Commonwealth v. Bohannon (1978)

But see also Commonwealth v. Fuller, 423 Mass. 216 , 229 n.10 (1996), noting that Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90 (1980), S.C., 385 Mass. 733 (1982), “did not involve a privileged record.” Also of importance to this issue is our conclusion concerning the relevance of the fact that Amy’s father had abused her.

If the matter is not collateral, extrinsic evidence may be introduced disputing the witness's testimony on direct or cross-examination." [6] See State v. Scott, 113 N.M. 525 , 828 P.2d 958, 963 (App.1991); State v. Cox, 298 Md. 173 , 468 A.2d 319, 323-24 (1983). [7] See Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90 , 378 N.E.2d 987, 991 (1978); Commonwealth v. Barresi, 46 Mass.App.Ct. 907 , 705 N.E.2d 639, 641 (1999); Commonwealth v. Nichols, 37 Mass.App.Ct. 332 , 639 N.E.2d 1088, …

Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90 , 378 N.E.2d 987, 991 (1978).

See Clinebell v. Commonwealth, 368 SE2d 263, 266 (Va. 1988); Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 378 NE2d 987, 990 (Mass. 1978); State v. Anderson, 686 P2d 193, 200 (Mont. 1984).

See Clinebell , 368 S.E.2d at 266 ("At least in the context of prosecutions of sexual offenses, evidentiary constraints must sometimes yield to a defendant's right of cross-examination. [cit.] Cross-examination is an absolute right guaranteed to a defendant by the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment and is fundamental to the truth-finding process."); Commonwealth v. Bohannon , 376 Mass. 90 , 378 N.E.2d 987 , 990-991 (1978) ("When evidence concerning a critical issue …

Miller, 105 Nev. at 501 , 779 P.2d at 89 . [46] Miller, 105 Nev. at 502 , 779 P.2d at 90 . [47] Efrain M., 107 Nev. at 950 , 823 P.2d at 265 . [48] See Stamps v. State, 107 Nev. 372, 377 , 812 P.2d 351, 354 (1991) (concluding that defendant's confrontation rights were violated because he was unable to introduce evidence of prior false allegations to corroborate his theory that the victim-witness's mother instigated the entire incident). [49] Brown v. State, 107 Nev. 164, 167…

See Commonwealth v. Fuller, 423 Mass. 216, 226 (1996); Commonwealth v. Sperrazza, 379 Mass. 166, 169 (1979); Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 94-96 (1978), S.C., 385 Mass. 733 (1982).

See, e. g., Pantazes v. State, 376 Md. 661 , 831 A.2d 432, 447 (2003); Morgan v. State, 54 P.3d 332, 333 (Alaska App.2002); State v. West, 95 Hawai'i 452 , 24 P.3d 648, 654 (2001); Lopez v. State, 18 S.W.3d 220, 226 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (refusing to adopt per se rule but looking at each case individually); State v. Walton, 715 N.E.2d 824, 828 (Ind.1999); State v. Smith, 743 So.2d 199, 202-03 (La.1999); State v. Johnson, 123 N.M. 640 , 944 P.2d 869, 878 (1997); People v. Grano…

Little v. State, 413 N.E.2d 639, 643 (Ind.Ct.App.1980); Cox v. State, 51 Md.App. 271 , 443 A.2d 607, 613 (1982) (recanted rape charges have "no relation to Ae chastity or any sexual misconduct of the [complainant]" so not within ambit of rape shield law); Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90 , 378 N.E.2d 987, 990-92 (1978) (proposed cross-examination concerning complainant's false rape allegations did not relate to her prior sexual activity or reputation for chastity so ra…

Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 92 (1978).

See Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation, 485 Mass. 641 , 651-652 (2020); Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 94 (1978), S.C., 385 Mass. 733 (1982). 9 juror violates this right.

One such exception allows admission of evidence of other accusations, when such accusations are "of the specific crime which is the subject of the trial" and might "seriously damage[] the complainant's credibility." Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 95 (1978), S.C., 385 Mass. 733 (1982).

Id. at 95 ("We . . . do not reach any issues related to the recently enacted 'rape-shield' statute").

App. 271, 281 , 443 A.2d 607 (1982) (“The challenged question, considered in the light of the proffer, had no relation to the chastity or any sexual misconduct of the witness.”), aff’d, 298 Md. 173 , 468 A.2d 319 (1983); Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 95 , 378 N.E.2d 987 (1978) (“[T]he proposed questions dealt with prior allegations of rape; they in no way sought to elicit a response concerning the complainant’s prior sexual activity or reputation for chastity.

But we have "chiseled a narrow exception" to this general rule, "recognizing that in special circumstances the interest of justice forbids strict application of the rule." LaVelle, supra, citing Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 94 (1978), S.C., 385 Mass. 733 (1982).11 In Bohannon, 376 Mass. at 94 , we declared, "[w]hen evidence concerning a critical issue is excluded and when that evidence might have had a significant impact on the result of the trial, the right to pr…

See Clinebell, 368 SE2d at 266 (“At least in the context of prosecutions of sexual offenses, evidentiary constraints must sometimes yield to a defendant’s right of cross-examination. [Cit.] Cross-examination is an absolute right guaranteed to a defendant by the confrontation 5 clause of the Sixth Amendment and is fundamental to the truth- finding process.”); Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 378 NE2d 987 , 990- 991 (Mass. 1978) (“When evidence concerning a critical issue is excluded…

We have “chiseled” a narrow exception to this rule where the denial of cross-examination would run counter to the interests of justice, see LaVelle, supra, at 151 , or would deprive the defendant of evidence that might have a significant impact on the outcome of the trial, Commonwealth v. Bohan-non, 376 Mass. 90, 92-93, 94 (1978), S.C., 385 Mass. 733 (1982) (prior false allegations of rape admissible to impeach victim again alleging rape).

“Evaluations of credibility are. . . within the exclusive province of the trier of fact.” Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 94 (1978), S.C., 385 Mass. 733 (1982).

“Evaluations of credibility are, of course, within the exclusive province of the trier of fact.” Commonwealth v. Ianello, 401 Mass. 197, 202 (1987), quoting from Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 94 (1978).

“Evaluations of credibility are, of course, within the exclusive province of the [jury].” Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 94 (1978).

That being so, no issue is raised as to the admissibility of the proffered evidence under the rubric of Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 95 (1978), S.C., 385 Mass. 733 (1982).

However, in Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 94 (1978), the court carved a narrow exception to the general rule to be applied in unusual fact situations where “the interest of justice forbids strict application of the rule.” Commonwealth v. LaVelle, supra. The court emphasized the narrowness of the exception to the general rule in Commonwealth v. LaVelle, supra. It stated: “We have applied this exception in only one case, Commonwealth v. Bohannon , where we allowed ev…

The defendant sought to introduce evidence that when her younger daughter was seven years old, she was overheard by a teacher telling another student that she was “having sex with [her] old boy friend.” Following an investigation by school officials, she stated that “she didn’t mean it” and “it was a joke.” Contrary to the defendant’s claim, the evidence is not admissible under the narrow exception of Commonwealth v. Bohan-non, 376 Mass. 90, 92-96 (1978), S.C., 385 Mass. 733…

This assertion falls far short of the showing required under Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 95 (1978).

See Davis, 415 U.S. at 320 , 94 S.Ct. at 1112 , 39 L.Ed.2d at 356 ; see also State v. Cox, 298 Md. 173 , 468 A.2d 319, 324-25 (1983) (holding it was reversible error to refuse cross-examination of the victim regarding prior false claims); Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90 , 378 N.E.2d 987, 990-91 (1978) (same).

On the other hand, in Commonwealth v. Scheffer, 43 Mass. App. Ct. at 399-400 , the five year old victim complained to her mother that the defendant had “stuck his finger in [her] peaches.” Prior to trial, defense counsel had knowledge of the victim’s past allegations that two male cousins had “stuck fingers in [her] private” and that her named uncle had “put his private in [her female cousin’s] private.” Based upon that knowledge, defense counsel brought a motion pursuant to…

The narrow exception to the longstanding rule that a prior false accusation of sexual assault is not admissible on the issue of credibility, see Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 93-94 (1978), does not apply to these facts.

The Commonwealth’s case rested almost entirely on the testimony of the complainant. “[T]he . . . evidence, if believed, might have had a significant impact. . . on the outcome of the trial.” Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 95 (1978), S.C., 385 Mass. 733 (1982).

“Evaluations of credibility are, of course, within the exclusive province of the trier of fact.” Commonwealth v. Ianello, 401 Mass. 197, 202 (1987), quoting Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 94 (1978).

See, e.g., State v. DeSantis, 155 Wis.2d 774 , 456 N.W.2d 600, 606-07 (1990) (requiting an “offer of proof’ from which the jury could reasonably conclude the statement was false); Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90 , 378 N.E.2d 987, 991 (1978) (requiring some “factual basis” of falsity); Clinebell, *460 368 S.E.2d at 266 (requiring a “reasonable probability of falsity”); Hughes v. Raines, 641 F.2d 790, 792 (9th Cir.1981) (requiring that it be “convincingly [shown] that t…

The defendant complains that counsel was constitutionally ineffective because he failed to utilize this information to pursue either a Bohannon argument (prior false allegation of rape), Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 92-96 (1978), S.C., 385 Mass. 733 (1982), or a Ruffen argument (precocious familiarity with sexual terminology prior to the alleged abuse by defendant), Commonwealth v. Ruffen, 399 Mass. 811, 815 (1987); Commonwealth v. Scheffer, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 398,…

Hughes v. Raines, 641 F.2d 790, 792-93 (9th Cir.1981) (excluding cross-examination of victim on alleged prior false accusation of rape because it amounted to a general credibility attack on the basis of an unrelated incident and there was no convincing proof that the accusation was false); Ex parte Loyd, 580 So.2d 1374, 1376 (Ala.1991) (holding that defendant could cross-examine victim about admittedly false pri- or charges and threats regarding sexual crimes because they we…

The State invites us to adopt the “demonstrably false” standard, but to construe it as meaning false “in fact.” See, e.g., State v. Hutchinson, 688 P.2d 209, 212-13 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); Com. v. Bohannon, 378 N.E.2d 987, 991 (Mass. 1978).

App. 1983) (holding that the defendant could cross-examine the victim about a prior accusation but that he would be bound by the victim’s answer); Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 378 N.E.2d 987, 991 (Mass. 1978) (holding that defendant should have been allowed to cross-examine victim about prior false accusation of rape because it might have damaged the victim’s credibility and the defendant proved in an offer of proof that the accusation was false); State v. Caswell, 320 N.W.2d 4…

Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 93 (1978) citing Miller v. Curtis, 158 Mass. 127, 131 (1893).

Such “[e]valuations of credibility are, of course, within the exclusive province of the trier of fact.” Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 94 (1978).

“Evaluations of credibility are, of course, within the exclusive province of the trier of fact.” Commonwealth v. Ianello, 401 Mass. 197, 202 (1987), quoting Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 94 (1978).

See Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 94 (1978) (“When evidence concerning a critical issue is excluded and when that evidence might have had a significant impact on the result of the trial, the right to present a full defense has been denied”).

See Miller v. State, 105 Nev. 497 , 779 P.2d 87, 89 (1989) and cases cited therein; Clinebell v. Commonwealth, 235 Va. 319 , 368 S.E.2d 263, 264 (1988) and cases cited therein; Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90 , 378 N.E.2d 987, 991 (1978).

See Commonwealth v. Ianello, 401 Mass. 197, 202 (1987); Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 94 (1978).

For example, a credible showing that a complainant previously had fabricated allegations of sexual assault, see Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 92-96 (1978), S.C., 385 Mass. 733 (1982), 10 or a showing of bias against the defendant, or credible information tending to suggest that the complainant has difficulty distinguishing fantasy from reality, might warrant in camera inspection of a complainant’s rape counselling records.

The defense position was that failure to prosecute was so indicative of the falsity of the complaints that the defense was entitled to inquire into them under the principle articulated in Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 93-95 (1978), S.C., 385 Mass. 733 (1982).

“Evaluations of credibility are, of course, within the exclusive province of the trier of fact.” Commonwealth v. Ianello, 401 Mass. 197, 202 (1987), quoting from Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 94 (1978).

The offer of proof on the issue consisted of a note written by the defendant during the trial stating that “she also said that someone named [G] raped her and that [M.P.] and [H.A.] raped her two [sic].” 12 The offer of proof was completely inadequate and was cor *18 rectly rejected by the judge. 13 See Commonwealth v. Lavelle, 414 Mass. 146, 151 (1993) (there must be basis in independent third-party records that witness made prior accusations); Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376…

“Evaluations of credibility are, of course, within the exclusive province of the trier of fact.” Commonwealth v. Ianello, 401 Mass. 197, 202 (1987), quoting from Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 94 (1978).

The judge balanced the complainant’s psychotherapist-patient privilege in favor of the defendant’s right to confrontation, and his ruling in respect to that privilege did not change; the defendant’s expert witness would be allowed to testify, on the basis of the psychiatric records but without reference to the prior rape, as to the complainant’s ability to perceive, to recollect, and whether she “has been out of touch with reality either through hallucinating or by hearing v…

The defendant’s reliance on Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 95 (1978), S.C., 385 Mass. 733 (1982), is misplaced for several reasons, not the least of which is Bohannon’s requirement that there be a factual basis for concluding that the victims or one of them had made the allegations and that the allegations were false.

Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 94 (1978), S.C., 385 Mass. 733 (1982), citing Miller v. Curtis, 158 Mass. 127, 131 (1893) (rule against introducing witness’s prior bad acts is not inflexible).

This is a case in which the right to a full defense was denied because excluded evidence “might have had a significant impact on the result of the trial. . . .” Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 94 (1978).

“When evidence concerning a critical issue is excluded and when the evidence might have had a significant impact on the result of the trial, the right to present a full defense has been denied.” Commonwealth v. Fayerweather, 406 Mass. 78, 84 (1989), quoting from Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 94 (1978).