Un v. Ashcroft (2005)

See id. at 210 ("[A]ssessing the credibility and significance of the evidence in the context of the entire record is a task for the IJ in the first instance.").

I thus cannot conclude that substantial evidence supports the IJ's and the BIA's rulings that the petitioners failed to meet their burden to show that, as adults, they were subject to harm severe enough to rise to the level of persecution.5 We have 5 As discussed supra at note 2, the BIA did issue a blanket ruling affirming the IJ's conclusion that the petitioners did not meet their burden to show that their past experiences rose to the - 28 - held that "threats of murder . …

Exhaustion of administrative remedies is statutorily mandated, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (d)(1), and is a jurisdictional requirement, see, e.g., Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 210 (1st Cir. 2005); Sousa v. INS, 226 F.3d 28 , 31-32 & n.3 (1st Cir. 2000).

Similarly, in Un v. Gonzales, the petitioner was twice confronted by government agents, who told him on the second occasion that he would be killed, and a friend subsequently told him to "go into hiding because they were 'looking to kill [the petitioner].'" 415 F.3d 205, 207-08 (1st Cir. 2005).

In the abstract, Thapaliya’s position seems sound, as we have held that credible, specific threats may rise to the level of persecution in some circumstances if they are severe enough, and “threats of murder fit squarely within this rubric.” Javed v. Holder, 715 F.3d 391, 395-96 (1st Cir.2013) (alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Amouri v. Holder, 572 F.3d 29, 33 (1st Cir.2009); Hincapie v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 213, 217 (1st Cir.2007); Un v. Gonzales, 4…

An agency must make findings “on all grounds necessary for decision.” Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 209 (1st Cir.2005).

We expect the BIA to address the IJ's "findings, implicitly if not explicitly, on all grounds necessary for decision." Escobar v. Garland, 122 F.4th 465 , 480 (1st Cir. 2024) (quoting Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 209 (1st Cir. 2005)).

Here, documents and testimony purporting to corroborate Khanal's political activities and the Maoists' threats of extortion and physical harm against him are undoubtedly relevant heard at the merits hearing, the IJ set forth the contents of Mr. Sharma and Mr. Bist's testimony but offered no analysis of this evidence in its findings of fact and conclusions of law. - 19 - to considerations of past persecution and a well-founded fear of future persecution -- particularly so whe…

Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 209 (1st Cir. 2005).

See Lim v. I.N.S., 224 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir. 2000) (“In certain extreme cases, we have held that repeated and especially menacing death threats can constitute a primary part of a past persecution claim, particularly where those threats are combined with confrontation or other mistreatment.”); Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 210 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[C]redible verbal death threats may fall within the meaning of ‘persecution.’” (emphasis added)); Japarkulova v. Holder, 615 F.3d 6…

Although the agency's findings "on all grounds that are necessary" to support its decision may be "either explicit or implicit," Rotinsulu v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 68, 73 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 209 (1st Cir. 2005)), we cannot infer that the agency here implicitly held that Paye's forced flight due to the genocidal killing and ethnic cleansing of Krahn people did not constitute past persecution.

"We have long held that 'credible, specific threats can amount to persecution if they are severe enough' -- particularly if they are death threats." Aguilar- Escoto v. Garland, 59 F.4th 510, 516 (1st Cir. 2023) (quoting Javed v. Holder, 715 F.3d 391, 395-96 (1st Cir. 2013)); see also Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 210 (1st Cir. 2005) ("[C]redible verbal death threats may fall within the meaning of 'persecution.'").

Javed v. Holder, 715 F.3d 391, 395-96 (1st Cir. 2013); see also Amouri v. Holder, 572 F.3d 29, 33 (1st Cir. 2009) ("[T]hreats of murder easily qualify as sufficiently severe harm."); Sok v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 48, 54 (1st Cir. 2008) ("[W]e have often acknowledged that credible threats can, depending on the circumstances, amount to persecution . . . ."); Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 210 (1st Cir. 2005) ("[C]redible verbal death threats - 8 - may fall within the meaning of 'per…

See Aguirre v. Holder, 728 F.3d 48, 55 (1st Cir. 2013); Jupiter v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 487, 490-91 (1st Cir. 2005); Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 210-11 (1st Cir. 2005); Kigozi v. Gonzales, No. 04-2090, 2005 WL 2170349 , at *1 (1st Cir. Sept. 8, 2005); cf. Singh v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 156 , 160 n.3 (1st Cir. 2005) (exercising jurisdiction over issues raised before the BIA and - 6 - affirmed without opinion).

Our case law is clear that "[w]hile the IJ need not address each and every piece of evidence put forth by a petitioner, he must at least 'make findings, implicitly if not explicitly, on all grounds necessary for decision.'" Sok v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 48, 54 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 209 (1st Cir. 2005)).

And "[w]hile the IJ need not address each and every piece of evidence put forth by a - 23 - petitioner, he must at least 'make findings, implicitly if not explicitly, on all grounds necessary for decision.'" Sok v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 48, 54 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 209 (1st Cir. 2005)).

Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 209-10 (1st Cir.2005) (remanding to agency for reconsideration of past persecution finding where petitioner presented evidence of one “explicit death threat with perhaps one or more implicit ones”); cf. Amouri v. Holder, 572 F.3d *47 29, 33 (1st Cir.2009) (observing that “threats of murder easily qualify as sufficiently severe harm” for purposes of persecution analysis).

Cf. Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 209-10 (1st Cir. 2005) (recognizing the possibility of “implicit” death threats and that those threats, taken in context with other hostile actions including more explicit threats, could support a finding of persecution).

Cf. Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 209-10 (1st Cir. 2005) (recognizing the possibility of "implicit" death threats and that those threats, taken in context with other hostile actions including more explicit threats, could support a finding of persecution).

Hincapie v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 213, 217 (1st Cir.2007); see also Ang v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 50, 56 (1st Cir.2005); Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 210 (1st Cir.2005).

And while “credible verbal death threats may fall within the meaning of ‘persecution,’ ” Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 210 (1st Cir.2005), this is only when the threats are “so menacing as to cause significant actual suffering or harm.” Bonilla, 539 F.3d at 77 (quoting Tabon-Marin v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 28, 32 (1st Cir.2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Persecution need not be physical, see Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 210 (1st Cir.2005), but economic extortion does not rise to the level of economic persecution unless it involves the “deliberate imposition of severe economic disadvantage or the deprivation of liberty, food, housing, employment, or other essentials of life,” Kadri v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 16 , 22 (1st Cir.2008) (quoting In re T-Z, 24 I & N. Dec. 163, 171 (BIA 2007)) (internal quotation mark omitted).

While “credible verbal death threats may fall within the meaning of ‘persecution,’” Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 210 (1st Cir.2005), the BIA was not required to conclude that this vague threat was persecution.

Nevertheless, “those findings can be either explicit or implicit.” Id. (citing Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 209 (1st Cir.2005)).

See, e.g., Ruiz v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir.2008) (“[T]he presence or absence of physical harm (and, indeed, the degree of harm inflicted) remains a relevant factor in determining whether mistreatment rises to the level of persecution.”); see also Sompotan, 533 F.3d at 71 (absence of physical harm “not determinative”); Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 210 (1st Cir.2005) (explaining that physical harm is not a prerequisite for a finding of persecution; in appropriate ci…

Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 209 (1st Cir.2005) (emphasis added) (holding that IJ’s failure to address past persecution argument was not harmless error). 6 Because “[w]e cannot say the evidence compels a conclusion either way,” the error cannot be regarded as harmless.

Where, as here, the petitioner fails to present an argument to the BIA, he has not exhausted his administrative remedies, see, e.g., Mejia-Rodriguez v. Holder, 558 F.3d 46, 50 (1st Cir.2009); Chhay v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2008); Sunoto v. Gonzales, 504 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir.2007); Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 210-11 (1st Cir.2005), and we lack jurisdiction to decide the issue.

Credible, imminent threats can rise to the level of persecution, Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 210 (1st Cir.2005), but the IJ could reasonably find that the threats, while undoubtedly frightening, were not sufficiently credible or imminent to rise to the level of persecution.

Although threats alone can sometimes support a finding of past persecution, see, e.g., Hincapie v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 213, 217 (1st Cir.2007), such cases generally involve repeated, specific threats against a petitioner on the basis of one of the protected grounds, see id. at 216-17 ; Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 209-10 (1st Cir.2005).

He “need not address each and every piece of evidence” adduced by the petitioner; he must, however, “at least make findings, implicitly if not explicitly, on all grounds necessary for decision.” Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 209 (1st Cir.2005) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

While the IJ need not address each and every piece of evidence put forth by a petitioner, he must at least “make findings, implicitly if not explicitly, on all grounds necessary for decision.” Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 209 (1st Cir.2005) (citing Gailius, 147 F.3d at 44 ).

See, e.g., Singh v. BIA, 435 F.3d 216, 219 (2d Cir.2006); Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 208-09 (1st Cir.2005); Qu v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir.2005).

In support of his petition, Essen renews the due process claim he made to the BIA, and also argues that the IJ erred by neglecting to consider whether he had demonstrated past persecution under the withholding of removal standard, as opposed to the asylum standard, cf. Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 209 (1st Cir.2005) (ruling that IJ erred by denying withholding of removal claim without making finding as to past persecution).

Because threats of murder would fit neatly under this carapace, see, e.g., Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 210 (1st Cir.2005); Andriasian v. INS, 180 F.3d 1033, 1042 (9th Cir.1999); Aguilar-Solis v. INS, 168 F.3d 565, 570 (1st Cir.1999), we assume, favorably to the petitioner, that she has met this prong of the test for persecution.

Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 210 (1st Cir.2005) (remanding for a determination of whether threats rising to the level of persecution were made). *8 Some argues that credibility should not even be an issue on appeal because the IJ did not make an explicit adverse credibility finding.

See Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 210 (1st Cir. 2005).

See Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 210 (1st Cir.2005).

See Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 209 (1st Cir.2005) (“[W]e expect an agency to make *273 findings, implicitly if not explicitly, on all grounds necessary for decision.”).

See, e.g., Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 210 (1st Cir.2005) (noting that threats alone could be enough to establish past persecution).

See Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 209 (1st Cir.2005); see also Choub v. Gonzales, 245 Fed.Appx. 618, 620 (9th Cir.2007) (discussing 2002 Country Report for Cambodia).

See Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 209 (1st Cir.2005).

Agency Consideration of Past Persecution In his last charge of legal error, Kho argues that his case must be remanded because the IJ failed to make an explicit finding regarding past persecution. 6 Under certain circumstances, the agency’s failure to address the issue of past persecution could result in depriving an asylum applicant of the “benefit of the regulatory presumption of fear of persecution based on prior events.” El Moraghy, 331 F.3d at 205 ; see also Un v. Gonzal…

See Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 210-11 (1st Cir.2005). 4 .

See Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 210 (1st Cir.2005); Haru-tyunyan v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 64, 65 (1st Cir.2005).

“If the [Bureau of Immigration Appeals] or the [immigration officer] has not ruled on an issue, either explicitly or implicitly, the respondent cannot ask us to uphold a decision on those grounds.” El Moraghy, 331 F.3d at 205 (citing Gailius, 147 F.3d at 44 ); accord Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 209 (1st Cir.2005) (“As we have made clear, we expect an agency to make findings, implicitly if not explicitly, on all grounds necessary for decision.”); see also Diab v. Ashcroft, …