3d 741, 745-46 (9th Cir.2004), whereas the First and Seventh Circuits rejected that view and required an explicit and particularized request for a stay of voluntary departure, see Bocova v.…

See, e.g., id. at 132 (seven arrests over a two-year period, accompanied by brief detentions and beatings which did not require medical treatment, did not rise to the level of persecution); Bocova, 412 F.3d at 263 (finding no persecution where petitioner was arrested, threatened with death twice over an eight-year period, and was so severely beaten that he lost consciousness and was hospitalized); Ravindran v. INS, 976 F.2d 754, 756-60 (1st Cir.1992) (persecution not found w…

See Topalli v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 128, 132 (1st Cir.2005) (distinguishing between “systematic maltreatment that rose to the level of past persecution” as opposed to a series of “isolated incidents,” and sustaining a finding of no past persecution where petitioner was beaten seven times by the police but did not need medical attention and was able to live in peace for three years following his last arrest); Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 263 (1st Cir.2005) (“Mistreatment o…

As we have often stated in the course of these cases, determining whether alleged incidents rise to the level of persecution requires some evidence that the mistreatment is “systematic rather than reflective of a series of isolated incidents.” Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 263 (1st Cir.2005) (citing In re O-Z & I-Z, 22 I. & N. Dec. 23, 26 (BIA 1998)). *5 Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusions that the events testified to by Huang were not sufficient to suppor…

While we do not minimize the mistreatment involved here, cf. Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 263 (1st Cir. 2005) (“any beating at the hands of the police is one beating too many”), we -6- cannot say that this evidence compels a conclusion contrary to that reached below.

Vargas-Salazar, 119 F.4th at 172-73 (concluding that multiple extortionate death threats and an injury that did not require hospitalization did not compel a finding of past persecution); Santos Garcia, 67 F.4th at 459-61 (three extortionate threats and a beating by armed assailants did not constitute persecution); Jinan Chen, 814 F.3d at 42-43 (upholding the Agency's no-persecution finding when the petitioner "was beaten and subsequently taken to the police station where he …

The Attorney General does point out that "mistreatment ordinarily must entail more than sporadic abuse in order to constitute persecution[,]" Bocova v. Gonzalez, 412 F.3d 257, 263 (1st Cir. 2005), superseded in unrelated part by 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26 (i), as recognized in Ivanov v. Holder, 736 F.3d 5, 20 (1st Cir. 2013).3 And the IJ did find that the beating that Pineda- Maldonado received from the cattle thieves and the beating that he We have acknowledged, however, that "a de…

In other words, the agency's factual findings must "be upheld unless a 'reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.'" Orelien v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 67, 70 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 262 (1st Cir. 2004)).

Rather, the IJ could not be more clear that “based on” the fact that Petitioner’s injuries “did not require any medical attention,” “the level of harm [Petitioner] experienced does not rise to the level of persecution.” A.R. 79 (emphasis supplied). 13 main question is whether Petitioner’s mistreatment was of “sufficient severity,” Oliva, 807 F.3d at 59 (internal quotation marks omitted), keeping in mind that “[a] key difference between persecution and less-severe mistreatmen…

See, e.g., Zarouite, 424 F.3d at 64 ; Velasquez v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 55 , 59 (1st Cir.2003), abrogated on other grounds by Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 266 (1st Cir.2005).

Id. at 576 (quoting Nelson v. INS, 232 F.3d 258, 263 (1st Cir.2000)); see also Attia v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 21, 23-24 (1st Cir.2007) (“a general climate of discrimination” is insufficient to compel finding of persecution); Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 263 (1st Cir.2005) (no persecution compelled where petitioner was arrested, threatened with death, and so severely- beaten that he lost consciousness and was hospitalized).

In reviewing such a credibility determination, we assess whether it is “ ‘supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.’ ” Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 262 (1st Cir.2005) (quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 , 112 S.Ct. 812 , 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992)).

Cf. Topalli v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 128, 129-32 (1st Cir.2005) (no persecution where petitioner was arrested, detained, and beaten over the course of three years but never required medical attention and was not abused for three years before leaving the country); Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 261-63 (1st Cir.2005), superseded in unrelated part by 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26 (i), as described in Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504, 524 (9th Cir.2012) (two beatings twenty-five m…

See Attia v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 21, 23-24 (1st Cir.2007) (no persecution where the applicant was beaten twice over a nine year period and experienced a “general climate of discrimination”); Topalli, 417 F.3d at 132 (seven arrests accompanied by short periods of detention and physical beatings over the span of two years found not to constitute *90 past persecution); Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 263-64 (1st Cir.2005) (no past persecution where the petitioner was arrested,…

The IJ cited Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 263 (1st Cir.2005) (to qualify as persecution, the experiences must rise above un *19 pleasantness, harassment, and even basic suffering).

See, e.g., Thapa v. Gon- zales, 460 F.3d 323, 332 (2d Cir. 2006); Obale v. Att’y Gen., 453 F.3d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 2006); Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 267-68 (1st Cir. 2005) (rejecting the government’s argument as “sheer persiflage”); Lopez-Chavez v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir. 2004); Rife v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 606, 615-16 (8th Cir. 2004); Nwakanma v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 325, 327 (6th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).

Cf. Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 263 (1st Cir.2005) (holding that mistreatment rises to the level of persecution when it is “systematic rather than reflective of a series of isolated incidents” and concluding that two instances of police brutality and one threat did not amount to persecution under this standard).

Journal v. Keisler, 507 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir.2007) (quoting Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 263 (1st Cir.2005)).

See, e.g., Topalli v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 128, 132 (1st Cir.2005) (involving seven arrests accompanied by brief detentions and beatings); Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 261, 263 (1st Cir.2005) (involving two beatings by the police, accompanied by death threats); Nelson v. INS, 232 F.3d 258, 264 (1st Cir.2000) (involving three incarcerations in solitary confinement, plus physical abuse). 4 .

See, e.g., Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 332 (2d Cir.2006); Obale v. Attorney General, 453 F.3d 151, 157 (3d Cir.2006); Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 267-68 (1st Cir.2005); Lopez-Chavez v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir.2004); Rife v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 606, 615-16 (8th Cir.2004); Nwakanma v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 325, 327 (6th Cir.2003) (per curiam).

Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 262 (1st Cir.2005); Laurent v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 59, 64 (1st Cir.2004).

Our circuit has held that we have the authority “to suspend the running of an unexpired voluntary departure period while a petition for judicial review is pending[,]” Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 268 (1st Cir.2005), and while several of our sister circuits are in accord, at least one disagrees.

Consequently, “if a claim for asylum is rejected on the merits, a counterpart claim for withholding of removal must necessarily fail.” Villa-Londono v. Holder, 600 F.3d 21 , 22 n. 1 (1st Cir.2010) (citing Orelien v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 67, 73 (1st Cir.2006); Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 262 (1st Cir.2005)).

“In determining whether alleged incidents rise to the level of persecution, one important factor is whether ‘the mistreatment can be said to be systematic rather than reflective of a series of isolated incidents.’ ” Journal, 507 F.3d at 12 (citing Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 263 (1st Cir.2005)).

“We review the BIA’s legal conclusions de novo, with appropriate deference to the agency’s interpretation of the underlying statute in accordance with administrative law principles.” Gailius v. INS, 147 F.3d 34, 43 (1st Cir.1998) (citing Ipina v. INS, 868 F.2d 511, 513 (1st Cir.1989)); see also Mejia-Orellana v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 13 , 16 (1st Cir.2007) (“We accord Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpretation.” (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 , 1…

We review fact-based determinations under a “substantial evidence” standard, which requires that we must affirm provided that the BIA’s decision is “supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 262 (1st Cir.2005) (quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 , 112 S.Ct. 812 , 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b)(4)(B).

Unfair treatment, without more, does not equate with persecution. 4 See, e.g., Orelien v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 67, 71 (1st Cir.2006); Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 264 (1st Cir.2005).

But “mistreatment must ordinarily entail more than sporadic abuse in order to constitute persecution.” Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 263 (1st Cir.2005).

See, e.g., Journal v. Keisler, 507 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir.2007) (no persecution where members of rival political party looked for applicant at his home and later hit applicant on the head and shoulders); Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 262-64 (1st Cir.2005) (no persecution where members of police beat applicant in two separate incidents and threatened him with death). *58 Moreover, Hussain’s experiences comprise two separate events that stemmed from a private dispute with a s…

See also Topalli v. *10 Gonzales, 417 F.3d 128, 132 (1st Cir.2005) (differentiating “systematic maltreatment that rose to the level of past persecution” from “isolated incidents”); Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 263 (1st Cir.2005) (“mistreatment ordinarily must entail more than sporadic abuse in order to constitute persecution”).

Economic Persecution The Immigration and Nationality Act does not define persecution, and we have said that the term “is a protean word, capable of many meanings.” Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 263 (1st Cir.2005).

Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 262 (1st Cir.2005).

Tota v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 161, 165 (1st Cir.2006) (noting that a withholding of removal claim “places a more stringent burden of proof on an alien than does a counterpart claim for asylum”) (quoting Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 262 (1st Cir.2005)).

Where, as here, a petitioner has failed to demonstrate past persecution, he must provide other evidence establishing his fear is “well-founded.” Velasquez v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 55, 58 (1st Cir.2003), abrogated on other grounds by Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 266 (1st Cir.2005).

While “mistreatment ordinarily must entail more than sporadic abuse in order to constitute persecution,” Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 263 (1st Cir.2005) (citation omitted), the mere fact that these events occurred over the course of four years does not automatically doom Sok’s claim.

See, e.g., Awad v. Gonzales, 463 F.3d 73, 76 (1st Cir.2006); Susanto, 439 F.3d at 57 ; Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 263-64 (1st Cir.2005); Nelson v. INS, 232 F.3d 258, 263-64 (1st Cir.2002).

Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 262 (1st Cir.2005).