Milner v. Department of the Navy (2011)

These exemptions are “explicitly exclusive, and must be narrowly construed in light of FOIA’s dominant objective of disclosure, not secrecy.” Maricopa, 108 F.3d at 1085 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added); see Milner, 131 S.Ct. at 1265-66 (emphasizing that FOIA strongly favors openness and “broad disclosure” with narrowly construed exceptions).

See Milner v. Department of the Navy, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 1259, 1265 , 179 L.Ed.2d 268 (2011) (FOIA strongly favors openness and “ ‘broad disclosure’ ” with narrowly construed exemptions).

J. 2, Dkt. 28. 4 on the agency to justify the withholding of any requested documents.’” Id. at 713 (quotation omitted); see also Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 , 565 (2011) (“These exemptions . . . must be ‘narrowly construed.’” (quotation omitted)).

These statutory exemptions “must be narrowly construed.” Lion Raisins, 354 F.3d at 1079 (quoting John Doe Agency, 493 U.S. at 152 , 110 S.Ct. 471 ); see also Milner, 131 S.Ct. at 1265-66 (FOIA strongly favors openness and “broad disclosure” with narrowly construed exceptions).

But cf. Milner v. Dep't of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 , 572 (2011) ("We will not take the opposite tack of allowing ambiguous legislative history to muddy clear statutory language.").

See Milner v. Department of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 , 572, 131 S.Ct. 1259 , 179 L.Ed.2d 268 (2011) ("Those of us who make use of legislative history believe that clear evidence of congressional intent may illuminate ambiguous text.

See Milner v. Department of Navy, 562 U. S. 562 , 574 (2011) (“When pre- sented, on the one hand, with clear statutory language and, on the other, with dueling committee reports, we must choose the language”).

See Milner v. 1 See also 33 U. S. C. § 447 (imposing penalties on “[e]very person who . . . gives any sum of money or other bribe, present, or reward . . . to any . . . employee of the offce of any supervisor of a harbor with intent to infuence such . . . employee to permit or overlook any violation of the provisions of this subchapter”). 28 SNYDER v. UNITED STATES Jackson, J., dissenting Department of Navy, 562 U. S. 562 , 574 (2011) (“When pre- sented, on the one hand, wit…

As always, our inquiry into the meaning of the statute’s text ceases when ‘the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.’ ” (quoting Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 , 122 S.Ct. 941 , 151 L.Ed.2d 908 (2002))); Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 562 U.S. 562 , 572, 131 S.Ct. 1259 , 179 L.Ed.2d 268 (2011) (“Those of us who make use of legislative history believe that clear evidence of congressional intent may illuminate ambi…

See Milner v. Dept. of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 , 572, 131 S.Ct. 1259 , 179 L.Ed.2d 268 (2011) (“Those of us who make use of legislative history believe that clear evidence of congressional intent may illuminate ambiguous [statutory] text.”); United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 436 , 129 S.Ct. 1079 , 172 L.Ed.2d 816 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (concluding that where the statutory text “is ambiguous, the structure [of the statute] leans in the defendant’s favor, the purpos…

Cir. 2012) ); see also Milner v. Dep't of Navy , 562 U.S. 562 , 572, 131 S.Ct. 1259 , 179 L.Ed.2d 268 (2011) ("Those of us who make use of legislative history believe that clear evidence of congressional intent may illuminate ambiguous text.").

Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 , 572, 131 S.Ct. 1259 , 179 L.Ed.2d 268 (2011) (“Those of us who make use of legislative history believe that clear evidence of congressional intent may illuminate ambiguous text.”); see also Goldings v. Winn, 383 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir.2004) (“[I]f the statute’s legislative history reveals an unequivocal answer as to the statute’s meaning, we do not look to the [agency’s] interpretation.... ”). 1.

Comm’n, 446 U.S. 680, 697 (1980); see Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 , 572 (2011) (“We will not . . . allow[] ambiguous legislative history to muddy clear statutory language.”).

Est. of Arrington v. Michael, 738 F.3d 599, 605 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 , 574 (2011) (“Legislative history, for those who take it into account, is meant to clear up ambiguity, not create it.”).

Bank of N. Mia., 502 F.2d 535, 540 (5th Cir. 1974); see Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 , 574 (2011) (“Legislative history, for those who take it into account, is meant to clear up ambiguity, not create it.”). 15 Case: 23-40671 Document: 135-1 Page: 16 Date Filed: 02/04/2025 No. 23-40671 “Where, as here, the language of a provision is sufficiently clear in its context . . . , there is no occasion to examine the additional considerations of ‘policy’ that may have influe…

Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 , 574 (2011) (“Legisla- tive history, for those who take it into account, is meant to clear up ambiguity, not create it.”).

Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 , 574 (2011) (“Legisla- tive history, for those who take it into account, is meant to clear up ambiguity, not create it.”).

See Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 , 574 (2011) (“Legislative history, for those who take it into account, is meant to clear up ambiguity, not create it.”); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (“The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”).4 “[B]efore concluding that a rule is genuinely ambiguo…

Although such consultation is unnecessary where the statutory language is clear, see Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 562 U.S. 562 , 574 (2011) (“Legislative history, for those who take it into account, is meant to clear up ambiguity, not create it.”), the legislative history here categorically contradicts Plaintiffs’ view.

Cf. Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 562 U.S. 562 , 572 Case: 21-2102 Document: 38 Page: 23 Filed: 02/24/2022 ALARM.COM INCORPORATED v. HIRSHFELD 23 (2011) (“We will not . . . allow[] ambiguous legislative his- tory to muddy clear statutory language.”).

Cf. Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 562 U.S. 562 , 572 Case: 21-2102 Document: 38 Page: 23 Filed: 02/24/2022 ALARM.COM INCORPORATED v. HIRSHFELD 23 (2011) (“We will not . . . allow[] ambiguous legislative his- tory to muddy clear statutory language.”).

See Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (“In surveying legislative history we have repeatedly stated that the authoritative source for finding the Legislature’s intent lies in the Committee Re- ports on the bill, which ‘represen[t] the considered and col- lective understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and studying proposed legislation.’ We have es- chewed reliance on the passing comments of one Member.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)…

Case: 18-1400 Document: 97 Page: 21 Filed: 03/18/2020 FACEBOOK, INC. v. WINDY CITY INNOVATIONS, LLC 21 ports on the bill, which ‘represen[t] the considered and col- lective understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and studying proposed legislation.’ We have es- chewed reliance on the passing comments of one Member.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969))); Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 , 572 (2011…

See id. at 1273 (“Congress’ decision to use different language to trigger Exemption 7 confirms that the concept of ‘law enforcement purposes’ sweeps in activities beyond [subparagraph (E)’s] investigation and prosecution.”) If “techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions” is given its natural meaning, it cannot encompass the protective measures discussed in SOP 303.

See Schiller v. N.L.R.B., 964 F.2d 1205, 1209 (D.C.Cir.1992) abrogated on other grounds by Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 , 131 S.Ct. 1259 , 179 L.Ed.2d 268 (2011) (“FOIA litigants are entitled to assume that the agency’s Vaughn index is accurate in every detail.

See Milner, 131 S.Ct. at 1267 (“Legislative history, for those who take it into account, is meant to clear up ambiguity, not create it”).

FOIA FOIA “generally provides that the public has a right of access, enforceable in court, to federal agency records, subject to nine specific exemptions.” Anderson v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., 907 F.2d 936 , 941 (10th Cir. 1990); see also Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 , 564 (2011) (“(FOIA) requires federal agencies to make Government records available to the public, subject to nine exemptions for specific categories of material.”).

Among other provisions, FOIA requires “each agency” to respond to appropriate requests and “make the [requested] records promptly available to any person.” 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(3)(A); see also Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 , 565, 131 S.Ct. 1259 , 179 L.Ed.2d 268 (2011) (“FOIA thus mandates that an agency disclose records on request, unless they fall within one of nine exemptions.”).

See Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 , 565, 131 S.Ct. 1259 , 179 L.Ed.2d 268 (2011) (“Congress enacted FOIA to overhaul the public-disclosure section of the Administrative procedures Act ... [which had] gradually become more ‘a withholding statute than a disclosure statute.’”) (quoting EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 , 93 S.Ct. 827 , 35 L.Ed.2d 119 (1973)).

Milner v. Department of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 572 , 131 S.Ct. 1259 , 179 L.Ed.2d 268 (2011) (“Those of us who make.use of legislative history believe that clear evidence of congressional intent may illuminate ambiguous text.

Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 , 572 (2011) (“Those of us who make use of legislative history believe that clear evidence of congressional intent may illuminate ambiguous text.

FOIA FOIA “generally provides that the public has a right of access, enforceable in court, to federal agency records, subject to nine specific exemptions.” Anderson v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., 907 F.2d 936 , 941 (10th Cir. 1990); see also Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 , 564 (2011) (“(FOIA) requires federal agencies to make Government records available to the public, subject to nine exemptions for specific categories of material.”).

The Court does not interpret “instructive” to mean that the UCMJ may be used to create ambiguity in the text where none existed before And legislative history, per the Supreme Court’s practice, may only be used to clarify ambiguous language, not to cast doubt on the meaning of otherwise clear language Milner v. Dep ’t of the Navy, 562 U.S. 562 , 572 (2011) (“Those of us who make use of legislative history believe that clear evidence of congressional intent may illuminate amb…

As he wrote, that limitation specifically was requested by “those who wish to seek review of decisions relating to public lands, such as the awarding of oil and gas leases . . . .” DAG White Ltr., 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 12 See, e.g., Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 , 572 (2011) (“Legislative history has no bearing unless text remains ambiguous.”). 2784, 2789 (emphasis added).

As he wrote, that limitation specifically was requested by “those who wish to seek review of decisions relating to public lands, such as the awarding of oil and gas leases . . . .” DAG White Ltr., 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 12 See, e.g., Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 , 572 (2011) (“Legislative history has no bearing unless text remains ambiguous.”). 2784, 2789 (emphasis added).

See Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 , 574 (2011) (“Legislative history, for those who take it into account, is meant to clear up ambiguity, not create it.”).9 4.

Rather, the agency must demonstrate that it had “any colorable or reasonable basis for not 13 disclosing the material until after [plaintiff] filed suit.” Id.; see also Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 , 565 (2011) (“FOIA . . . mandates that an agency disclose records on request, unless they fall within one of nine exemptions.”).

See Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, 590 U.S. __ , 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1749 (2020) (“Of course some Members of this Court have consulted legislative history when interpreting ambiguous statutory language.”); Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 , 574 (2011) (“Legislative history, for those who take it into account, is meant to clear up ambiguity, not create it.”). consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies.” Pub.

See Massey v. F.B.L, 3 F.3d 620, 624 (2d Cir. 1993), abrogated by Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 (2011) (“[IJndividuals, including government employees and officials, have privacy interests in the dissemination of their names.”).

Cir. 2019) (“[W]hen the statutory text is clear, legislative history should not be used to muddy its meaning.”); Milner, 562 U.S. at 574 (“Legislative history, for those who take it into account, is meant to clear up ambiguity, not create it.”).

See, e.g., Milner v, Dep’t of the Navy, 562 U.S. 562 , 572 (2011) (“Those of us who make use of legislative history believe that clear evidence of congressional intent may illuminate ambiguous text.”).

See Exxon Mobil Corp v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (“Extrinsic materials have a role in statutory interpretation only to the extent they shed a reliable light on the enacting Legislature’s understanding of otherwise ambiguous terms.”); see, e.g., Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 562 U.S. 562 , 574 (2011) (“Legislative history, for those who take it into account, is meant to clear up ambiguity, not create it.”); Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 242 (2…

See id. at 942-93; see also Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 , 572 (2011) (“When presented, on the one hand, with clear statutory language and, on the other, with dueling committee reports, we must choose the language.”) Next Defendant argues that the Executive Branch and other courts have understood the FVRA to include a “spring-back” provision.

Cir. 1992), abrogated by Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 (2011) (“FOIA litigation is not immune from our open, adversary process . . . .

See Milner v. Dep’t. of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 , 572 (2011) (“[C]lear evidence of congressional intent may illuminate ambiguous text.”).

Miner v. Dep’t. of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 , 572 (2011) (“[C]lear evidence of congressional intent may illuminate ambiguous text.”).

Cir. 2012)); see also Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 , 572 (2011) (“Those of us who make use of legislative history believe that clear evidence of congressional intent may illuminate ambiguous text.”).

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005); see Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 , 572 (2011) (“We will 122 Permitting Part-Time Employees to Work Regularly Scheduled Weeks of 33 to 39 Hours not . . . allow[] ambiguous legislative history to muddy clear statutory language.”). 5.

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005); see Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 , 572 (2011) (“We will not . . . allow[] ambiguous legislative history to muddy clear statutory language.”). 5.

See Milner v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, 575 F.3d 959, 965 (9th Cir.2009), overruled by Milner, 131 S.Ct. 1259 (2011). .