In Re Blodgett (1994)

But see id. at 920 & n. 6 (Wahl, J., dissenting) (“It is troubling that since the Minnesota statute went into effect in 1939, it has been arbitrarily and inconsistently enforced despite the limiting construction in Pearson.”).

In In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 916 (Minn. 1994), that court held, “[s]o long as civil commitment is programmed to provide treatment and periodic review, due process is provided.

As an illustration he cites In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn. 1994) (PP Act requires a “volitional dysfunction which grossly impairs judgment and behavior with respect to the sex drive.”).

As an illustration he cites In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn.1994) (PP Act requires a “volitional dysfunction which grossly impairs judgment and behavior with respect to the sex drive.”).

In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 914-16 (Minn.) (en banc), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 146 , 130 L.Ed.2d 86 (1994).

Cf. Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 916 (“[E]ven when treatment is problematic, and it often is, the state’s interest in the safety of others is no less legitimate and compelling.

See Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18b(a)(3) (employing the language “as a result ”) (emphasis added); Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 914-16 (finding the psychopathic personality statute, which is not predicated on a lack of criminal responsibility, is constitutional).

In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 916-17 (Minn.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 849 , 115 S.Ct. 146 , 130 L.Ed.2d 86 (1994).

Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979); Linehan III, 557 N.W.2d at 181; In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 916 (Minn.1994).

“The psychopathic personality statute identifies a volitional dysfunction which grossly impairs judgment and behavior with respect to the sex drive.” In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn.1994), pet. for cert. filed (U.S. June 9, 1994) (No. 93-9493).

“The psychopathic personality statute identifies a volitional dysfunction which grossly impairs judgment and behavior with respect to the sex drive.” In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 146 , 130 L.Ed.2d 86 (1994).

History of the SPP and SDP Acts The current civil commitment statutes for SPP and SDP are the product of a delicate balancing between the “legitimate public concern over the danger posed by predatory sex offenders” and the fundamental right of those persons committed to live their lives “free of physical restraint by the state.” In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 912, 914 (Minn.1994).

In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn.1994), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 146 , — L.Ed.2d — (1994).

See, e.g., Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80 , 112 S.Ct. 1780 (“Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action.”) (internal citation omitted); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361 , 103 S.Ct. 3043 , 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983) (“[C]ommitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”) (internal citation omitted); see also Cooper v.…

P. 15 (“The court may admit all relevant, reliable evidence ... without requiring foundation witnesses.”); Linehan III, 557 N.W.2d at 178, 189 (stating the district court used a “mul-ti-factor analysis” including statistics and “other factors it believed were sound indicators of future conduct,” and concluding the court did not err in “considering] evidence not specifically listed in Linehan I ”); In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn.1994) (noting that district court co…

See Minn.Stat. § 253B.03, subd. 7 (2010) (declaring that a committed individual has “the right to receive proper care and treatment, best adapted, according to contemporary professional standards, to rendering further supervision unnecessary”); In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 916 (Minn.1994) (stating that “[s]o long as civil commitment is programmed to provide treatment and periodic review, due process is provided”).

Morrow v. LaFleur, 590 N.W.2d 787, 796 (Minn.1999); In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 914 (Minn.1994).

We held in In re Blodgett that a person is committed as a psychopathic personality when he or she both needs treatment for an identifiable sexual disorder, as defined by the statute and by this court’s decision in Pearson, and poses a danger to the public. 510 N.W.2d 910, 914-15 (Minn.), cert. denied, U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 146 , 130 L.Ed.2d 86 (1994).

The supreme court has further defined this as "an identifiable and documentable *375 violent sexually deviant condition or disorder." Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 915 (footnote omitted).

We are not convinced. [¶13] Courts have held that “[s]o long as civil commitment is programmed to provide treatment and periodic review, due process is provided.” In re Moen, 837 N.W.2d 40, 48 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 916 (Minn. 1994)).

In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 921 (Minn.1994); see, e.g., State v. Guminga, 395 N.W.2d 344, 345-46 (Minn.1986) (conducting a substantive-due-process analysis of a statute involving intrusion, on personal liberty); State v. Tibbetts, 281 N.W.2d 499, 501 (Minn.1979) (discussing the high stakes of loss of liberty upon criminal conviction).

If so, “the state must show that its action serves a compelling government interest.” Id. (citing In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 914 (Minn.1994)).

In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn. 1994).1 Here, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to commit him as an SPP because the evidence was insufficient to commit him as an SDP and the standard to commit as an SDP is higher.

In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn. 1994).

In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 916 (Minn. 1994).

In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn. 1994).

As the Task Force noted, the "opportunity for periodic review of the need for continued confinement and commitment is critical to upholding civil commitment in light of a due process challenge,” (Task Force Report at 14) (citing In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 916 (Minn.1994).) The ultimate resolution of this claim, of course, will depend on a full presentation of all the evidence at the trial on the merits. .

The supreme court has recognized that the viability of such a claim may depend on the adequacy of treatment provided by the MSOP: “So long as civil commitment is programmed to provide treatment and periodic review, due process is provided.” See In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 916 (Minn.1994).

See Minn.Stat. § 253B.19, subd. 2(d); In re Blodgett 510 N.W.2d 910, 917 (Minn.1994) (noting that in “a proceeding where a committed person is seeking a discharge from commitment ... the burden of proof should be on the state to show by clear and convincing evidence that commitment should continue”).

Safety, 727 N.W.2d 410, 416-17 (Minn.2007) (holding that the “state has a compelling interest” in protecting “the citizens of Minnesota” from those who “pose a severe threat to the[ir] health and safety” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 924 (Minn.1994) (finding that the State has a “compelling interest in protecting the public from violent sexual assaults”); State v. Hershber-ger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 399 (Minn.1990) (finding…

Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 75-76 , 112 S.Ct. 1780, 1783 , 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 , 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1809 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979); In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 916 (Minn.1994).

Under the pre-1994 statutory framework, this court held that the burden was on the petitioner seeking a discharge or transfer to show that he or she is entitled to discharge and that “the state’s interest in the health and safety of the public and mentally ill and dangerous patients is adequately served by a preponderance of the evidence burden.” Drewes v. Levine, 352 N.W.2d 456, 458 (Minn.App.1984). 1 But in 1994, the Minnesota Supreme Court, after upholding the constitutio…

See Linehan III, 557 N.W.2d at 181 (using strict scrutiny to evaluate substantive-due-process claim); Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 914 (same).

We have previously recognized that the government has a compelling interest in the “protection of members of the public from persons who have an uncontrollable impulse to sexually assault.” In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 914 (Minn.1994).

Indeed, the Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that there is a compelling governmental interest in “the protection of members of the public from persons who have an uncontrollable impulse to sexually assault.” In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 914 (Minn.1994); cf. Jones, 729 N.W.2d at 15 (Anderson, J., concurring) (concluding that the state’s interest in tracking the whereabouts of convicted kidnappers on *241 Indian reservations and in protecting potential kidnapping victims …

In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn.1994).

While excluding “mere sexual promiscuity,” and “other forms of sexual delinquency,” a psychopathic personality “is an identifiable and documentable violent sexually deviant condition or disorder.” In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn.1994) (footnotes omitted).

Id. at 915 (footnotes omitted).

In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 917 (Minn.1994).

This difference in the nature of the prisoners’ offenses is an adequate basis upon which to conclude that sexually violent predators and other violent offenders are not similarly situated and may be treated differently without violating the Equal Protection Clause. *549 See In re Hay, 263 Kan. 822 , 953 P.2d 666, 675 (1998) (rejecting equal protection challenge to similar statute, holding that “there exist clear distinctions between this class [of sexually violent predators]…

See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77-80 , 112 S.Ct. 1780, 1784-85 , 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992); O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 580 , 95 S.Ct. 2486, 2496 , 45 L.Ed.2d 396 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring); In re Linehan, 594 N.W.2d 867, 872 (Minn.), cert. denied , — U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 587 , 145 L.Ed.2d 488 (1999); In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 914 (Minn.1994).

In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 914 (Minn.1994).

In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 917 (Minn.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 146 , 130 L.Ed.2d 86 (1994); see In re Harhut, 385 N.W.2d 305, 312-13 (Minn.1986) (holding that at hearing on judicial review under Minn. Stat. § 253B.17 (1984) of indeterminate commitment as mentally retarded, burden of proof is on state to avoid serious due process concerns).

See In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 916 (Minn. 1994) (stating that: “[i]t also seems somewhat incongruous that a sexual offender should be able to prove he is untreatable by refusing treatment”).

And the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that it has "never held that the Constitution prevents a State from civilly detaining those for whom no treatment is available, but who nevertheless pose a danger to others." Kansas v. Hendricks , 521 U.S. 346 , 366, 117 S.Ct. 2072 , 2084, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997) ; see Call , 535 N.W.2d at 318 (stating that "[i]n [ In re Blodgett , 510 N.W.2d 910 , 916 (Minn. 1994) ] , we rejected the argument that a psychopathic personality condition is …

See In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn.1994).

See In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 917 (Minn.1994) (rejecting equal protection challenge to a similar statute, noting that there are “genuine and substantial distinctions” between the sexual predator and other criminals because “the sexual predator poses a danger that is unlike any other”); see also Martin v. People, 27 P.3d 846, 862 (Colo.2001) (recognizing “the legislature’s continuing desire to set sex offenders apart from other offenders”); Friesen, 45 P.3d at 785 (conc…

See In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 917 (Minn. 1994) (rejecting equal protection challenge to a similar statute, noting that there are “genuine and 11 substantial distinctions” between the sexual predator and other criminals because “the sexual predator poses a danger that is unlike any other”); see also Martin v. People, 27 P.3d 846, 862 (Colo. 2001) (recognizing “the legislature’s continuing desire to set sex offenders apart from other offenders”); Friesen, 45 P.3d at 785 …

See In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn.1994) (considering frequency and similarity of incidents to determine whether party should be committed as SPP).

See In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 916 (Minn.1994) (holding sexual predator’s confinement did not violate due process even though treatment was “problematic”).