Kandamar v. Gonzales (2006)

See Kandamar, 464 F.3d at 74 (“Certainly, there can be little doubt about DHS’s authority to inspect and photograph ... passport[s] and other documentation.”).

In Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 71-72 (1st Cir.2006), the First Circuit defined “egregious government conduct” as “government misconduct by threats, coercion or physical abuse.” Kandamar, a native and citizen of Morocco, entered the United States legally but overstayed his visa.

A due process claim requires that a "'cognizable liberty or property interest be at stake,'" Rivera v. Sessions, 903 F.3d 147 , 150–51 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 69 (1st Cir. 2006)), and none is present here.

The Second Circuit thus unanimously rejected the petitioners’ constitutional challenges and “join[ed] every circuit that ha[d] considered the issue in concluding that the Program [did] not violate Equal Protection guarantees.” Id.; see Malik v. Gonzales, 213 Fed.Appx. 173, 174-75 (4th Cir. 2007); Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 72-74 (1st Cir. 2006); Zafar v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 461 F.3d 1357, 1367 (11th Cir. 2006); Hadayat v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 659, 664-65 (7th Cir. 2006…

This court has noted that Lopez-Mendoza provides “only a ‘glimmer of hope of suppression.’ ” Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 70 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Navarro-Chalan v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 2004)).

We also need not spell out precisely how we would assess whether constitutional violations are “egregious.” Though we have previously noted some factors that we might find informative, see Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 71 (1st Cir.2006), we have not yet followed other circuits in establishing a particular test.

Nolasco-Gaspar also claims that the immigration officers violated his Fifth Amendment rights and 8 C.F.R. § 287.8 (c)(2)(vii) by using “threats, coercion or physical abuse.” See Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 71 (1st Cir.2006).

Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 69 (1st Cir.2006) (stating that voluntary *16 departure is a "privilege, not a right” and within the discretion of the IJ) (quoting Jupiter v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 487, 492 (1st Cir.2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 4 .

However, “[w]hen constitutional claims ‘involve procedural errors correctable by the BIA, applicants must raise such claims as part of their administrative appeal.’ ” Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 71 (1st Cir.2006) (quoting Capric v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1075, 1087 (7th Cir.2004)).

Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 71 (1st Cir.2006).

This is so because Congress has plenary power over immigration and naturalization, and may “permissibly set immigration criteria based on an alien’s nationality,” Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 72 (1st Cir.2006), even though such distinctions would be suspect if applied to American citizens.

In Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 71-72 (1st Cir. 2006), the First Circuit defined “egregious government con- duct” as “government misconduct by threats, coercion or physical abuse.” Kandamar, a native and citizen of Morocco, 3788 LOPEZ-RODRIGUEZ v. HOLDER entered the United States legally but overstayed his visa.

Kechichian, 585 F.3d at 22 (citing Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 71 (1st Cir.2006)).

Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 71 (1st Cir.2006).

Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491-92 , 119 S.Ct. 936 , 142 L.Ed.2d 940 (1999) (holding that consideration of terrorist links in deportation context is not sufficient to constitute selective deportation); Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 74 (1st Cir.2006) (similar).

See Zerrei v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 342, 348 (2d Cir. 2006) (“even if Zerrei could show that the NSEERS program . . . violated the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment, the fact would remain that Zerrei has overstayed his visa and has no right to remain in this country”); Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 74 (1st Cir. 2006) (“the decision to 12 Nos. 06-2932 & 06-3318 remove Petitioner was based on the fact that he had overstayed his visa, not based on his national…

See Zerrei v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 342, 348 (2d Cir.2006) (“even if Zerrei could show that the NSEERS program ... violated the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment, the fact would remain that Zerrei has overstayed his visa and has no right to remain in this country”); Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 74 (1st Cir.2006) (“the decision to remove Petitioner was based on the fact that he had overstayed his visa, not based on his national origin”); Ahmed v. Gonzales, …

See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050-51 , 104 S.Ct. 3479 , 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply in the immigration context, except when there are “egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or other liberties that might transgress notions of fundamental fairness and undermine the probative value of the evidence obtained”); Montero v. INS, 124 F.3d 381, 386 (2d Cir.1997) (“Beyond violations of the Fourth Amendment, it is clear from L…

Id. at 15 (citing Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 72 (1st Cir. 2006); Bruns v. Mayhew, 750 F.3d 61, 66 (1st Cir. 2014)).

Cir. 1979) (holding that “[d]istinctions based on nationality may be drawn in the immigration field” and “must be sustained” unless “wholly irrational”); Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 72 (1st Cir. 2006) (stating that “Congress may permissibly set immigration criteria based on an alien’s nationality or place of origin”); Bruns v. Mayhew, 750 F.3d 61, 66 (1st Cir. 2014) (holding that “[b]ecause Congress acts with plenary authority when it legislates the rights and benefit…

Indeed, the Supreme Court has “long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.” The political character of this intrinsically executive function renders it “subject only to narrow judicial review.” Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 72 (1st Cir.2006) (quoting Adams v. Baker, 909 F.2d 643, 647 (1st Cir.1990) (citations omitted)); see also INS v. …

See Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 71 (1st Cir.2006) (requiring "specific evidence of . . . government misconduct by threats, coercion, or physical abuse" to demonstrate egregiousness); Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 236 (2d Cir.2006) (" Lopez-Mendoza requires more than a violation to justify exclusion.

See Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 71 (1st Cir.2006).

See Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65 , 72–74 (1st Cir. 2006); Hadayat v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 659, 665 (7th Cir. 2006).

See Kandamar v. Gonzales , 464 F.3d 65 , 72-74 (1st Cir. 2006) ; Hadayat v. Gonzales , 458 F.3d 659 , 665 (7th Cir. 2006).

V ; see also Kandamar v. Gonzales , 464 F.3d 65 , 69 (1st Cir. 2006) (analyzing non-specific unfairness claim as due process claim).

In Yanez-Marquez , we applied Lopez-Mendoza to hold that "the exclusionary rule applies in removal proceedings to egregious violations of the Fourth Amendment." 789 F.3d at 450 (emphasis added); see also Kandamar v. Gonzales , 464 F.3d 65 , 70 (1st Cir. 2006) ; Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales , 461 F.3d 231 , 235 (2d Cir. 2006) ; Oliva-Ramos v. Att'y Gen. , 694 F.3d 259 , 274-75 (3d Cir. 2012) ; Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS , 22 F.3d 1441 , 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1994).

We have held repeatedly that the “privilege” of voluntary departure involves “no property interest” and “no cognizable liberty interest” because it is “essentially discretionary.” Jupiter v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 487, 492 (1st Cir. 2005); see also Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 69 (1st Cir. 2006).

See Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 71 (1st Cir.2006) (requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies); 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (d)(1) (same).

But “an alien must possess a valid, unexpired passport even if the passport is in the possession of the DHS.” Atmadja v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 322 Fed.Appx. 889, 890 (11th Cir.2009) (emphasis added); see also Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 69-70 (1st Cir.2006).

See Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 69 (1st Cir.2006) (“[T]he IJ succinctly explained that the lack of a passport or any other travel document precluded voluntary departure.

See Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 69 (1st Cir.2006) (“[T]he IJ succinctly explained that the lack of a passport or any other travel document precluded voluntary departure.

DaCosta, 449 F.3d at 50; see also Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 69 (1st Cir.2006) (applying DaCosta to a claim that a petitioner received an inadequate hearing). *42 MeCreath argues he was entitled to have the BIA remand to the IJ to consider in the first instance whether he fits within In re Magana.

See Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 71 (1st Cir. 2006) (requiring “specific evidence of . . . government misconduct by threats, coercion, or physical abuse” to demonstrate egregiousness); Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Lopez- Mendoza requires more than a violation to justify exclusion.

See Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 74 (1st Cir.2006) (holding that any error that occurred from allegedly unconstitutional seizure would be harmless in light of untainted evidence of petitioner's removability).

See Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 73-74 (1st Cir. 2006); Zafar v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 461 F.3d 1357, 1367 (11th Cir.2006); Ahmed v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 433, 439-40 (5th Cir.2006); Ali v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 678 , 681 n. 4 (5th Cir.2006); see also 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252 (g) (West 2005) (providing courts have no jurisdiction to review Government’s decision to “commence proceedings, adjudicate eases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter”).

See Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 73-74 (1st Cir.2006); Ahmed v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 433, 439-40 (5th Cir.2006); Ali v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 678 , 681 n. 4 (5th Cir.2006); Zafar v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 461 F.3d 1357, 1367 (11th Cir.2006).

Ramos , 321 F.Supp.3d at 1125-26 (citing Kwai Fun Wong v. U.S. , 373 F.3d 952 , 970 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Importantly, the AADC standard confining discrimination claims to 'outrageous' cases is limited to challenges to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, i.e. , the 'discretion to choose to deport one person rather than another.' "); see also Kandamar v. Gonzales , 464 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2006) (rejecting application of the AADC test for outrageous animus to a programmatic ch…