ITT Telecom Products Corp. v. Dooley (1989)

E.g., Wentland v. Wass, 126 Cal.App.4th 1484 , 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 109 , 113—16 (2005); ITT Telecom Products Corp. v. Dooley, 214 Cal.App.3d 307 , 262 Cal.Rptr. 773, 779-81 (1989).

(See ITT Telecom Products Corp. v. Dooley (1989) 214 Cal. App.3d 307, 314-317, & fn. 7 [ 262 Cal. Rptr. 773 ] [private commercial arbitration]; Wallin v. Vienna Sausage Manufacturing Co. (1984) 156 Cal. App.3d 1051 , 1056 & fn. 5 [ 203 Cal. Rptr. 375 ] [labor arbitration].) A leading treatise on California law provides further indication that the Ribas decision generally has been understood in just this fashion.

Since they have no stake in the case and cannot be paid more than a nominal fee for testifying, they would be highly reluctant to testify if the 10 See, e.g., Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co., 5 Cal. App. 4th 392, 405 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that the privilege protects adverse witnesses from suit by opposing parties); Darragh v. Superior Court In and For County of Maricopa, 900 P.2d 1215, 1217 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (concluding that expert’s appraisals and testi…

The surviving entity becomes subject to all of the former entity’s debts and liabilities as if the surviving entity had incurred them itself. 10 Section 3-114 also provides that “[t]he assets of each . . . limited liability company . . . transfer to, vest in, and devolve on the successor without further act or deed.” (§ 3-114(e)(1), italics added.) Maryland Corporations and Associations Code section 1-101(d) provides: “ ‘Assets’ means any tangible, intangible, real, or perso…

(See Stacy & Witbeck, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1, 6-8 [litigation privilege did not apply to False Claims Act claim which contained contract elements]; ITT Telecom Products Corp. v. Dooley (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 307, 319-320 [privilege barred tort but not contract claims for breach of confidentiality agreement during litigation].) 6

(Wentland v. Wara (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1490-1494 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 109 ]; Paul v. Friedman (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 853, 869 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 82 ]; ITT Telecom Products Corp. v. Dooley (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 307, 317-320 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 773 ].) We therefore conclude that the County’s disclosures were not statutorily privileged. * See footnote, ante, page 516.

Code, § 3426.10 [operative date of act]; ITT Telecom Products Corp. v. Dooley (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 307, 321, fn. 11 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 773 ].) Civil Code section 3426.2, subdivision (a) provides: “Actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined.” Based on the unambiguous words of the statute, we reject Hospital Group’s argument that California law does not permit injunctive relief to be based on threatened misappropriation of trade secrets. *524 It is well established th…

As such, “trade secrets have been recognized as a constitutionally protected intangible property interest.” (ITT Telecom Products Corp. v. Dooley (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 307, 318 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 773 ].) By creating a limited property right in information, trade secret law “acts as an incentive for investment in innovation.” (Prior Restraints and Intellectual Property, supra, 12 Fordham Intell.

(ITT Telecom Products Corp. v. Dooley (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 307, 320, 319 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 773 ] [defendant was not privileged under Civ.

Although the statutory privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), is often called “absolute,” the courts have nonetheless held that it does not preclude liability for malpractice in a lawsuit against a negligent expert witness by the party who hired the witness (Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 392, 402-406 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 781 ]); liability for breach of contract based upon an employee-witness’s wrongful disclosure of trade secrets (ITT…

Although the statutory privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), is often called "absolute," the courts have nonetheless held that it does not preclude liability for malpractice in a lawsuit against a negligent expert witness by the party who hired the witness ( Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1992) 5 Cal. App.4th 392, 402-406 [ 6 Cal. Rptr.2d 781 ]); liability for breach of contract based upon an employee-witness's wrongful disclosure of trade secrets (…

(See Ribas v. Clark (1985) 38 Cal.3d 355, 365 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 143 , 696 P.2d 637 , 49 A.L.R.4th 417 ] [tort claim for invasion of privacy barred by litigation privilege]; ITT Telecom Products Corp v. Dooley (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 307, 317, 323 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 773 ] [tort claim for disclosure of trade secrets barred by litigation privilege].) 2 Westinghouse does not allege the suits it was forced to defend lacked merit; nor does it allege a cause of action for malicious prosec…

(Fuhrman v. California Satellite Systems (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 408 421-422 [ 231 Cal.Rptr. 113 ], overruled on other grounds in Silberg v. Anderson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 219 ; Herzog v. “A” Company, Inc. (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 656, 661-662 [ 188 Cal.Rptr. 155 ]; Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 764, 773, 777 [ 234 Cal.Rptr. 653 ]; see Rubin v. Green (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1187, 1194-1195 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 828 , 847 P.2d 1044 ]; ITT Telecom Products Corp.…

(ITT Telecom Products Corp. v. Dooley (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 307, 311 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 773 ].) Since a motion for summary judgment raises only questions of law regarding the construction and effect of the supporting and opposing papers, this court reviews them independently.

(ITT Telecom Products Corp. v. Dooley (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 307, 311 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 773 ].) Crown Motors’s prime contention is the city council did not include a proper declaration of facts as required by Government Code section 36937, subdivision (b), for the ordinance to take effect immediately.

(ITT Telecom Products Corp. v. Dooley (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 307, 311 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 773 ].) 2.

(ITT Telecom Products Corp. v. Dooley (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 307, 311 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 773 ].) B.

(ITT Telecom Products Corp. v. Dooley (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 307, 316 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 773 ] [§ 47(2) applies to non-witness expert consultants to litigants].) We conclude that where, as here, the insurer provides a defense for a party, the realities of the insurer’s role in the litigation dictate that the insurer be treated as an authorized participant in judicial proceedings for purposes of section 47(2).

See ITT Telecom, Products Corp. v. Dooley, 214 Cal.App.3d 307, 319 , 262 Cal.Rptr. 773 (1989).

(Doc. 296) at 15 (citing Wentland v. Wass, 126 Cal. App. 4th 1484, 1494 (2005)); see also ITT Telecom Products Corp. v. Dooley, 214 Cal. App. 3d 307 (1989) (holding the litigation privilege does not apply to statements in breach of an express contract of confidentiality or nondisclosure).