Commonwealth v. Gagnon (1982)

Id. 387 Mass, at 569-74, 441 N.E.2d 753 .

Finally, insofar as the meaning of “arising from separate incidences” in § 10G (c) is ambiguous, 24 the rule of lenity supports the interpretation we have adopted here: “Under the rule of lenity, ‘if we find that the statute is ambiguous or are unable to ascertain the intent of the Legislature, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of any rational doubt.’ Commonwealth v. Constantino, 443 Mass. 521, 524 (2005). ‘This principle applies to sentencing as well as substantive p…

Penal statutes must be strictly construed, but “this maxim is a guide for resolving ambiguity rather than a rigid requirement that we interpret each statute in the manner most favorable to defendants.” Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567, 569 (1982), quoting from Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 102-103 (1982).

See c. 90, § 24 (1) (e); Commonwealth v. Griffin, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 174, 186 (1985). 10 Section 24G (a) was enacted by St. 1982, c. 373, § 9, with a minor modification by St. 1982, § 376, § 1. 11 The defendant did not make such an objection at the time of sentencing, or move on such a ground for postconviction relief under Mass.R.Crim.P. 30(a), 378 Mass. 900 (1979). 12 Quoted from Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567, 568 (1982), where the sentencing provisions of the parti…

To that end, the court “shall indulge every rational presumption in favor of the statute’s validity.” Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567, 569 (1982).

Common *160 wealth v. Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567, 569 (1982).

L. c. 94C, § 32(a) (as in effect prior to 1982), declared unconstitutional in Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567, 574 (1982), the statute applied to Dupree contains no internal inconsistencies.

Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567 ,-, 441 N.E.2d 753, 755 (1982) (statute prohibiting distribution of heroin held unconstitutionally vague in that its penalty clause comprehended two inconsistent penalty schemes).

We have applied the rule of lenity “to sentencing as well as substantive provisions.” Richardson, supra at 254 , quoting Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567, 569 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983).

“This principle applies to sentencing as well as substantive provisions.” Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567, 569 (1982).

See State v. Thompson, 197 Conn. 67 , 495 A.2d 1054, 1061 (1985); Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567 , 441 N.E.2d 753, 755 (1982); Duquette v. Warden, New Hampshire State Prison, 154 N.H. 737 , 919 A.2d 767, 773 (2007); State v. Manzie, 168 N.J. 113 , 773 A.2d 659, 661 (2001); State v. Egbert, 748 P.2d 558, 559 (Utah 1987); Nowack v. State, 774 P.2d 561, 564 (Wyo.1989).

See State v. Thompson, 495 A.2d 1054, 1061 (Conn. 1985); Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 441 N.E.2d 753, 755 (Mass. 1982); Duquette v. Warden, New Hampshire State Prison, 919 A.2d 767, 773 (N.H. 2007); State v. Manzie, 773 A.2d 659, 661 (N.J. 2001); State v. Egbert, 748 P.2d 558, 559 (Utah 1987); Nowack v. State, 774 P.2d 561, 564 (Wyo. 1989).

Contrast, Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567, 569 (1982).

Commonwealth v. Wotan , 422 Mass, at 742-743, citing Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567, 569 (1982), cert, denied, 461 U.S. 921 and 464 U.S. 815 (1983).

Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567, 573 (1982).

Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567, 569 (1982), cert, denied, 461 U.S. 921 (1983).

In Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567 , 441 N.E.2d 753 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 , 104 S.Ct. 70 , 78 L.Ed.2d 84 (1983), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court struck down as unconstitutionally vague a statute providing for punishment “by a term of imprisonment ... or by a fine ... or both.” The statute further provided that “[a]ny person convicted of violating this subdivision shall be punished by a mandatory minimum one year term of imprisonment.” Gagnon , 387…

However, “[w]e may look to outside sources to determine the meaning of a statute whose language is unclear.” Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567, 569 (1982).

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567 , 441 N.E.2d 753 (1982); Sheriff of Middlesex County v. Commissioner of Correction, 383 Mass. 631 , 421 N.E.2d 75 (1981).

See Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567 , 569–574 (1982).

See Commonwealth v. Chavis, 415 Mass. 703, 707-708 (1993), quoting Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567, 569 (1982), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983), quoting Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 102-103 (1982) (rule of lenity “is a guide for resolving ambiguity, rather than a rigid requirement that we interpret each statute in the manner most favorable to defendants”).

See Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567 , S.C., 387 Mass. 768 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 921 and 424 U.S. 815 (1983) (drug control statute that contained contradictory sentencing provisions held unconstitutionally vague).

See also The Columbia Encyclopedia 1706 (6th ed. 2000) (“machine . . . arrangement of moving and stationary mechanical parts used to perform some useful work”) (emphasis added). 10 More significantly in favor of Carter’s position is the well-established rule of lenity consisting of interrelated principles mandating that “criminal statutes are to be construed narrowly,” Commonwealth v. Kerr, 409 Mass. 284, 286 (1991), and “strictly against the Commonwealth,” Commonwealth v. W…

See Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567, 569 , S.C., 387 Mass. 768 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 921 and 464 U.S. 815 (1983) (any reasonable doubt as to the meaning of a criminal statute must be resolved in favor of a defendant and against the finding of a criminal violation). “[T]he mere fact of agency is not enough to impose criminal liability on the master.” Commonwealth v. Beneficial Fin.

Compare Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567 (1982) (striking down drug control statute because penalty provisions were facially inconsistent and legislative history was inconclusive).

See Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1985) (conflicting penalty provisions).

See Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567, 569 , modified on other grounds, 387 Mass. 768 (1982); Commonwealth v. Clinton, 374 Mass. 719, 721 (1978).

See Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567, 569 (1982).

See Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567, 569 (1982), citing United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979), and United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483 (1948) . . . .” Id. at 155.

See Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567, 569 (1982), citing United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979), and United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483 (1948).

See Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567, 569 , modified on other grounds, 387 Mass. 768 (1982), cert, denied, 461 U.S. 911 and 464 U.S. 815 (1983); Commonwealth v. Connolly, 394 Mass. at 174 .

See Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567, 569 (1982).

See Commonwealth v. Gagnon (I), 387 Mass. 567 (1982). 1 The Commonwealth concedes that this conviction must be vacated insofar as the indictment charges a violation of G.

See Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567, 573-574 (1982); Commonwealth v. Marrone, 387 Mass. 702 , 704 & n.4 (1982).

See Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567, 573-574 (1982); Commonwealth v. Marrone, 387 Mass. 702 , 704 & n. 4 (1982).

See Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567, 574 (1982).