Commonwealth v. O'CONNOR (1990)

See O’Connor, 407 Mass. at 668 (“an in loco parentis relationship does not arise merely because someone in a position of stepparent has taken a child into his or her home and cares for the child”).

"The mistaken admission of hearsay evidence, if merely cumulative of another witness's testimony, does not constitute reversible error." Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 407 Mass. 663, 670 (1990).

Commonwealth v. O’Connor, 407 Mass. 663, 668 (1990).

A judge's decision to restrict cross-examination is "not subject to reversal unless the defendant can show he was prejudiced by too narrow a restriction in his cross-examination rights." Commonwealth v. Syrafos, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 211 , 219 5 (1995), quoting Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 407 Mass. 663, 672 (1990). 2.

Even if those statements were inadmissible hearsay, however, "[t]he mistaken admission of hearsay evidence, if merely cumulative of another witness's testimony, does not constitute reversible error." Commonwealth v. Dunn, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 89, 94 (2002), quoting Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 407 Mass. 663, 670 (1990).

See Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 407 Mass. 663, 670 (1990) ("mistaken admission of hearsay evidence, if merely cumulative of another witness's testimony, does not constitute reversible error"). 3.

The instruction tracked the language of instruction 5.11 of the Massachusetts Superior Court Criminal Practice Jury Instruction (2013), and the language of Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 407 Mass. 663, 667 (1990), an earlier 3 case in which the court makes reference to the defense.

See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 445 Mass. 1003, 1004 (2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 924 (2006) (observing that court has “not addressed the issue [of the parental privilege defense] one way or the other,” and determining that defendant’s request for jury instruction on that defense “[would] be best addressed on remand”); Commonwealth v. Torres, 442 Mass. 554 , 568 n.11 (2004) (rejecting defendant’s contention that trial judge erred in failing to give instruction regarding par…

“The necessity, extent, and character of supplemental instructions in response to a jury request are matters within a trial judge’s discretion.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 429 Mass. 745,753 (1999), quoting from Commonwealth v. O’Connor, 407 Mass. 663, 667 (1990).

In any event, “[t]he mistaken admission of hearsay evidence, if merely cumulative of another witness’s testimony, does not constitute reversible error,” Commonwealth v. O’Connor, 407 Mass. 663, 670 (1990), and it follows that it clearly does not establish the existence of a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. 2.

It has long been our rule that the “necessity, extent, and character of supplemental instructions in response to a jury request are matters within a trial judge’s discretion.” Commonwealth v. O’Connor, 407 Mass. 663, 667 (1990), citing Commonwealth v. King, 366 Mass. 6, 10 (1974), cert. denied sub nom.

“Generally, ‘[t]he mistaken admission of hearsay evidence, if merely cumulative of another witness’s testimony, does not constitute reversible error.’ ” Commonwealth v. Dunn, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 89, 94 (2002), quot ing from Commonwealth v. O’Connor, 407 Mass. 663, 670 (1990).

Generally, “[t]he mistaken admission of hearsay evidence, if merely cumulative of another witness’s testimony, does not constitute reversible error.” Commonwealth v. O’Connor, 407 Mass. 663, 670 (1990).

In that regard, he claims that he cannot be viewed as acting in loco parentis to Phillip within the principles set out in Commonwealth v. O’Connor, 407 Mass. 663, 668 (1990) (“[t]he key factors to a threshold showing of in loco parentis status are the intent to take over the position of parent, and the discharge of support and maintenance responsibilities toward the child”), cannot be held responsible merely because of his association with Phillip’s parents, and cannot be he…

Contrast Commonwealth v. O’Connor, 407 Mass. 663, 670 (1990).

See Commonwealth v. O’Connor, 407 Mass. 663, 670 (1990) (“The mistaken admission of hearsay evidence, if merely cumulative of another witness’s testimony, does not constitute reversible error”). 3.

While the defendant suggests in his brief on appeal that the judge “explicitly stated that the severity of the defendant’s sentence was based on his belief that the jury’s verdict was erroneous,” the judge in fact stated, “I deeply respect the verdict of the jury.” Just as in Commonwealth v. O’Connor, 407 Mass. 663, 674 (1990), “the judge’s remark was merely a restatement of the principle that the factors he considers in making a decision on sentencing are wholly distinct fr…

“The necessity, extent, and character of supplemental instructions in response to a jury request are matters within a trial judge’s discretion.” Commonwealth v. O’Connor, 407 Mass. 663, 667 (1990), citing Commonwealth v. King, 366 Mass. 6, 10 (1974), cert. denied sub nom.

Commonwealth v. O’Connor, 407 Mass. 663, 674 (1990).

The judge was not required to repeat that instruction in response to the jury’s request for a further instruction regarding the elements of malice.' “The necessity, extent, and character of supplemental instructions in response to a jury request are matters within a trial judge’s discretion.” Commonwealth v. O’Connor, 407 Mass. 663, 667 (1990).

Commonwealth v. O’Connor, 407 Mass. 663, 672 (1990).

L. c. 233, § 21B. “[T]he scope and contours of cross-examination are within the judge’s sound discretion, and ... he or she may limit ‘to what extent the accuracy, veracity, and credibility of a witness may be tested.’ ” Commonwealth v. O’Connor, 407 Mass. 663, 672 (1990), quoting from Commonwealth v. Repoza, 382 Mass. 119, 125 (1980).

Commonwealth v. O’Connor, 407 Mass. 663, 667 (1990).

Commonwealth v. O’Connor, 407 Mass. 663, 672 (1990)(“[a] defendant is entitled as a matter of right to a reasonable cross-examination of a witness in order to show bias and prejudice”).

Ry., 6 Mass. App. Ct. 553, 556 (1978); Commonwealth v. O’Connor, 407 Mass. 663, 670 (1990).

See Commonwealth v. O’Connor, 407 Mass. 663, 668-669 (1990).

See Commonwealth v. O’Connor, 407 Mass. 663, 670 (1990); Commonwealth v. Dunn, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 89, 94-95 (2002).

See O’Connor, 555 N.E.2d at 868-69 (explaining that the lack of a permanent living arrangement between an adult claiming in loco parentis status and the child makes proof of the intent to replace a natural parent, which, in any event, is “never to be lightly inferred,” even more difficult).

See Commonwealth v. Connor, 407 Mass. 663, 670 (1990).

See Commonwealth v. O’Connor, 407 Mass. 663, 667-668 (1990).

See Commonwealth v. O’Connor, 407 Mass. 663, 670 (1990).

See Commonwealth v. O’Connor, 407 Mass. 663, 672 (1990).