State v. Sangster (1980)

See, e.g., Sanford, 814 N.W.2d at 616 (noting vehicle clearly met the first prong and thus the pivotal issue of the case turned on the second prong); State v. Sylvester, 331 N.W.2d 130, 131-32 (Iowa 1983) (applying two-prong test to delivery truck); State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 663 (Iowa 1980) (holding evidence was sufficient when garage was used to store automobile).

State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 664 (Iowa 1980).

The supreme court has discussed the elements of each offense in State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 664 (Iowa 1980) where it determined that criminal trespass was a lesser included offense of burglary.

State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 663 (Iowa 1980).

See, e.g., Sanford, 814 N.W.2d at 616 (noting vehicle clearly met the first prong and thus the pivotal issue of the case turned on the second prong); State v. Sylvester, 331 N.W.2d 130 , 131–32 (Iowa 1983) (applying two-prong test to delivery truck); State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 663 (Iowa 1980) (holding evidence was sufficient when garage was used to store automobile).

See, e.g., Sanford, 814 N.W.2d at 616 (noting vehicle clearly met the first prong and thus the pivotal issue of the case turned on the second prong); State v. Sylvester, 331 N.W.2d 130 , 131–32 (Iowa 1983) (applying two-prong test to delivery truck); State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 663 (Iowa 1980) (holding evidence was sufficient when garage was used to store automobile).

State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 663 (Iowa 1980).

State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 663 (Iowa 1980); State v. Furnald, 263 N.W.2d 751, 752 (Iowa 1978).

See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 328 N.W.2d 918, 920 (Iowa 1983) (where court found “ample evidence” of assault, trial court erred in refusing to submit assault as lesser included offense in robbery case); State v. Wales, 325 N.W.2d 87, 89 (Iowa 1982) (where burglary was alleged to have been committed in either of two ways, only one of which included criminal trespass as a lesser included offense, and evidence was sufficient to support a finding on either alternative, defendant …

The Supreme Court of Iowa, in State v. Sangster, Iowa, 299 N.W.2d 661, 663-664 (1980), framed the test as follows: "The elements of an offense are determined by the statute defining it rather than by the charge or the evidence. [Citation.] When the statute defines an offense alternatively, the relevant definition is the one for the offense involved in the particular prosecution. [Citations.] "When the elements of the major offense are identified, the next inquiry is whether …

State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 663 (Iowa 1980).

Id. at 663 (“The lesser offense is necessarily included in the greater offense if it is impossible to commit the greater without also committing the lesser.”).

State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 663 (Iowa 1980).

State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 662-63 (Iowa 1980).

Principles for making this determination were reviewed and reiterated recently in State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 663-64 (Iowa 1980).

The unchallenged jury instructions only required the jury to find that Archer entered or attempted to enter the designated occupied structures “with the specific intent to commit a theft.” See State v. Schiebout, 944 N.W.2d 666 , 671 (Iowa 2020) (“Jury instructions, when not objected to, become the law of the case for purposes of appellate review for sufficiency-of-evidence claims.”); see also Iowa Code § 713.1 (defining burglary); State v. Ernst, 954 N.W.2d 50 , 56 (Iowa 20…

One can reasonably infer an intent to commit theft “from the evidence of surreptitious entry and other circumstances.” Id. at 55 (quoting State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 663 (Iowa 1980)).

We first note that intent to commit theft can “reasonably be inferred from the evidence of surreptitious entry and other circumstances.” State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 663 (Iowa 1980); see also State v. Oetken, 613 N.W.2d 679, 686 (Iowa 2000) (en banc) (“An intent to commit theft may be inferred from an actual breaking and entering of a building which contains things of value.”); State v. Erving, 346 N.W.2d 833, 836 (Iowa 1984) (“[E]xperience teaches that, in the great m…

We first note that intent to commit theft can “reasonably be inferred from the evidence of surreptitious entry and other circumstances.” State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 663 (Iowa 1980); see also State v. Oetken, 613 N.W.2d 679, 686 (Iowa 2000) (en banc) (“An intent to commit theft may be inferred from an actual breaking and entering of a building which contains things of value.”); State v. Erving, 346 N.W.2d 833, 836 (Iowa 1984) (“[E]xperience teaches that, in the great m…

See Iowa Code § 702.12 (defining “occupied structure”); 713.1 (establishing “occupied structure” as element of burglary); State v. Rooney, 862 N.W.2d 367, 376 (Iowa 2015) (setting forth two-prong test for “occupied structure” requiring “place” and “purpose”); State v. Oetken, 613 N.W.2d 679, 686 (Iowa 2000) (“An intent to commit theft may be inferred from an actual breaking and entering of a building which contains things of value.”); State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 663 (…

This means that the pivotal issue in this case is whether the second prong of the definition found in section 702.12 has been satisfied”); State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 663 (Iowa 1980) (holding evidence was sufficient where garage was used to store automobile); State v. Sylvester, 331 N.W.2d 130 (Iowa 1983) (applying two-pronged test to delivery truck); Burns, 80 N.W. at 545 - 46 (applying two-prong test to a “building, to wit, a printing office” and holding evidence su…

An offense meets the legal test if “ ‘[t]he lesser offense [is] composed solely of some but not all elements of the greater crime.’” State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 663 (Iowa 1980) (quoting State v. Furnald, 263 N.W.2d 751, 752 (Iowa 1978)).

An offense meets the legal test if “ ‘[t]he lesser offense [is] composed solely of some but not all elements of the greater crime.’ ” State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 663 (Iowa 1980) (quoting State v. Furnald, 263 N.W.2d 751, 752 (Iowa 1978)).

State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 663 (Iowa 1980).

State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 663 (Iowa 1980); State v. Clay, 213 N.W.2d 473, 480 (Iowa 1973).

See State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 663 (Iowa 1980) (“When the statute defines an offense alternatively, the relevant definition is the one for the offense involved in the particular prosecution.”).

Id. at 835 (citing State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 663 (Iowa 1980)).

State v. Lampman, 345 N.W.2d 142, 143 (Iowa 1984); State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 663 (Iowa 1980).

State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 663 (Iowa 1980).

Newman, 313 N.W.2d at 486 (quoting State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 662-63 (Iowa 1980)).

See State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 663 (Iowa 1980) (“The elements of an offense are determined by the statute defining it_”); Lever Brothers Co. v. Erbe, 249 Iowa 454, 468 , 87 N.W.2d 469, 478 (1958) (“It is axiomatic that statutes creating and defining crimes cannot be extended by intendment.”).

State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 663 (Iowa 1980).

State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 663 (Iowa 1980); see Iowa R.Crim.P. 6(3), 21(3).

Initially, we note that it is settled that simple trespass is a lesser and included offense of burglary when burglary is alleged and proved in its entry alternative, State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 664 (Iowa 1980), or when it is submitted in both the breaking and entry alternative.

State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 663 (Iowa 1980).

State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 663 (Iowa 1981).

In State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 663 (Iowa 1980), we reiterated our adherence to the two-prong test for deciding if one offense is included within another: The standards for determining when an offense is included in another are the same now as when [State v. Furnald, 263 N.W.2d 751 (Iowa 1978)] was decided.

State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 663 (Iowa 1980).

See Webb, 313 N.W.2d at 552 ; State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 663-64 (Iowa 1980).

A recent example is State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 663-64 (Iowa 1980).

State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 663 (Iowa 1980); State v. Hochmuth, 256 Iowa 442, 446-48 , 127 N.W.2d 658, 659-60 (1964).

The elements of a burglary charge under section 713.1, The Code, were discussed in State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 662 (Iowa 1980), and that discussion need not be repeated here.

See Sangster, 299 N.W.2d at 663 ; State v. Furnald, 263 N.W.2d 751, 752 (Iowa 1978).

See State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 663 (Iowa 1980) (noting the “defendant’s intent to commit theft could reasonably be inferred from the evidence of surreptitious entry and other circumstances”).

(Iowa 1981). 12 public.”13 See State v. Waller, 450 N.W.2d 864, 866 (Iowa 1990) (explaining criminal trespass element of entry upon property of another “corresponds to entry into an occupied structure not open to the public”); see also State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 664 (Iowa 1980) (holding “absence of authority is a common element in the two offenses”).

See State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 663 (Iowa 1980) (affirming defendant’s conviction for burglary where defendant surreptitiously entered private garage).

See, e.g., State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 662-63 (Iowa 1980) (affirming defendant’s conviction where the defendant surreptitiously entered a private garage, stole no items, and his shoes matched the wet shoeprints on the garage floor); State v. Curry, No. 10-2009, 2013 WL 988794 , at *1-2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2013) (affirming burglary conviction where the defendant broke into the structure and was found hiding nearby despite the absence of evidence anything was taken …

See State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 664 (Iowa 1980) (holding that criminal trespass is a lesser-included offense of second-degree burglary); see also Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 , 52 S.Ct. 180, 182 , 76 L.Ed. 306, 309 (1932) (stating that the elements of two offenses are compared in order to determine whether they are separate offenses).

See also State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661 (Iowa 1980).